new file mode 100644
@@ -0,0 +1,476 @@
+(modified to not remove ssh_packet_read_expect() and to add to
+KexAlgorithms in sshd.c and sshconnect2.c as this version pre-dates
+kex_proposal_populate_entries())
+
+Backport of:
+
+From 1edb00c58f8a6875fad6a497aa2bacf37f9e6cd5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon, 18 Dec 2023 14:45:17 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] upstream: implement "strict key exchange" in ssh and sshd
+
+This adds a protocol extension to improve the integrity of the SSH
+transport protocol, particular in and around the initial key exchange
+(KEX) phase.
+
+Full details of the extension are in the PROTOCOL file.
+
+with markus@
+
+OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2a66ac962f0a630d7945fee54004ed9e9c439f14
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [import from ubuntu https://git.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/openssh/tree/debian/patches/CVE-2023-48795.patch?h=ubuntu/jammy-security
+Upstream commit https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/1edb00c58f8a6875fad6a497aa2bacf37f9e6cd5]
+CVE: CVE-2023-48795
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ PROTOCOL | 26 +++++++++++++++++
+ kex.c | 72 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
+ kex.h | 1 +
+ packet.c | 78 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
+ sshconnect2.c | 14 +++------
+ sshd.c | 7 +++--
+ 6 files changed, 142 insertions(+), 56 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/PROTOCOL b/PROTOCOL
+index e6a7d60..971f01e 100644
+--- a/PROTOCOL
++++ b/PROTOCOL
+@@ -102,6 +102,32 @@ OpenSSH supports the use of ECDH in Curve25519 for key exchange as
+ described at:
+ http://git.libssh.org/users/aris/libssh.git/plain/doc/curve25519-sha256@libssh.org.txt?h=curve25519
+
++1.9 transport: strict key exchange extension
++
++OpenSSH supports a number of transport-layer hardening measures under
++a "strict KEX" feature. This feature is signalled similarly to the
++RFC8308 ext-info feature: by including a additional algorithm in the
++initiial SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT kex_algorithms field. The client may append
++"kex-strict-c-v00@openssh.com" to its kex_algorithms and the server
++may append "kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com". These pseudo-algorithms
++are only valid in the initial SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT and MUST be ignored
++if they are present in subsequent SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT packets.
++
++When an endpoint that supports this extension observes this algorithm
++name in a peer's KEXINIT packet, it MUST make the following changes to
++the the protocol:
++
++a) During initial KEX, terminate the connection if any unexpected or
++ out-of-sequence packet is received. This includes terminating the
++ connection if the first packet received is not SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT.
++ Unexpected packets for the purpose of strict KEX include messages
++ that are otherwise valid at any time during the connection such as
++ SSH2_MSG_DEBUG and SSH2_MSG_IGNORE.
++b) After sending or receiving a SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS message, reset the
++ packet sequence number to zero. This behaviour persists for the
++ duration of the connection (i.e. not just the first
++ SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS).
++
+ 2. Connection protocol changes
+
+ 2.1. connection: Channel write close extension "eow@openssh.com"
+diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c
+index 0bcd27d..e7b2d4d 100644
+--- a/kex.c
++++ b/kex.c
+@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@
+ #include "digest.h"
+
+ /* prototype */
+-static int kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *);
++static int kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *, uint32_t seq);
+ static int kex_input_newkeys(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+
+ static const char * const proposal_names[PROPOSAL_MAX] = {
+@@ -175,6 +175,18 @@ kex_names_valid(const char *names)
+ return 1;
+ }
+
++/* returns non-zero if proposal contains any algorithm from algs */
++static int
++has_any_alg(const char *proposal, const char *algs)
++{
++ char *cp;
++
++ if ((cp = match_list(proposal, algs, NULL)) == NULL)
++ return 0;
++ free(cp);
++ return 1;
++}
++
+ /*
+ * Concatenate algorithm names, avoiding duplicates in the process.
+ * Caller must free returned string.
+@@ -182,7 +194,7 @@ kex_names_valid(const char *names)
+ char *
+ kex_names_cat(const char *a, const char *b)
+ {
+- char *ret = NULL, *tmp = NULL, *cp, *p, *m;
++ char *ret = NULL, *tmp = NULL, *cp, *p;
+ size_t len;
+
+ if (a == NULL || *a == '\0')
+@@ -199,10 +211,8 @@ kex_names_cat(const char *a, const char *b)
+ }
+ strlcpy(ret, a, len);
+ for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0'; (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
+- if ((m = match_list(ret, p, NULL)) != NULL) {
+- free(m);
++ if (has_any_alg(ret, p))
+ continue; /* Algorithm already present */
+- }
+ if (strlcat(ret, ",", len) >= len ||
+ strlcat(ret, p, len) >= len) {
+ free(tmp);
+@@ -410,7 +420,12 @@ kex_protocol_error(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+ {
+ int r;
+
+- error("kex protocol error: type %d seq %u", type, seq);
++ /* If in strict mode, any unexpected message is an error */
++ if ((ssh->kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) && ssh->kex->kex_strict) {
++ ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "strict KEX violation: "
++ "unexpected packet type %u (seqnr %u)", type, seq);
++ }
++ error_f("type %u seq %u", type, seq);
+ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, seq)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+@@ -485,6 +500,11 @@ kex_input_ext_info(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, &kex_protocol_error);
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &ninfo)) != 0)
+ return r;
++ if (ninfo >= 1024) {
++ error("SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO with too many entries, expected "
++ "<=1024, received %u", ninfo);
++ return dispatch_protocol_error(type, seq, ssh);
++ }
+ for (i = 0; i < ninfo; i++) {
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &name, NULL)) != 0)
+ return r;
+@@ -600,7 +620,7 @@ kex_input_kexinit(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+ error_f("no kex");
+ return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ }
+- ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, NULL);
++ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, &kex_protocol_error);
+ ptr = sshpkt_ptr(ssh, &dlen);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put(kex->peer, ptr, dlen)) != 0)
+ return r;
+@@ -636,7 +656,7 @@ kex_input_kexinit(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+ if (!(kex->flags & KEX_INIT_SENT))
+ if ((r = kex_send_kexinit(ssh)) != 0)
+ return r;
+- if ((r = kex_choose_conf(ssh)) != 0)
++ if ((r = kex_choose_conf(ssh, seq)) != 0)
+ return r;
+
+ if (kex->kex_type < KEX_MAX && kex->kex[kex->kex_type] != NULL)
+@@ -900,20 +920,14 @@ proposals_match(char *my[PROPOSAL_MAX], char *peer[PROPOSAL_MAX])
+ return (1);
+ }
+
+-/* returns non-zero if proposal contains any algorithm from algs */
+ static int
+-has_any_alg(const char *proposal, const char *algs)
++kexalgs_contains(char **peer, const char *ext)
+ {
+- char *cp;
+-
+- if ((cp = match_list(proposal, algs, NULL)) == NULL)
+- return 0;
+- free(cp);
+- return 1;
++ return has_any_alg(peer[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], ext);
+ }
+
+ static int
+-kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh)
++kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh, uint32_t seq)
+ {
+ struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
+ struct newkeys *newkeys;
+@@ -938,13 +952,23 @@ kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh)
+ sprop=peer;
+ }
+
+- /* Check whether client supports ext_info_c */
+- if (kex->server && (kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL)) {
+- char *ext;
+-
+- ext = match_list("ext-info-c", peer[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], NULL);
+- kex->ext_info_c = (ext != NULL);
+- free(ext);
++ /* Check whether peer supports ext_info/kex_strict */
++ if ((kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) != 0) {
++ if (kex->server) {
++ kex->ext_info_c = kexalgs_contains(peer, "ext-info-c");
++ kex->kex_strict = kexalgs_contains(peer,
++ "kex-strict-c-v00@openssh.com");
++ } else {
++ kex->kex_strict = kexalgs_contains(peer,
++ "kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com");
++ }
++ if (kex->kex_strict) {
++ debug3_f("will use strict KEX ordering");
++ if (seq != 0)
++ ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh,
++ "strict KEX violation: "
++ "KEXINIT was not the first packet");
++ }
+ }
+
+ /* Check whether client supports rsa-sha2 algorithms */
+diff --git a/kex.h b/kex.h
+index c353295..d97323e 100644
+--- a/kex.h
++++ b/kex.h
+@@ -148,6 +148,7 @@ struct kex {
+ u_int kex_type;
+ char *server_sig_algs;
+ int ext_info_c;
++ int kex_strict;
+ struct sshbuf *my;
+ struct sshbuf *peer;
+ struct sshbuf *client_version;
+diff --git a/packet.c b/packet.c
+index bde6c10..28f3729 100644
+--- a/packet.c
++++ b/packet.c
+@@ -1205,8 +1205,13 @@ ssh_packet_send2_wrapped(struct ssh *ssh)
+ sshbuf_dump(state->output, stderr);
+ #endif
+ /* increment sequence number for outgoing packets */
+- if (++state->p_send.seqnr == 0)
++ if (++state->p_send.seqnr == 0) {
++ if ((ssh->kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) != 0) {
++ ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "outgoing sequence number "
++ "wrapped during initial key exchange");
++ }
+ logit("outgoing seqnr wraps around");
++ }
+ if (++state->p_send.packets == 0)
+ if (!(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY))
+ return SSH_ERR_NEED_REKEY;
+@@ -1214,6 +1219,11 @@ ssh_packet_send2_wrapped(struct ssh *ssh)
+ state->p_send.bytes += len;
+ sshbuf_reset(state->outgoing_packet);
+
++ if (type == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS && ssh->kex->kex_strict) {
++ debug_f("resetting send seqnr %u", state->p_send.seqnr);
++ state->p_send.seqnr = 0;
++ }
++
+ if (type == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS)
+ r = ssh_set_newkeys(ssh, MODE_OUT);
+ else if (type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS && state->server_side)
+@@ -1342,8 +1352,7 @@ ssh_packet_read_seqnr(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
+ /* Stay in the loop until we have received a complete packet. */
+ for (;;) {
+ /* Try to read a packet from the buffer. */
+- r = ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(ssh, typep, seqnr_p);
+- if (r != 0)
++ if ((r = ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(ssh, typep, seqnr_p)) != 0)
+ break;
+ /* If we got a packet, return it. */
+ if (*typep != SSH_MSG_NONE)
+@@ -1627,10 +1636,16 @@ ssh_packet_read_poll2(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
+ if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->input, mac->mac_len)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ }
++
+ if (seqnr_p != NULL)
+ *seqnr_p = state->p_read.seqnr;
+- if (++state->p_read.seqnr == 0)
++ if (++state->p_read.seqnr == 0) {
++ if ((ssh->kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) != 0) {
++ ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "incoming sequence number "
++ "wrapped during initial key exchange");
++ }
+ logit("incoming seqnr wraps around");
++ }
+ if (++state->p_read.packets == 0)
+ if (!(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY))
+ return SSH_ERR_NEED_REKEY;
+@@ -1696,6 +1711,10 @@ ssh_packet_read_poll2(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
+ #endif
+ /* reset for next packet */
+ state->packlen = 0;
++ if (*typep == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS && ssh->kex->kex_strict) {
++ debug_f("resetting read seqnr %u", state->p_read.seqnr);
++ state->p_read.seqnr = 0;
++ }
+
+ if ((r = ssh_packet_check_rekey(ssh)) != 0)
+ return r;
+@@ -1716,10 +1735,39 @@ ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
+ r = ssh_packet_read_poll2(ssh, typep, seqnr_p);
+ if (r != 0)
+ return r;
+- if (*typep) {
+- state->keep_alive_timeouts = 0;
+- DBG(debug("received packet type %d", *typep));
++ if (*typep == 0) {
++ /* no message ready */
++ return 0;
++ }
++ state->keep_alive_timeouts = 0;
++ DBG(debug("received packet type %d", *typep));
++
++ /* Always process disconnect messages */
++ if (*typep == SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT) {
++ if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &reason)) != 0 ||
++ (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0)
++ return r;
++ /* Ignore normal client exit notifications */
++ do_log2(ssh->state->server_side &&
++ reason == SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION ?
++ SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR,
++ "Received disconnect from %s port %d:"
++ "%u: %.400s", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
++ ssh_remote_port(ssh), reason, msg);
++ free(msg);
++ return SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED;
+ }
++
++ /*
++ * Do not implicitly handle any messages here during initial
++ * KEX when in strict mode. They will be need to be allowed
++ * explicitly by the KEX dispatch table or they will generate
++ * protocol errors.
++ */
++ if (ssh->kex != NULL &&
++ (ssh->kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) && ssh->kex->kex_strict)
++ return 0;
++ /* Implicitly handle transport-level messages */
+ switch (*typep) {
+ case SSH2_MSG_IGNORE:
+ debug3("Received SSH2_MSG_IGNORE");
+@@ -1734,19 +1782,6 @@ ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
+ debug("Remote: %.900s", msg);
+ free(msg);
+ break;
+- case SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT:
+- if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &reason)) != 0 ||
+- (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0)
+- return r;
+- /* Ignore normal client exit notifications */
+- do_log2(ssh->state->server_side &&
+- reason == SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION ?
+- SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR,
+- "Received disconnect from %s port %d:"
+- "%u: %.400s", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
+- ssh_remote_port(ssh), reason, msg);
+- free(msg);
+- return SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED;
+ case SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED:
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &seqnr)) != 0)
+ return r;
+@@ -2211,6 +2246,7 @@ kex_to_blob(struct sshbuf *m, struct kex *kex)
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->hostkey_type)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->hostkey_nid)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->kex_type)) != 0 ||
++ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->kex_strict)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, kex->my)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, kex->peer)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, kex->client_version)) != 0 ||
+@@ -2373,6 +2409,7 @@ kex_from_blob(struct sshbuf *m, struct kex **kexp)
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, (u_int *)&kex->hostkey_type)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, (u_int *)&kex->hostkey_nid)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &kex->kex_type)) != 0 ||
++ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &kex->kex_strict)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, kex->my)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, kex->peer)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, kex->client_version)) != 0 ||
+@@ -2701,6 +2738,7 @@ sshpkt_disconnect(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fmt,...)
+ vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args);
+ va_end(args);
+
++ debug2_f("sending SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT: %s", buf);
+ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, buf)) != 0 ||
+diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
+index b25225e..83ae4a4 100644
+--- a/sshconnect2.c
++++ b/sshconnect2.c
+@@ -241,7 +241,8 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
+ fatal_fr(r, "kex_assemble_namelist");
+ free(all_key);
+
+- if ((s = kex_names_cat(options.kex_algorithms, "ext-info-c")) == NULL)
++ if ((s = kex_names_cat(options.kex_algorithms,
++ "ext-info-c,kex-strict-c-v00@openssh.com")) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("kex_names_cat");
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal(ssh, s);
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
+@@ -363,7 +364,6 @@ struct cauthmethod {
+ };
+
+ static int input_userauth_service_accept(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+-static int input_userauth_ext_info(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+ static int input_userauth_success(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+ static int input_userauth_failure(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+ static int input_userauth_banner(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+@@ -477,7 +477,7 @@ ssh_userauth2(struct ssh *ssh, const char *local_user,
+
+ ssh->authctxt = &authctxt;
+ ssh_dispatch_init(ssh, &input_userauth_error);
+- ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, &input_userauth_ext_info);
++ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, kex_input_ext_info);
+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT, &input_userauth_service_accept);
+ ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(ssh, DISPATCH_BLOCK, &authctxt.success); /* loop until success */
+ pubkey_cleanup(ssh);
+@@ -529,13 +529,6 @@ input_userauth_service_accept(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+ return r;
+ }
+
+-/* ARGSUSED */
+-static int
+-input_userauth_ext_info(int type, u_int32_t seqnr, struct ssh *ssh)
+-{
+- return kex_input_ext_info(type, seqnr, ssh);
+-}
+-
+ void
+ userauth(struct ssh *ssh, char *authlist)
+ {
+@@ -617,6 +610,7 @@ input_userauth_success(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+ free(authctxt->methoddata);
+ authctxt->methoddata = NULL;
+ authctxt->success = 1; /* break out */
++ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, dispatch_protocol_error);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
+index ef18ba4..652bdc3 100644
+--- a/sshd.c
++++ b/sshd.c
+@@ -2354,11 +2354,13 @@ static void
+ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
+ {
+ char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_SERVER };
++ char *s;
+ struct kex *kex;
+ int r;
+
+- myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal(ssh,
+- options.kex_algorithms);
++ if ((s = kex_names_cat(options.kex_algorithms, "kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com")) == NULL)
++ fatal_f("kex_names_cat");
++ myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal(ssh, s);
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = compat_cipher_proposal(ssh,
+ options.ciphers);
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = compat_cipher_proposal(ssh,
+@@ -2411,6 +2413,7 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
+ (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "send test");
+ #endif
++ free(s);
+ debug("KEX done");
+ }
+
+--
+2.25.1
+
new file mode 100644
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+From fcd78e31cdd45a7e69ccfe6d8a3b1037dc1de290 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed, 24 May 2023 23:01:06 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] upstream: fix AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand when
+ AuthorizedKeysCommand
+Description: Fix the wrong code as the Subject suggests
+ I added that description to mention, that the file header change was
+ incompatible with the proposed code below and failed to apply,
+ therefore I dropped that chunk of the code.
+Origin: backport, https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/fcd78e31cdd45a7e69ccfe6d8a3b1037dc1de290
+Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3574
+Bug-Ubuntu: https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/openssh/+bug/2031942
+Last-Update: 2023-09-01
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [import from ubuntu https://git.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/openssh/tree/debian/patches/fix-authorized-principals-command.patch?h=ubuntu/jammy-security
+Upstream commit https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/fcd78e31cdd45a7e69ccfe6d8a3b1037dc1de290]
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+This patch header follows DEP-3: http://dep.debian.net/deps/dep3/
+--- a/servconf.c
++++ b/servconf.c
+@@ -2372,7 +2372,7 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerO
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: %s must be an absolute path",
+ filename, linenum, keyword);
+ }
+- if (*activep && options->authorized_keys_command == NULL)
++ if (*activep && *charptr == NULL)
+ *charptr = xstrdup(str + len);
+ argv_consume(&ac);
+ break;
@@ -32,6 +32,8 @@ SRC_URI = "http://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-${PV}.tar
file://CVE-2023-38408-0002.patch \
file://CVE-2023-38408-0003.patch \
file://CVE-2023-38408-0004.patch \
+ file://fix-authorized-principals-command.patch \
+ file://CVE-2023-48795.patch \
"
SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "fd497654b7ab1686dac672fb83dfb4ba4096e8b5ffcdaccd262380ae58bec5e7"