From patchwork Tue Apr 26 12:07:20 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Ross Burton X-Patchwork-Id: 7179 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 58A80C433F5 for ; Tue, 26 Apr 2022 12:07:37 +0000 (UTC) Received: from foss.arm.com (foss.arm.com [217.140.110.172]) by mx.groups.io with SMTP id smtpd.web11.5367.1650974846978462288 for ; Tue, 26 Apr 2022 05:07:27 -0700 Authentication-Results: mx.groups.io; dkim=missing; spf=pass (domain: arm.com, ip: 217.140.110.172, mailfrom: ross.burton@arm.com) Received: from usa-sjc-imap-foss1.foss.arm.com (unknown [10.121.207.14]) by usa-sjc-mx-foss1.foss.arm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4448823A for ; Tue, 26 Apr 2022 05:07:26 -0700 (PDT) Received: from oss-tx204.lab.cambridge.arm.com (usa-sjc-imap-foss1.foss.arm.com [10.121.207.14]) by usa-sjc-imap-foss1.foss.arm.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id E49DF3F5A1 for ; Tue, 26 Apr 2022 05:07:25 -0700 (PDT) From: Ross Burton To: openembedded-core@lists.openembedded.org Subject: [RFC PATCH] bitbake.conf: mark all directories as safe for git to read Date: Tue, 26 Apr 2022 13:07:20 +0100 Message-Id: <20220426120720.969039-1-ross.burton@arm.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 MIME-Version: 1.0 List-Id: X-Webhook-Received: from li982-79.members.linode.com [45.33.32.79] by aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org with HTTPS for ; Tue, 26 Apr 2022 12:07:37 -0000 X-Groupsio-URL: https://lists.openembedded.org/g/openembedded-core/message/164868 Recent git releases containing [1] have an ownership check when opening repositories, and refuse to open a repository if it is owned by a different user. This breaks any use of git in do_install, as that is executed by the (fake) root user. Whilst not common, this does happen. Setting the git configuration safe.directories=* disables this check, so that git is usable in fakeroot tasks. This can be set globally via the internal environment variable GIT_CONFIG_PARAMETERS, we can't use GIT_CONFIG_*_KEY/VALUE as that isn't present in all the releases which have the ownership check. We already set GIT_CEILING_DIRECTORIES to ensure that git doesn't recurse up out of the work directory, so this isn't a security issue. [1] https://github.com/git/git/commit/8959555cee7ec045958f9b6dd62e541affb7e7d9 Signed-off-by: Ross Burton --- meta/conf/bitbake.conf | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) diff --git a/meta/conf/bitbake.conf b/meta/conf/bitbake.conf index 0e939aca4f..1deba8d910 100644 --- a/meta/conf/bitbake.conf +++ b/meta/conf/bitbake.conf @@ -776,10 +776,18 @@ export PKG_CONFIG_DISABLE_UNINSTALLED = "yes" export PKG_CONFIG_SYSTEM_LIBRARY_PATH = "${base_libdir}:${libdir}" export PKG_CONFIG_SYSTEM_INCLUDE_PATH = "${includedir}" +# Git configuration + # Don't allow git to chdir up past WORKDIR so that it doesn't detect the OE # repository when building a recipe export GIT_CEILING_DIRECTORIES = "${WORKDIR}" +# Treat all directories are safe, as during fakeroot tasks git will run as +# root so recent git releases (eg 2.30.3) will refuse to work on repositories. See +# https://github.com/git/git/commit/8959555cee7ec045958f9b6dd62e541affb7e7d9 for +# further details. +export GIT_CONFIG_PARAMETERS="'safe.directory=*'" + ### ### Config file processing ###