Message ID | 20220331193819.1623580-1-ralph.siemsen@linaro.org |
---|---|
State | Accepted, archived |
Commit | 058dec11cc6580212c6d4560d0f0e5b704d501dc |
Headers | show |
Series | [dunfell] bluez5: fix CVE-2022-0204 | expand |
On Thu, Mar 31, 2022 at 12:38 PM Ralph Siemsen <ralph.siemsen@linaro.org> wrote: > > Fix heap overflow when appending prepare writes > > The code shall check if the prepare writes would append more the > allowed maximum attribute length. > > Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/bluez/bluez/commit/591c546c536b42bef696d027f64aa22434f8c3f0] > CVE: CVE-2022-0204 > > Signed-off-by: Ralph Siemsen <ralph.siemsen@linaro.org> > --- > Status on other branches: > - master/kirkstone 5.64 includes the fix > - honister 5.61 needs patch > - hardknott 5.56 needs patch > > meta/recipes-connectivity/bluez5/bluez5.inc | 1 + > .../bluez5/bluez5/CVE-2022-0204.patch | 66 +++++++++++++++++++ > 2 files changed, 67 insertions(+) > create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/bluez5/bluez5/CVE-2022-0204.patch > > diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/bluez5/bluez5.inc b/meta/recipes-connectivity/bluez5/bluez5.inc > index 7cf061dcf6..4d4348898a 100644 > --- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/bluez5/bluez5.inc > +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/bluez5/bluez5.inc > @@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${KERNELORG_MIRROR}/linux/bluetooth/bluez-${PV}.tar.xz \ > file://CVE-2021-0129.patch \ > file://CVE-2021-3588.patch \ > file://CVE-2021-3658.patch \ > + file://CVE-2022-0204.patch \ seems to have tabs vs spaces problem. > " > S = "${WORKDIR}/bluez-${PV}" > > diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/bluez5/bluez5/CVE-2022-0204.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/bluez5/bluez5/CVE-2022-0204.patch > new file mode 100644 > index 0000000000..646b5ddfc8 > --- /dev/null > +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/bluez5/bluez5/CVE-2022-0204.patch > @@ -0,0 +1,66 @@ > +From 0d328fdf6564b67fc2ec3533e3da201ebabcc9e3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 > +From: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com> > +Date: Tue, 8 Jun 2021 16:46:49 -0700 > +Subject: [PATCH] shared/gatt-server: Fix heap overflow when appending prepare > + writes > + > +The code shall check if the prepare writes would append more the > +allowed maximum attribute length. > + > +Fixes https://github.com/bluez/bluez/security/advisories/GHSA-479m-xcq5-9g2q > + > +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/bluez/bluez/commit/591c546c536b42bef696d027f64aa22434f8c3f0] > +Signed-off-by: Ralph Siemsen <ralph.siemsen@linaro.org> > +CVE: CVE-2022-0204 > + > +--- > + src/shared/gatt-server.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++ > + 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+) > + > +diff --git a/src/shared/gatt-server.c b/src/shared/gatt-server.c > +index 0c25a97..20e14bc 100644 > +--- a/src/shared/gatt-server.c > ++++ b/src/shared/gatt-server.c > +@@ -816,6 +816,20 @@ static uint8_t authorize_req(struct bt_gatt_server *server, > + server->authorize_data); > + } > + > ++static uint8_t check_length(uint16_t length, uint16_t offset) > ++{ > ++ if (length > BT_ATT_MAX_VALUE_LEN) > ++ return BT_ATT_ERROR_INVALID_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_LEN; > ++ > ++ if (offset > BT_ATT_MAX_VALUE_LEN) > ++ return BT_ATT_ERROR_INVALID_OFFSET; > ++ > ++ if (length + offset > BT_ATT_MAX_VALUE_LEN) > ++ return BT_ATT_ERROR_INVALID_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_LEN; > ++ > ++ return 0; > ++} > ++ > + static void write_cb(struct bt_att_chan *chan, uint8_t opcode, const void *pdu, > + uint16_t length, void *user_data) > + { > +@@ -846,6 +860,10 @@ static void write_cb(struct bt_att_chan *chan, uint8_t opcode, const void *pdu, > + (opcode == BT_ATT_OP_WRITE_REQ) ? "Req" : "Cmd", > + handle); > + > ++ ecode = check_length(length, 0); > ++ if (ecode) > ++ goto error; > ++ > + ecode = check_permissions(server, attr, BT_ATT_PERM_WRITE_MASK); > + if (ecode) > + goto error; > +@@ -1353,6 +1371,10 @@ static void prep_write_cb(struct bt_att_chan *chan, uint8_t opcode, > + util_debug(server->debug_callback, server->debug_data, > + "Prep Write Req - handle: 0x%04x", handle); > + > ++ ecode = check_length(length, offset); > ++ if (ecode) > ++ goto error; > ++ > + ecode = check_permissions(server, attr, BT_ATT_PERM_WRITE_MASK); > + if (ecode) > + goto error; > -- > 2.25.1 > > > -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- > Links: You receive all messages sent to this group. > View/Reply Online (#163867): https://lists.openembedded.org/g/openembedded-core/message/163867 > Mute This Topic: https://lists.openembedded.org/mt/90162847/1997914 > Group Owner: openembedded-core+owner@lists.openembedded.org > Unsubscribe: https://lists.openembedded.org/g/openembedded-core/unsub [raj.khem@gmail.com] > -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- >
Yep, I must have fumbled it before sending it out. Please ignore this one, I'll do a v2 later. Any comments on the usefulness/format of the "Status in other branches" would be appreciated. Ralph
On Thu, Mar 31, 2022 at 10:32 AM Ralph Siemsen <ralph.siemsen@linaro.org> wrote: > > Yep, I must have fumbled it before sending it out. > Please ignore this one, I'll do a v2 later. > > Any comments on the usefulness/format of the "Status in other > branches" would be appreciated. I approve of the location and format. And it is useful too :-) Steve > > Ralph > > -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- > Links: You receive all messages sent to this group. > View/Reply Online (#163869): https://lists.openembedded.org/g/openembedded-core/message/163869 > Mute This Topic: https://lists.openembedded.org/mt/90162847/3617601 > Group Owner: openembedded-core+owner@lists.openembedded.org > Unsubscribe: https://lists.openembedded.org/g/openembedded-core/unsub [sakoman@gmail.com] > -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- >
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/bluez5/bluez5.inc b/meta/recipes-connectivity/bluez5/bluez5.inc index 7cf061dcf6..4d4348898a 100644 --- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/bluez5/bluez5.inc +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/bluez5/bluez5.inc @@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${KERNELORG_MIRROR}/linux/bluetooth/bluez-${PV}.tar.xz \ file://CVE-2021-0129.patch \ file://CVE-2021-3588.patch \ file://CVE-2021-3658.patch \ + file://CVE-2022-0204.patch \ " S = "${WORKDIR}/bluez-${PV}" diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/bluez5/bluez5/CVE-2022-0204.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/bluez5/bluez5/CVE-2022-0204.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..646b5ddfc8 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/bluez5/bluez5/CVE-2022-0204.patch @@ -0,0 +1,66 @@ +From 0d328fdf6564b67fc2ec3533e3da201ebabcc9e3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com> +Date: Tue, 8 Jun 2021 16:46:49 -0700 +Subject: [PATCH] shared/gatt-server: Fix heap overflow when appending prepare + writes + +The code shall check if the prepare writes would append more the +allowed maximum attribute length. + +Fixes https://github.com/bluez/bluez/security/advisories/GHSA-479m-xcq5-9g2q + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/bluez/bluez/commit/591c546c536b42bef696d027f64aa22434f8c3f0] +Signed-off-by: Ralph Siemsen <ralph.siemsen@linaro.org> +CVE: CVE-2022-0204 + +--- + src/shared/gatt-server.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/src/shared/gatt-server.c b/src/shared/gatt-server.c +index 0c25a97..20e14bc 100644 +--- a/src/shared/gatt-server.c ++++ b/src/shared/gatt-server.c +@@ -816,6 +816,20 @@ static uint8_t authorize_req(struct bt_gatt_server *server, + server->authorize_data); + } + ++static uint8_t check_length(uint16_t length, uint16_t offset) ++{ ++ if (length > BT_ATT_MAX_VALUE_LEN) ++ return BT_ATT_ERROR_INVALID_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_LEN; ++ ++ if (offset > BT_ATT_MAX_VALUE_LEN) ++ return BT_ATT_ERROR_INVALID_OFFSET; ++ ++ if (length + offset > BT_ATT_MAX_VALUE_LEN) ++ return BT_ATT_ERROR_INVALID_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_LEN; ++ ++ return 0; ++} ++ + static void write_cb(struct bt_att_chan *chan, uint8_t opcode, const void *pdu, + uint16_t length, void *user_data) + { +@@ -846,6 +860,10 @@ static void write_cb(struct bt_att_chan *chan, uint8_t opcode, const void *pdu, + (opcode == BT_ATT_OP_WRITE_REQ) ? "Req" : "Cmd", + handle); + ++ ecode = check_length(length, 0); ++ if (ecode) ++ goto error; ++ + ecode = check_permissions(server, attr, BT_ATT_PERM_WRITE_MASK); + if (ecode) + goto error; +@@ -1353,6 +1371,10 @@ static void prep_write_cb(struct bt_att_chan *chan, uint8_t opcode, + util_debug(server->debug_callback, server->debug_data, + "Prep Write Req - handle: 0x%04x", handle); + ++ ecode = check_length(length, offset); ++ if (ecode) ++ goto error; ++ + ecode = check_permissions(server, attr, BT_ATT_PERM_WRITE_MASK); + if (ecode) + goto error;
Fix heap overflow when appending prepare writes The code shall check if the prepare writes would append more the allowed maximum attribute length. Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/bluez/bluez/commit/591c546c536b42bef696d027f64aa22434f8c3f0] CVE: CVE-2022-0204 Signed-off-by: Ralph Siemsen <ralph.siemsen@linaro.org> --- Status on other branches: - master/kirkstone 5.64 includes the fix - honister 5.61 needs patch - hardknott 5.56 needs patch meta/recipes-connectivity/bluez5/bluez5.inc | 1 + .../bluez5/bluez5/CVE-2022-0204.patch | 66 +++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 67 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/bluez5/bluez5/CVE-2022-0204.patch