Message ID | 7fdb46a83e117459780d5cd0997b0666b7b1a081.1674657501.git.steve@sakoman.com |
---|---|
State | New, archived |
Headers | show |
Series | [dunfell,01/16] cve-update-db-native: Allow to overrule the URL in a bbappend. | expand |
I haven't checked yet in dunfell, but in kirkstone this commit merged last week breaks nativesdk-qemu builds. This chunk: +@@ -1486,7 +1505,7 @@ void *qxl_phys2virt(PCIQXLDevice *qxl, QXLPHYSICAL pqxl, int group_id) + offset = le64_to_cpu(pqxl) & 0xffffffffffff; + return (void *)(intptr_t)offset; + case MEMSLOT_GROUP_GUEST: +- if (!qxl_get_check_slot_offset(qxl, pqxl, &slot, &offset)) { ++ if (!qxl_get_check_slot_offset(qxl, pqxl, &slot, &offset, size)) { + return NULL; + } + ptr = memory_region_get_ram_ptr(qxl->guest_slots[slot].mr); Uses size parameter which was added in previous commit (which wasn't backported): https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/commit/8efec0ef8bbc1e75a7ebf6e325a35806ece9b39f So either both commits need to be backported or this one reworked not to use undeclared size as it leads to: | ../qemu-6.2.0/hw/display/qxl.c: In function 'qxl_phys2virt': | ../qemu-6.2.0/hw/display/qxl.c:1477:67: error: 'size' undeclared (first use in this function); did you mean 'gsize'? | 1477 | if (!qxl_get_check_slot_offset(qxl, pqxl, &slot, &offset, size)) { | | ^~~~ | | gsize I'm surprised this wasn't caught on autobuilder already, maybe it's triggered only with extra PACKAGECONFIG options we have enabled: PACKAGECONFIG:append:class-nativesdk = " virglrenderer epoxy spice libusb usb-redir" Regards, On Wed, Jan 25, 2023 at 3:42 PM Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com> wrote: > From: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com> > > Upstream-Status: Backport from > https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/commit/6dbbf055148c6f1b7d8a3251a65bd6f3d1e1f622 > > Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com> > Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com> > --- > meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc | 1 + > .../qemu/qemu/CVE-2022-4144.patch | 103 ++++++++++++++++++ > 2 files changed, 104 insertions(+) > create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2022-4144.patch > > diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc > b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc > index fff2c87780..898fa1a8d8 100644 > --- a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc > +++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc > @@ -115,6 +115,7 @@ SRC_URI = " > https://download.qemu.org/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.xz \ > file://CVE-2021-3638.patch \ > file://CVE-2021-20196.patch \ > file://CVE-2021-3507.patch \ > + file://CVE-2022-4144.patch \ > " > UPSTREAM_CHECK_REGEX = "qemu-(?P<pver>\d+(\.\d+)+)\.tar" > > diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2022-4144.patch > b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2022-4144.patch > new file mode 100644 > index 0000000000..3f0d5fbd5c > --- /dev/null > +++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2022-4144.patch > @@ -0,0 +1,103 @@ > +From 6dbbf055148c6f1b7d8a3251a65bd6f3d1e1f622 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 > +From: =?UTF-8?q?Philippe=20Mathieu-Daud=C3=A9?= <philmd@linaro.org> > +Date: Mon, 28 Nov 2022 21:27:40 +0100 > +Subject: [PATCH] hw/display/qxl: Avoid buffer overrun in qxl_phys2virt > + (CVE-2022-4144) > +MIME-Version: 1.0 > +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 > +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit > + > +Have qxl_get_check_slot_offset() return false if the requested > +buffer size does not fit within the slot memory region. > + > +Similarly qxl_phys2virt() now returns NULL in such case, and > +qxl_dirty_one_surface() aborts. > + > +This avoids buffer overrun in the host pointer returned by > +memory_region_get_ram_ptr(). > + > +Fixes: CVE-2022-4144 (out-of-bounds read) > +Reported-by: Wenxu Yin (@awxylitol) > +Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/1336 > + > +Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@linaro.org> > +Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com> > +Message-Id: <20221128202741.4945-5-philmd@linaro.org> > + > +Upstream-Status: Backport [ > https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/commit/6dbbf055148c6f1b7d8a3251a65bd6f3d1e1f622 > ] > +CVE: CVE-2022-4144 > +Comments: Deleted patch hunk in qxl.h,as it contains change > +in comments which is not present in current version of qemu. > + > +Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com> > +--- > + hw/display/qxl.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++---- > + 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) > + > +diff --git a/hw/display/qxl.c b/hw/display/qxl.c > +index cd7eb39d..6bc8385b 100644 > +--- a/hw/display/qxl.c > ++++ b/hw/display/qxl.c > +@@ -1440,11 +1440,13 @@ static void qxl_reset_surfaces(PCIQXLDevice *d) > + > + /* can be also called from spice server thread context */ > + static bool qxl_get_check_slot_offset(PCIQXLDevice *qxl, QXLPHYSICAL > pqxl, > +- uint32_t *s, uint64_t *o) > ++ uint32_t *s, uint64_t *o, > ++ size_t size_requested) > + { > + uint64_t phys = le64_to_cpu(pqxl); > + uint32_t slot = (phys >> (64 - 8)) & 0xff; > + uint64_t offset = phys & 0xffffffffffff; > ++ uint64_t size_available; > + > + if (slot >= NUM_MEMSLOTS) { > + qxl_set_guest_bug(qxl, "slot too large %d >= %d", slot, > +@@ -1468,6 +1470,23 @@ static bool qxl_get_check_slot_offset(PCIQXLDevice > *qxl, QXLPHYSICAL pqxl, > + slot, offset, qxl->guest_slots[slot].size); > + return false; > + } > ++ size_available = memory_region_size(qxl->guest_slots[slot].mr); > ++ if (qxl->guest_slots[slot].offset + offset >= size_available) { > ++ qxl_set_guest_bug(qxl, > ++ "slot %d offset %"PRIu64" > region size > %"PRIu64"\n", > ++ slot, qxl->guest_slots[slot].offset + offset, > ++ size_available); > ++ return false; > ++ } > ++ size_available -= qxl->guest_slots[slot].offset + offset; > ++ if (size_requested > size_available) { > ++ qxl_set_guest_bug(qxl, > ++ "slot %d offset %"PRIu64" size %zu: " > ++ "overrun by %"PRIu64" bytes\n", > ++ slot, offset, size_requested, > ++ size_requested - size_available); > ++ return false; > ++ } > + > + *s = slot; > + *o = offset; > +@@ -1486,7 +1505,7 @@ void *qxl_phys2virt(PCIQXLDevice *qxl, QXLPHYSICAL > pqxl, int group_id) > + offset = le64_to_cpu(pqxl) & 0xffffffffffff; > + return (void *)(intptr_t)offset; > + case MEMSLOT_GROUP_GUEST: > +- if (!qxl_get_check_slot_offset(qxl, pqxl, &slot, &offset)) { > ++ if (!qxl_get_check_slot_offset(qxl, pqxl, &slot, &offset, size)) > { > + return NULL; > + } > + ptr = memory_region_get_ram_ptr(qxl->guest_slots[slot].mr); > +@@ -1944,9 +1963,9 @@ static void qxl_dirty_one_surface(PCIQXLDevice > *qxl, QXLPHYSICAL pqxl, > + uint32_t slot; > + bool rc; > + > +- rc = qxl_get_check_slot_offset(qxl, pqxl, &slot, &offset); > +- assert(rc == true); > + size = (uint64_t)height * abs(stride); > ++ rc = qxl_get_check_slot_offset(qxl, pqxl, &slot, &offset, size); > ++ assert(rc == true); > + trace_qxl_surfaces_dirty(qxl->id, offset, size); > + qxl_set_dirty(qxl->guest_slots[slot].mr, > + qxl->guest_slots[slot].offset + offset, > +-- > +2.25.1 > + > -- > 2.25.1 > > > -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- > Links: You receive all messages sent to this group. > View/Reply Online (#176358): > https://lists.openembedded.org/g/openembedded-core/message/176358 > Mute This Topic: https://lists.openembedded.org/mt/96521255/3617156 > Group Owner: openembedded-core+owner@lists.openembedded.org > Unsubscribe: https://lists.openembedded.org/g/openembedded-core/unsub [ > Martin.Jansa@gmail.com] > -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- > >
On Tue, Jan 31, 2023 at 8:18 AM Martin Jansa via lists.openembedded.org <Martin.Jansa=gmail.com@lists.openembedded.org> wrote: > I haven't checked yet in dunfell, but in kirkstone this commit merged last > week breaks nativesdk-qemu builds. > I can confirm it fails the same with this commit from Hitendra in dunfell: nativesdk-qemu/4.2.0-r0/qemu-4.2.0/hw/display/qxl.c:1508:67: error: 'size' undeclared (first use in this function); did you mean 'gsize'? | 1508 | if (!qxl_get_check_slot_offset(qxl, pqxl, &slot, &offset, size)) { | | ^~~~ | | gsize as well as the same backport from Bhabu in kirkstone (already merged): https://git.openembedded.org/openembedded-core/commit/?h=kirkstone&id=4cb3874abf4fdeb04337a48a14c765ba9b2269d4 To reproduce this just enable "spice" PACKAGECONFIG in nativesdk-qemu. Hitendra, Bhabu: please have a look. Regards, > > This chunk: > +@@ -1486,7 +1505,7 @@ void *qxl_phys2virt(PCIQXLDevice *qxl, QXLPHYSICAL > pqxl, int group_id) > + offset = le64_to_cpu(pqxl) & 0xffffffffffff; > + return (void *)(intptr_t)offset; > + case MEMSLOT_GROUP_GUEST: > +- if (!qxl_get_check_slot_offset(qxl, pqxl, &slot, &offset)) { > ++ if (!qxl_get_check_slot_offset(qxl, pqxl, &slot, &offset, size)) > { > + return NULL; > + } > + ptr = memory_region_get_ram_ptr(qxl->guest_slots[slot].mr); > > Uses size parameter which was added in previous commit (which wasn't > backported): > > https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/commit/8efec0ef8bbc1e75a7ebf6e325a35806ece9b39f > > So either both commits need to be backported or this one reworked not to > use undeclared size as it leads to: > > | ../qemu-6.2.0/hw/display/qxl.c: In function 'qxl_phys2virt': > | ../qemu-6.2.0/hw/display/qxl.c:1477:67: error: 'size' undeclared (first > use in this function); did you mean 'gsize'? > | 1477 | if (!qxl_get_check_slot_offset(qxl, pqxl, &slot, > &offset, size)) { > | | > ^~~~ > | | > gsize > > I'm surprised this wasn't caught on autobuilder already, maybe it's > triggered only with extra PACKAGECONFIG options we have enabled: > PACKAGECONFIG:append:class-nativesdk = " virglrenderer epoxy spice libusb > usb-redir" > > Regards, > > > On Wed, Jan 25, 2023 at 3:42 PM Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com> wrote: > >> From: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com> >> >> Upstream-Status: Backport from >> https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/commit/6dbbf055148c6f1b7d8a3251a65bd6f3d1e1f622 >> >> Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com> >> Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com> >> --- >> meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc | 1 + >> .../qemu/qemu/CVE-2022-4144.patch | 103 ++++++++++++++++++ >> 2 files changed, 104 insertions(+) >> create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2022-4144.patch >> >> diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc >> b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc >> index fff2c87780..898fa1a8d8 100644 >> --- a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc >> +++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc >> @@ -115,6 +115,7 @@ SRC_URI = " >> https://download.qemu.org/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.xz \ >> file://CVE-2021-3638.patch \ >> file://CVE-2021-20196.patch \ >> file://CVE-2021-3507.patch \ >> + file://CVE-2022-4144.patch \ >> " >> UPSTREAM_CHECK_REGEX = "qemu-(?P<pver>\d+(\.\d+)+)\.tar" >> >> diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2022-4144.patch >> b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2022-4144.patch >> new file mode 100644 >> index 0000000000..3f0d5fbd5c >> --- /dev/null >> +++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2022-4144.patch >> @@ -0,0 +1,103 @@ >> +From 6dbbf055148c6f1b7d8a3251a65bd6f3d1e1f622 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 >> +From: =?UTF-8?q?Philippe=20Mathieu-Daud=C3=A9?= <philmd@linaro.org> >> +Date: Mon, 28 Nov 2022 21:27:40 +0100 >> +Subject: [PATCH] hw/display/qxl: Avoid buffer overrun in qxl_phys2virt >> + (CVE-2022-4144) >> +MIME-Version: 1.0 >> +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 >> +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit >> + >> +Have qxl_get_check_slot_offset() return false if the requested >> +buffer size does not fit within the slot memory region. >> + >> +Similarly qxl_phys2virt() now returns NULL in such case, and >> +qxl_dirty_one_surface() aborts. >> + >> +This avoids buffer overrun in the host pointer returned by >> +memory_region_get_ram_ptr(). >> + >> +Fixes: CVE-2022-4144 (out-of-bounds read) >> +Reported-by: Wenxu Yin (@awxylitol) >> +Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/1336 >> + >> +Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@linaro.org> >> +Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com> >> +Message-Id: <20221128202741.4945-5-philmd@linaro.org> >> + >> +Upstream-Status: Backport [ >> https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/commit/6dbbf055148c6f1b7d8a3251a65bd6f3d1e1f622 >> ] >> +CVE: CVE-2022-4144 >> +Comments: Deleted patch hunk in qxl.h,as it contains change >> +in comments which is not present in current version of qemu. >> + >> +Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com> >> +--- >> + hw/display/qxl.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++---- >> + 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) >> + >> +diff --git a/hw/display/qxl.c b/hw/display/qxl.c >> +index cd7eb39d..6bc8385b 100644 >> +--- a/hw/display/qxl.c >> ++++ b/hw/display/qxl.c >> +@@ -1440,11 +1440,13 @@ static void qxl_reset_surfaces(PCIQXLDevice *d) >> + >> + /* can be also called from spice server thread context */ >> + static bool qxl_get_check_slot_offset(PCIQXLDevice *qxl, QXLPHYSICAL >> pqxl, >> +- uint32_t *s, uint64_t *o) >> ++ uint32_t *s, uint64_t *o, >> ++ size_t size_requested) >> + { >> + uint64_t phys = le64_to_cpu(pqxl); >> + uint32_t slot = (phys >> (64 - 8)) & 0xff; >> + uint64_t offset = phys & 0xffffffffffff; >> ++ uint64_t size_available; >> + >> + if (slot >= NUM_MEMSLOTS) { >> + qxl_set_guest_bug(qxl, "slot too large %d >= %d", slot, >> +@@ -1468,6 +1470,23 @@ static bool >> qxl_get_check_slot_offset(PCIQXLDevice *qxl, QXLPHYSICAL pqxl, >> + slot, offset, qxl->guest_slots[slot].size); >> + return false; >> + } >> ++ size_available = memory_region_size(qxl->guest_slots[slot].mr); >> ++ if (qxl->guest_slots[slot].offset + offset >= size_available) { >> ++ qxl_set_guest_bug(qxl, >> ++ "slot %d offset %"PRIu64" > region size >> %"PRIu64"\n", >> ++ slot, qxl->guest_slots[slot].offset + offset, >> ++ size_available); >> ++ return false; >> ++ } >> ++ size_available -= qxl->guest_slots[slot].offset + offset; >> ++ if (size_requested > size_available) { >> ++ qxl_set_guest_bug(qxl, >> ++ "slot %d offset %"PRIu64" size %zu: " >> ++ "overrun by %"PRIu64" bytes\n", >> ++ slot, offset, size_requested, >> ++ size_requested - size_available); >> ++ return false; >> ++ } >> + >> + *s = slot; >> + *o = offset; >> +@@ -1486,7 +1505,7 @@ void *qxl_phys2virt(PCIQXLDevice *qxl, QXLPHYSICAL >> pqxl, int group_id) >> + offset = le64_to_cpu(pqxl) & 0xffffffffffff; >> + return (void *)(intptr_t)offset; >> + case MEMSLOT_GROUP_GUEST: >> +- if (!qxl_get_check_slot_offset(qxl, pqxl, &slot, &offset)) { >> ++ if (!qxl_get_check_slot_offset(qxl, pqxl, &slot, &offset, >> size)) { >> + return NULL; >> + } >> + ptr = memory_region_get_ram_ptr(qxl->guest_slots[slot].mr); >> +@@ -1944,9 +1963,9 @@ static void qxl_dirty_one_surface(PCIQXLDevice >> *qxl, QXLPHYSICAL pqxl, >> + uint32_t slot; >> + bool rc; >> + >> +- rc = qxl_get_check_slot_offset(qxl, pqxl, &slot, &offset); >> +- assert(rc == true); >> + size = (uint64_t)height * abs(stride); >> ++ rc = qxl_get_check_slot_offset(qxl, pqxl, &slot, &offset, size); >> ++ assert(rc == true); >> + trace_qxl_surfaces_dirty(qxl->id, offset, size); >> + qxl_set_dirty(qxl->guest_slots[slot].mr, >> + qxl->guest_slots[slot].offset + offset, >> +-- >> +2.25.1 >> + >> -- >> 2.25.1 >> >> >> >> >> > -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- > Links: You receive all messages sent to this group. > View/Reply Online (#176506): > https://lists.openembedded.org/g/openembedded-core/message/176506 > Mute This Topic: https://lists.openembedded.org/mt/96521255/3617156 > Group Owner: openembedded-core+owner@lists.openembedded.org > Unsubscribe: https://lists.openembedded.org/g/openembedded-core/unsub [ > Martin.Jansa@gmail.com] > -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- > >
On Mon, Jan 30, 2023 at 9:39 PM Martin Jansa <Martin.Jansa@gmail.com> wrote: > > On Tue, Jan 31, 2023 at 8:18 AM Martin Jansa via lists.openembedded.org <Martin.Jansa=gmail.com@lists.openembedded.org> wrote: >> >> I haven't checked yet in dunfell, but in kirkstone this commit merged last week breaks nativesdk-qemu builds. > > > I can confirm it fails the same with this commit from Hitendra in dunfell: > > nativesdk-qemu/4.2.0-r0/qemu-4.2.0/hw/display/qxl.c:1508:67: error: 'size' undeclared (first use in this function); did you mean 'gsize'? > | 1508 | if (!qxl_get_check_slot_offset(qxl, pqxl, &slot, &offset, size)) { > | | ^~~~ > | | gsize > > as well as the same backport from Bhabu in kirkstone (already merged): > https://git.openembedded.org/openembedded-core/commit/?h=kirkstone&id=4cb3874abf4fdeb04337a48a14c765ba9b2269d4 > > To reproduce this just enable "spice" PACKAGECONFIG in nativesdk-qemu. > > Hitendra, Bhabu: please have a look. Yes, please do! Unless I get a fix for the spice regression sometime soon I will revert the patch in kirkstone and of course won't take the dunfell version. Steve >> This chunk: >> +@@ -1486,7 +1505,7 @@ void *qxl_phys2virt(PCIQXLDevice *qxl, QXLPHYSICAL pqxl, int group_id) >> + offset = le64_to_cpu(pqxl) & 0xffffffffffff; >> + return (void *)(intptr_t)offset; >> + case MEMSLOT_GROUP_GUEST: >> +- if (!qxl_get_check_slot_offset(qxl, pqxl, &slot, &offset)) { >> ++ if (!qxl_get_check_slot_offset(qxl, pqxl, &slot, &offset, size)) { >> + return NULL; >> + } >> + ptr = memory_region_get_ram_ptr(qxl->guest_slots[slot].mr); >> >> Uses size parameter which was added in previous commit (which wasn't backported): >> https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/commit/8efec0ef8bbc1e75a7ebf6e325a35806ece9b39f >> >> So either both commits need to be backported or this one reworked not to use undeclared size as it leads to: >> >> | ../qemu-6.2.0/hw/display/qxl.c: In function 'qxl_phys2virt': >> | ../qemu-6.2.0/hw/display/qxl.c:1477:67: error: 'size' undeclared (first use in this function); did you mean 'gsize'? >> | 1477 | if (!qxl_get_check_slot_offset(qxl, pqxl, &slot, &offset, size)) { >> | | ^~~~ >> | | gsize >> >> I'm surprised this wasn't caught on autobuilder already, maybe it's triggered only with extra PACKAGECONFIG options we have enabled: >> PACKAGECONFIG:append:class-nativesdk = " virglrenderer epoxy spice libusb usb-redir" >> >> Regards, >> >> >> On Wed, Jan 25, 2023 at 3:42 PM Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com> wrote: >>> >>> From: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com> >>> >>> Upstream-Status: Backport from https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/commit/6dbbf055148c6f1b7d8a3251a65bd6f3d1e1f622 >>> >>> Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com> >>> Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com> >>> --- >>> meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc | 1 + >>> .../qemu/qemu/CVE-2022-4144.patch | 103 ++++++++++++++++++ >>> 2 files changed, 104 insertions(+) >>> create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2022-4144.patch >>> >>> diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc >>> index fff2c87780..898fa1a8d8 100644 >>> --- a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc >>> +++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc >>> @@ -115,6 +115,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://download.qemu.org/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.xz \ >>> file://CVE-2021-3638.patch \ >>> file://CVE-2021-20196.patch \ >>> file://CVE-2021-3507.patch \ >>> + file://CVE-2022-4144.patch \ >>> " >>> UPSTREAM_CHECK_REGEX = "qemu-(?P<pver>\d+(\.\d+)+)\.tar" >>> >>> diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2022-4144.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2022-4144.patch >>> new file mode 100644 >>> index 0000000000..3f0d5fbd5c >>> --- /dev/null >>> +++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2022-4144.patch >>> @@ -0,0 +1,103 @@ >>> +From 6dbbf055148c6f1b7d8a3251a65bd6f3d1e1f622 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 >>> +From: =?UTF-8?q?Philippe=20Mathieu-Daud=C3=A9?= <philmd@linaro.org> >>> +Date: Mon, 28 Nov 2022 21:27:40 +0100 >>> +Subject: [PATCH] hw/display/qxl: Avoid buffer overrun in qxl_phys2virt >>> + (CVE-2022-4144) >>> +MIME-Version: 1.0 >>> +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 >>> +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit >>> + >>> +Have qxl_get_check_slot_offset() return false if the requested >>> +buffer size does not fit within the slot memory region. >>> + >>> +Similarly qxl_phys2virt() now returns NULL in such case, and >>> +qxl_dirty_one_surface() aborts. >>> + >>> +This avoids buffer overrun in the host pointer returned by >>> +memory_region_get_ram_ptr(). >>> + >>> +Fixes: CVE-2022-4144 (out-of-bounds read) >>> +Reported-by: Wenxu Yin (@awxylitol) >>> +Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/1336 >>> + >>> +Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@linaro.org> >>> +Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com> >>> +Message-Id: <20221128202741.4945-5-philmd@linaro.org> >>> + >>> +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/commit/6dbbf055148c6f1b7d8a3251a65bd6f3d1e1f622] >>> +CVE: CVE-2022-4144 >>> +Comments: Deleted patch hunk in qxl.h,as it contains change >>> +in comments which is not present in current version of qemu. >>> + >>> +Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com> >>> +--- >>> + hw/display/qxl.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++---- >>> + 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) >>> + >>> +diff --git a/hw/display/qxl.c b/hw/display/qxl.c >>> +index cd7eb39d..6bc8385b 100644 >>> +--- a/hw/display/qxl.c >>> ++++ b/hw/display/qxl.c >>> +@@ -1440,11 +1440,13 @@ static void qxl_reset_surfaces(PCIQXLDevice *d) >>> + >>> + /* can be also called from spice server thread context */ >>> + static bool qxl_get_check_slot_offset(PCIQXLDevice *qxl, QXLPHYSICAL pqxl, >>> +- uint32_t *s, uint64_t *o) >>> ++ uint32_t *s, uint64_t *o, >>> ++ size_t size_requested) >>> + { >>> + uint64_t phys = le64_to_cpu(pqxl); >>> + uint32_t slot = (phys >> (64 - 8)) & 0xff; >>> + uint64_t offset = phys & 0xffffffffffff; >>> ++ uint64_t size_available; >>> + >>> + if (slot >= NUM_MEMSLOTS) { >>> + qxl_set_guest_bug(qxl, "slot too large %d >= %d", slot, >>> +@@ -1468,6 +1470,23 @@ static bool qxl_get_check_slot_offset(PCIQXLDevice *qxl, QXLPHYSICAL pqxl, >>> + slot, offset, qxl->guest_slots[slot].size); >>> + return false; >>> + } >>> ++ size_available = memory_region_size(qxl->guest_slots[slot].mr); >>> ++ if (qxl->guest_slots[slot].offset + offset >= size_available) { >>> ++ qxl_set_guest_bug(qxl, >>> ++ "slot %d offset %"PRIu64" > region size %"PRIu64"\n", >>> ++ slot, qxl->guest_slots[slot].offset + offset, >>> ++ size_available); >>> ++ return false; >>> ++ } >>> ++ size_available -= qxl->guest_slots[slot].offset + offset; >>> ++ if (size_requested > size_available) { >>> ++ qxl_set_guest_bug(qxl, >>> ++ "slot %d offset %"PRIu64" size %zu: " >>> ++ "overrun by %"PRIu64" bytes\n", >>> ++ slot, offset, size_requested, >>> ++ size_requested - size_available); >>> ++ return false; >>> ++ } >>> + >>> + *s = slot; >>> + *o = offset; >>> +@@ -1486,7 +1505,7 @@ void *qxl_phys2virt(PCIQXLDevice *qxl, QXLPHYSICAL pqxl, int group_id) >>> + offset = le64_to_cpu(pqxl) & 0xffffffffffff; >>> + return (void *)(intptr_t)offset; >>> + case MEMSLOT_GROUP_GUEST: >>> +- if (!qxl_get_check_slot_offset(qxl, pqxl, &slot, &offset)) { >>> ++ if (!qxl_get_check_slot_offset(qxl, pqxl, &slot, &offset, size)) { >>> + return NULL; >>> + } >>> + ptr = memory_region_get_ram_ptr(qxl->guest_slots[slot].mr); >>> +@@ -1944,9 +1963,9 @@ static void qxl_dirty_one_surface(PCIQXLDevice *qxl, QXLPHYSICAL pqxl, >>> + uint32_t slot; >>> + bool rc; >>> + >>> +- rc = qxl_get_check_slot_offset(qxl, pqxl, &slot, &offset); >>> +- assert(rc == true); >>> + size = (uint64_t)height * abs(stride); >>> ++ rc = qxl_get_check_slot_offset(qxl, pqxl, &slot, &offset, size); >>> ++ assert(rc == true); >>> + trace_qxl_surfaces_dirty(qxl->id, offset, size); >>> + qxl_set_dirty(qxl->guest_slots[slot].mr, >>> + qxl->guest_slots[slot].offset + offset, >>> +-- >>> +2.25.1 >>> + >>> -- >>> 2.25.1 >>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> > > -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- > Links: You receive all messages sent to this group. > View/Reply Online (#176508): https://lists.openembedded.org/g/openembedded-core/message/176508 > Mute This Topic: https://lists.openembedded.org/mt/96521255/3617601 > Group Owner: openembedded-core+owner@lists.openembedded.org > Unsubscribe: https://lists.openembedded.org/g/openembedded-core/unsub [sakoman@gmail.com] > -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- >
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc index fff2c87780..898fa1a8d8 100644 --- a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc +++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc @@ -115,6 +115,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://download.qemu.org/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.xz \ file://CVE-2021-3638.patch \ file://CVE-2021-20196.patch \ file://CVE-2021-3507.patch \ + file://CVE-2022-4144.patch \ " UPSTREAM_CHECK_REGEX = "qemu-(?P<pver>\d+(\.\d+)+)\.tar" diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2022-4144.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2022-4144.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3f0d5fbd5c --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2022-4144.patch @@ -0,0 +1,103 @@ +From 6dbbf055148c6f1b7d8a3251a65bd6f3d1e1f622 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: =?UTF-8?q?Philippe=20Mathieu-Daud=C3=A9?= <philmd@linaro.org> +Date: Mon, 28 Nov 2022 21:27:40 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] hw/display/qxl: Avoid buffer overrun in qxl_phys2virt + (CVE-2022-4144) +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +Have qxl_get_check_slot_offset() return false if the requested +buffer size does not fit within the slot memory region. + +Similarly qxl_phys2virt() now returns NULL in such case, and +qxl_dirty_one_surface() aborts. + +This avoids buffer overrun in the host pointer returned by +memory_region_get_ram_ptr(). + +Fixes: CVE-2022-4144 (out-of-bounds read) +Reported-by: Wenxu Yin (@awxylitol) +Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/1336 + +Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@linaro.org> +Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com> +Message-Id: <20221128202741.4945-5-philmd@linaro.org> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/commit/6dbbf055148c6f1b7d8a3251a65bd6f3d1e1f622] +CVE: CVE-2022-4144 +Comments: Deleted patch hunk in qxl.h,as it contains change +in comments which is not present in current version of qemu. + +Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com> +--- + hw/display/qxl.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++---- + 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/hw/display/qxl.c b/hw/display/qxl.c +index cd7eb39d..6bc8385b 100644 +--- a/hw/display/qxl.c ++++ b/hw/display/qxl.c +@@ -1440,11 +1440,13 @@ static void qxl_reset_surfaces(PCIQXLDevice *d) + + /* can be also called from spice server thread context */ + static bool qxl_get_check_slot_offset(PCIQXLDevice *qxl, QXLPHYSICAL pqxl, +- uint32_t *s, uint64_t *o) ++ uint32_t *s, uint64_t *o, ++ size_t size_requested) + { + uint64_t phys = le64_to_cpu(pqxl); + uint32_t slot = (phys >> (64 - 8)) & 0xff; + uint64_t offset = phys & 0xffffffffffff; ++ uint64_t size_available; + + if (slot >= NUM_MEMSLOTS) { + qxl_set_guest_bug(qxl, "slot too large %d >= %d", slot, +@@ -1468,6 +1470,23 @@ static bool qxl_get_check_slot_offset(PCIQXLDevice *qxl, QXLPHYSICAL pqxl, + slot, offset, qxl->guest_slots[slot].size); + return false; + } ++ size_available = memory_region_size(qxl->guest_slots[slot].mr); ++ if (qxl->guest_slots[slot].offset + offset >= size_available) { ++ qxl_set_guest_bug(qxl, ++ "slot %d offset %"PRIu64" > region size %"PRIu64"\n", ++ slot, qxl->guest_slots[slot].offset + offset, ++ size_available); ++ return false; ++ } ++ size_available -= qxl->guest_slots[slot].offset + offset; ++ if (size_requested > size_available) { ++ qxl_set_guest_bug(qxl, ++ "slot %d offset %"PRIu64" size %zu: " ++ "overrun by %"PRIu64" bytes\n", ++ slot, offset, size_requested, ++ size_requested - size_available); ++ return false; ++ } + + *s = slot; + *o = offset; +@@ -1486,7 +1505,7 @@ void *qxl_phys2virt(PCIQXLDevice *qxl, QXLPHYSICAL pqxl, int group_id) + offset = le64_to_cpu(pqxl) & 0xffffffffffff; + return (void *)(intptr_t)offset; + case MEMSLOT_GROUP_GUEST: +- if (!qxl_get_check_slot_offset(qxl, pqxl, &slot, &offset)) { ++ if (!qxl_get_check_slot_offset(qxl, pqxl, &slot, &offset, size)) { + return NULL; + } + ptr = memory_region_get_ram_ptr(qxl->guest_slots[slot].mr); +@@ -1944,9 +1963,9 @@ static void qxl_dirty_one_surface(PCIQXLDevice *qxl, QXLPHYSICAL pqxl, + uint32_t slot; + bool rc; + +- rc = qxl_get_check_slot_offset(qxl, pqxl, &slot, &offset); +- assert(rc == true); + size = (uint64_t)height * abs(stride); ++ rc = qxl_get_check_slot_offset(qxl, pqxl, &slot, &offset, size); ++ assert(rc == true); + trace_qxl_surfaces_dirty(qxl->id, offset, size); + qxl_set_dirty(qxl->guest_slots[slot].mr, + qxl->guest_slots[slot].offset + offset, +-- +2.25.1 +