new file mode 100644
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+From 9e2ecb2af8302dedc49cb6a63ebe063c58a9e7e3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Date: Thu, 14 Dec 2023 11:29:49 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH] dix: allocate enough space for logical button maps
+
+Both DeviceFocusEvent and the XIQueryPointer reply contain a bit for
+each logical button currently down. Since buttons can be arbitrarily mapped
+to anything up to 255 make sure we have enough bits for the maximum mapping.
+
+CVE-2023-6816, ZDI-CAN-22664, ZDI-CAN-22665
+
+This vulnerability was discovered by:
+Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/commit/9e2ecb2af8302dedc49cb6a63ebe063c58a9e7e3]
+CVE: CVE-2023-6816
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ Xi/xiquerypointer.c | 3 +--
+ dix/enterleave.c | 5 +++--
+ 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/Xi/xiquerypointer.c b/Xi/xiquerypointer.c
+index 5b77b1a444..2b05ac5f39 100644
+--- a/Xi/xiquerypointer.c
++++ b/Xi/xiquerypointer.c
+@@ -149,8 +149,7 @@ ProcXIQueryPointer(ClientPtr client)
+ if (pDev->button) {
+ int i;
+
+- rep.buttons_len =
+- bytes_to_int32(bits_to_bytes(pDev->button->numButtons));
++ rep.buttons_len = bytes_to_int32(bits_to_bytes(256)); /* button map up to 255 */
+ rep.length += rep.buttons_len;
+ buttons = calloc(rep.buttons_len, 4);
+ if (!buttons)
+diff --git a/dix/enterleave.c b/dix/enterleave.c
+index 867ec74363..ded8679d76 100644
+--- a/dix/enterleave.c
++++ b/dix/enterleave.c
+@@ -784,8 +784,9 @@ DeviceFocusEvent(DeviceIntPtr dev, int type, int mode, int detail,
+
+ mouse = IsFloating(dev) ? dev : GetMaster(dev, MASTER_POINTER);
+
+- /* XI 2 event */
+- btlen = (mouse->button) ? bits_to_bytes(mouse->button->numButtons) : 0;
++ /* XI 2 event contains the logical button map - maps are CARD8
++ * so we need 256 bits for the possibly maximum mapping */
++ btlen = (mouse->button) ? bits_to_bytes(256) : 0;
+ btlen = bytes_to_int32(btlen);
+ len = sizeof(xXIFocusInEvent) + btlen * 4;
+
+--
+GitLab
+
new file mode 100644
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+From ece23be888a93b741aa1209d1dbf64636109d6a5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Date: Mon, 18 Dec 2023 14:27:50 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH] dix: Allocate sufficient xEvents for our DeviceStateNotify
+
+If a device has both a button class and a key class and numButtons is
+zero, we can get an OOB write due to event under-allocation.
+
+This function seems to assume a device has either keys or buttons, not
+both. It has two virtually identical code paths, both of which assume
+they're applying to the first event in the sequence.
+
+A device with both a key and button class triggered a logic bug - only
+one xEvent was allocated but the deviceStateNotify pointer was pushed on
+once per type. So effectively this logic code:
+
+ int count = 1;
+ if (button && nbuttons > 32) count++;
+ if (key && nbuttons > 0) count++;
+ if (key && nkeys > 32) count++; // this is basically always true
+ // count is at 2 for our keys + zero button device
+
+ ev = alloc(count * sizeof(xEvent));
+ FixDeviceStateNotify(ev);
+ if (button)
+ FixDeviceStateNotify(ev++);
+ if (key)
+ FixDeviceStateNotify(ev++); // santa drops into the wrong chimney here
+
+If the device has more than 3 valuators, the OOB is pushed back - we're
+off by one so it will happen when the last deviceValuator event is
+written instead.
+
+Fix this by allocating the maximum number of events we may allocate.
+Note that the current behavior is not protocol-correct anyway, this
+patch fixes only the allocation issue.
+
+Note that this issue does not trigger if the device has at least one
+button. While the server does not prevent a button class with zero
+buttons, it is very unlikely.
+
+CVE-2024-0229, ZDI-CAN-22678
+
+This vulnerability was discovered by:
+Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/commit/ece23be888a93b741aa1209d1dbf64636109d6a5]
+CVE: CVE-2024-0229
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ dix/enterleave.c | 6 +++---
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/dix/enterleave.c b/dix/enterleave.c
+index ded8679d76..17964b00a4 100644
+--- a/dix/enterleave.c
++++ b/dix/enterleave.c
+@@ -675,7 +675,8 @@ static void
+ DeliverStateNotifyEvent(DeviceIntPtr dev, WindowPtr win)
+ {
+ int evcount = 1;
+- deviceStateNotify *ev, *sev;
++ deviceStateNotify sev[6 + (MAX_VALUATORS + 2)/3];
++ deviceStateNotify *ev;
+ deviceKeyStateNotify *kev;
+ deviceButtonStateNotify *bev;
+
+@@ -714,7 +715,7 @@ DeliverStateNotifyEvent(DeviceIntPtr dev, WindowPtr win)
+ }
+ }
+
+- sev = ev = xallocarray(evcount, sizeof(xEvent));
++ ev = sev;
+ FixDeviceStateNotify(dev, ev, NULL, NULL, NULL, first);
+
+ if (b != NULL) {
+@@ -770,7 +771,6 @@ DeliverStateNotifyEvent(DeviceIntPtr dev, WindowPtr win)
+
+ DeliverEventsToWindow(dev, win, (xEvent *) sev, evcount,
+ DeviceStateNotifyMask, NullGrab);
+- free(sev);
+ }
+
+ void
+--
+GitLab
+
new file mode 100644
@@ -0,0 +1,221 @@
+From 219c54b8a3337456ce5270ded6a67bcde53553d5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Date: Mon, 18 Dec 2023 12:26:20 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH] dix: fix DeviceStateNotify event calculation
+
+The previous code only made sense if one considers buttons and keys to
+be mutually exclusive on a device. That is not necessarily true, causing
+a number of issues.
+
+This function allocates and fills in the number of xEvents we need to
+send the device state down the wire. This is split across multiple
+32-byte devices including one deviceStateNotify event and optional
+deviceKeyStateNotify, deviceButtonStateNotify and (possibly multiple)
+deviceValuator events.
+
+The previous behavior would instead compose a sequence
+of [state, buttonstate, state, keystate, valuator...]. This is not
+protocol correct, and on top of that made the code extremely convoluted.
+
+Fix this by streamlining: add both button and key into the deviceStateNotify
+and then append the key state and button state, followed by the
+valuators. Finally, the deviceValuator events contain up to 6 valuators
+per event but we only ever sent through 3 at a time. Let's double that
+troughput.
+
+CVE-2024-0229, ZDI-CAN-22678
+
+This vulnerability was discovered by:
+Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/commit/219c54b8a3337456ce5270ded6a67bcde53553d5]
+CVE: CVE-2024-0229
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ dix/enterleave.c | 121 ++++++++++++++++++++---------------------------
+ 1 file changed, 52 insertions(+), 69 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/dix/enterleave.c b/dix/enterleave.c
+index 17964b00a4..7b7ba1098b 100644
+--- a/dix/enterleave.c
++++ b/dix/enterleave.c
+@@ -615,9 +615,15 @@ FixDeviceValuator(DeviceIntPtr dev, deviceValuator * ev, ValuatorClassPtr v,
+
+ ev->type = DeviceValuator;
+ ev->deviceid = dev->id;
+- ev->num_valuators = nval < 3 ? nval : 3;
++ ev->num_valuators = nval < 6 ? nval : 6;
+ ev->first_valuator = first;
+ switch (ev->num_valuators) {
++ case 6:
++ ev->valuator2 = v->axisVal[first + 5];
++ case 5:
++ ev->valuator2 = v->axisVal[first + 4];
++ case 4:
++ ev->valuator2 = v->axisVal[first + 3];
+ case 3:
+ ev->valuator2 = v->axisVal[first + 2];
+ case 2:
+@@ -626,7 +632,6 @@ FixDeviceValuator(DeviceIntPtr dev, deviceValuator * ev, ValuatorClassPtr v,
+ ev->valuator0 = v->axisVal[first];
+ break;
+ }
+- first += ev->num_valuators;
+ }
+
+ static void
+@@ -646,7 +651,7 @@ FixDeviceStateNotify(DeviceIntPtr dev, deviceStateNotify * ev, KeyClassPtr k,
+ ev->num_buttons = b->numButtons;
+ memcpy((char *) ev->buttons, (char *) b->down, 4);
+ }
+- else if (k) {
++ if (k) {
+ ev->classes_reported |= (1 << KeyClass);
+ ev->num_keys = k->xkbInfo->desc->max_key_code -
+ k->xkbInfo->desc->min_key_code;
+@@ -670,15 +675,26 @@ FixDeviceStateNotify(DeviceIntPtr dev, deviceStateNotify * ev, KeyClassPtr k,
+ }
+ }
+
+-
++/**
++ * The device state notify event is split across multiple 32-byte events.
++ * The first one contains the first 32 button state bits, the first 32
++ * key state bits, and the first 3 valuator values.
++ *
++ * If a device has more than that, the server sends out:
++ * - one deviceButtonStateNotify for buttons 32 and above
++ * - one deviceKeyStateNotify for keys 32 and above
++ * - one deviceValuator event per 6 valuators above valuator 4
++ *
++ * All events but the last one have the deviceid binary ORed with MORE_EVENTS,
++ */
+ static void
+ DeliverStateNotifyEvent(DeviceIntPtr dev, WindowPtr win)
+ {
++ /* deviceStateNotify, deviceKeyStateNotify, deviceButtonStateNotify
++ * and one deviceValuator for each 6 valuators */
++ deviceStateNotify sev[3 + (MAX_VALUATORS + 6)/6];
+ int evcount = 1;
+- deviceStateNotify sev[6 + (MAX_VALUATORS + 2)/3];
+- deviceStateNotify *ev;
+- deviceKeyStateNotify *kev;
+- deviceButtonStateNotify *bev;
++ deviceStateNotify *ev = sev;
+
+ KeyClassPtr k;
+ ButtonClassPtr b;
+@@ -691,82 +707,49 @@ DeliverStateNotifyEvent(DeviceIntPtr dev, WindowPtr win)
+
+ if ((b = dev->button) != NULL) {
+ nbuttons = b->numButtons;
+- if (nbuttons > 32)
++ if (nbuttons > 32) /* first 32 are encoded in deviceStateNotify */
+ evcount++;
+ }
+ if ((k = dev->key) != NULL) {
+ nkeys = k->xkbInfo->desc->max_key_code - k->xkbInfo->desc->min_key_code;
+- if (nkeys > 32)
++ if (nkeys > 32) /* first 32 are encoded in deviceStateNotify */
+ evcount++;
+- if (nbuttons > 0) {
+- evcount++;
+- }
+ }
+ if ((v = dev->valuator) != NULL) {
+ nval = v->numAxes;
+-
+- if (nval > 3)
+- evcount++;
+- if (nval > 6) {
+- if (!(k && b))
+- evcount++;
+- if (nval > 9)
+- evcount += ((nval - 7) / 3);
+- }
++ /* first three are encoded in deviceStateNotify, then
++ * it's 6 per deviceValuator event */
++ evcount += ((nval - 3) + 6)/6;
+ }
+
+- ev = sev;
+- FixDeviceStateNotify(dev, ev, NULL, NULL, NULL, first);
+-
+- if (b != NULL) {
+- FixDeviceStateNotify(dev, ev++, NULL, b, v, first);
+- first += 3;
+- nval -= 3;
+- if (nbuttons > 32) {
+- (ev - 1)->deviceid |= MORE_EVENTS;
+- bev = (deviceButtonStateNotify *) ev++;
+- bev->type = DeviceButtonStateNotify;
+- bev->deviceid = dev->id;
+- memcpy((char *) &bev->buttons[4], (char *) &b->down[4],
+- DOWN_LENGTH - 4);
+- }
+- if (nval > 0) {
+- (ev - 1)->deviceid |= MORE_EVENTS;
+- FixDeviceValuator(dev, (deviceValuator *) ev++, v, first);
+- first += 3;
+- nval -= 3;
+- }
++ BUG_RETURN(evcount <= ARRAY_SIZE(sev));
++
++ FixDeviceStateNotify(dev, ev, k, b, v, first);
++
++ if (b != NULL && nbuttons > 32) {
++ deviceButtonStateNotify *bev = (deviceButtonStateNotify *) ++ev;
++ (ev - 1)->deviceid |= MORE_EVENTS;
++ bev->type = DeviceButtonStateNotify;
++ bev->deviceid = dev->id;
++ memcpy((char *) &bev->buttons[4], (char *) &b->down[4],
++ DOWN_LENGTH - 4);
+ }
+
+- if (k != NULL) {
+- FixDeviceStateNotify(dev, ev++, k, NULL, v, first);
+- first += 3;
+- nval -= 3;
+- if (nkeys > 32) {
+- (ev - 1)->deviceid |= MORE_EVENTS;
+- kev = (deviceKeyStateNotify *) ev++;
+- kev->type = DeviceKeyStateNotify;
+- kev->deviceid = dev->id;
+- memmove((char *) &kev->keys[0], (char *) &k->down[4], 28);
+- }
+- if (nval > 0) {
+- (ev - 1)->deviceid |= MORE_EVENTS;
+- FixDeviceValuator(dev, (deviceValuator *) ev++, v, first);
+- first += 3;
+- nval -= 3;
+- }
++ if (k != NULL && nkeys > 32) {
++ deviceKeyStateNotify *kev = (deviceKeyStateNotify *) ++ev;
++ (ev - 1)->deviceid |= MORE_EVENTS;
++ kev->type = DeviceKeyStateNotify;
++ kev->deviceid = dev->id;
++ memmove((char *) &kev->keys[0], (char *) &k->down[4], 28);
+ }
+
++ first = 3;
++ nval -= 3;
+ while (nval > 0) {
+- FixDeviceStateNotify(dev, ev++, NULL, NULL, v, first);
+- first += 3;
+- nval -= 3;
+- if (nval > 0) {
+- (ev - 1)->deviceid |= MORE_EVENTS;
+- FixDeviceValuator(dev, (deviceValuator *) ev++, v, first);
+- first += 3;
+- nval -= 3;
+- }
++ ev->deviceid |= MORE_EVENTS;
++ FixDeviceValuator(dev, (deviceValuator *) ++ev, v, first);
++ first += 6;
++ nval -= 6;
+ }
+
+ DeliverEventsToWindow(dev, win, (xEvent *) sev, evcount,
+--
+GitLab
+
new file mode 100644
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+From df3c65706eb169d5938df0052059f3e0d5981b74 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Date: Thu, 21 Dec 2023 13:48:10 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH] Xi: when creating a new ButtonClass, set the number of
+ buttons
+
+There's a racy sequence where a master device may copy the button class
+from the slave, without ever initializing numButtons. This leads to a
+device with zero buttons but a button class which is invalid.
+
+Let's copy the numButtons value from the source - by definition if we
+don't have a button class yet we do not have any other slave devices
+with more than this number of buttons anyway.
+
+CVE-2024-0229, ZDI-CAN-22678
+
+This vulnerability was discovered by:
+Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/commit/df3c65706eb169d5938df0052059f3e0d5981b74]
+CVE: CVE-2024-0229
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ Xi/exevents.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+diff --git a/Xi/exevents.c b/Xi/exevents.c
+index 54ea11a938..e161714682 100644
+--- a/Xi/exevents.c
++++ b/Xi/exevents.c
+@@ -605,6 +605,7 @@ DeepCopyPointerClasses(DeviceIntPtr from, DeviceIntPtr to)
+ to->button = calloc(1, sizeof(ButtonClassRec));
+ if (!to->button)
+ FatalError("[Xi] no memory for class shift.\n");
++ to->button->numButtons = from->button->numButtons;
+ }
+ else
+ classes->button = NULL;
+--
+GitLab
+
new file mode 100644
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+From 37539cb0bfe4ed96d4499bf371e6b1a474a740fe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Date: Thu, 21 Dec 2023 14:10:11 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH] Xi: require a pointer and keyboard device for
+ XIAttachToMaster
+
+If we remove a master device and specify which other master devices
+attached slaves should be returned to, enforce that those two are
+indeeed a pointer and a keyboard.
+
+Otherwise we can try to attach the keyboards to pointers and vice versa,
+leading to possible crashes later.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/commit/37539cb0bfe4ed96d4499bf371e6b1a474a740fe]
+CVE: CVE-2024-0229
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ Xi/xichangehierarchy.c | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/Xi/xichangehierarchy.c b/Xi/xichangehierarchy.c
+index 504defe566..d2d985848d 100644
+--- a/Xi/xichangehierarchy.c
++++ b/Xi/xichangehierarchy.c
+@@ -270,7 +270,7 @@ remove_master(ClientPtr client, xXIRemoveMasterInfo * r, int flags[MAXDEVICES])
+ if (rc != Success)
+ goto unwind;
+
+- if (!IsMaster(newptr)) {
++ if (!IsMaster(newptr) || !IsPointerDevice(newptr)) {
+ client->errorValue = r->return_pointer;
+ rc = BadDevice;
+ goto unwind;
+@@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ remove_master(ClientPtr client, xXIRemoveMasterInfo * r, int flags[MAXDEVICES])
+ if (rc != Success)
+ goto unwind;
+
+- if (!IsMaster(newkeybd)) {
++ if (!IsMaster(newkeybd) || !IsKeyboardDevice(newkeybd)) {
+ client->errorValue = r->return_keyboard;
+ rc = BadDevice;
+ goto unwind;
+--
+GitLab
+
new file mode 100644
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+From e5e8586a12a3ec915673edffa10dc8fe5e15dac3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 6 Dec 2023 12:09:41 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] glx: Call XACE hooks on the GLX buffer
+
+The XSELINUX code will label resources at creation by checking the
+access mode. When the access mode is DixCreateAccess, it will call the
+function to label the new resource SELinuxLabelResource().
+
+However, GLX buffers do not go through the XACE hooks when created,
+hence leaving the resource actually unlabeled.
+
+When, later, the client tries to create another resource using that
+drawable (like a GC for example), the XSELINUX code would try to use
+the security ID of that object which has never been labeled, get a NULL
+pointer and crash when checking whether the requested permissions are
+granted for subject security ID.
+
+To avoid the issue, make sure to call the XACE hooks when creating the
+GLX buffers.
+
+Credit goes to Donn Seeley <donn@xmission.com> for providing the patch.
+
+CVE-2024-0408
+
+Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
+Acked-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/commit/e5e8586a12a3ec915673edffa10dc8fe5e15dac3]
+CVE: CVE-2024-0408
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ glx/glxcmds.c | 8 ++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/glx/glxcmds.c b/glx/glxcmds.c
+index fc26a2e345..1e46d0c723 100644
+--- a/glx/glxcmds.c
++++ b/glx/glxcmds.c
+@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@
+ #include "indirect_util.h"
+ #include "protocol-versions.h"
+ #include "glxvndabi.h"
++#include "xace.h"
+
+ static char GLXServerVendorName[] = "SGI";
+
+@@ -1392,6 +1393,13 @@ DoCreatePbuffer(ClientPtr client, int screenNum, XID fbconfigId,
+ if (!pPixmap)
+ return BadAlloc;
+
++ err = XaceHook(XACE_RESOURCE_ACCESS, client, glxDrawableId, RT_PIXMAP,
++ pPixmap, RT_NONE, NULL, DixCreateAccess);
++ if (err != Success) {
++ (*pGlxScreen->pScreen->DestroyPixmap) (pPixmap);
++ return err;
++ }
++
+ /* Assign the pixmap the same id as the pbuffer and add it as a
+ * resource so it and the DRI2 drawable will be reclaimed when the
+ * pbuffer is destroyed. */
+--
+GitLab
+
new file mode 100644
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+From 2ef0f1116c65d5cb06d7b6d83f8a1aea702c94f7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 6 Dec 2023 11:51:56 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] ephyr,xwayland: Use the proper private key for cursor
+
+The cursor in DIX is actually split in two parts, the cursor itself and
+the cursor bits, each with their own devPrivates.
+
+The cursor itself includes the cursor bits, meaning that the cursor bits
+devPrivates in within structure of the cursor.
+
+Both Xephyr and Xwayland were using the private key for the cursor bits
+to store the data for the cursor, and when using XSELINUX which comes
+with its own special devPrivates, the data stored in that cursor bits'
+devPrivates would interfere with the XSELINUX devPrivates data and the
+SELINUX security ID would point to some other unrelated data, causing a
+crash in the XSELINUX code when trying to (re)use the security ID.
+
+CVE-2024-0409
+
+Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/commit/2ef0f1116c65d5cb06d7b6d83f8a1aea702c94f7]
+CVE: CVE-2024-0409
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ hw/kdrive/ephyr/ephyrcursor.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/kdrive/ephyr/ephyrcursor.c b/hw/kdrive/ephyr/ephyrcursor.c
+index f991899..3f192d0 100644
+--- a/hw/kdrive/ephyr/ephyrcursor.c
++++ b/hw/kdrive/ephyr/ephyrcursor.c
+@@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ miPointerSpriteFuncRec EphyrPointerSpriteFuncs = {
+ Bool
+ ephyrCursorInit(ScreenPtr screen)
+ {
+- if (!dixRegisterPrivateKey(&ephyrCursorPrivateKey, PRIVATE_CURSOR_BITS,
++ if (!dixRegisterPrivateKey(&ephyrCursorPrivateKey, PRIVATE_CURSOR,
+ sizeof(ephyrCursorRec)))
+ return FALSE;
+
+--
+2.25.1
+
new file mode 100644
@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+From 4a5e9b1895627d40d26045bd0b7ef3dce503cbd1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Date: Thu, 4 Jan 2024 10:01:24 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH] Xi: flush hierarchy events after adding/removing master
+ devices
+
+The `XISendDeviceHierarchyEvent()` function allocates space to store up
+to `MAXDEVICES` (256) `xXIHierarchyInfo` structures in `info`.
+
+If a device with a given ID was removed and a new device with the same
+ID added both in the same operation, the single device ID will lead to
+two info structures being written to `info`.
+
+Since this case can occur for every device ID at once, a total of two
+times `MAXDEVICES` info structures might be written to the allocation.
+
+To avoid it, once one add/remove master is processed, send out the
+device hierarchy event for the current state and continue. That event
+thus only ever has exactly one of either added/removed in it (and
+optionally slave attached/detached).
+
+CVE-2024-21885, ZDI-CAN-22744
+
+This vulnerability was discovered by:
+Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/commit/4a5e9b1895627d40d26045bd0b7ef3dce503cbd1]
+CVE: CVE-2024-21885
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ Xi/xichangehierarchy.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++-----
+ 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/Xi/xichangehierarchy.c b/Xi/xichangehierarchy.c
+index d2d985848d..72d00451e3 100644
+--- a/Xi/xichangehierarchy.c
++++ b/Xi/xichangehierarchy.c
+@@ -416,6 +416,11 @@ ProcXIChangeHierarchy(ClientPtr client)
+ size_t len; /* length of data remaining in request */
+ int rc = Success;
+ int flags[MAXDEVICES] = { 0 };
++ enum {
++ NO_CHANGE,
++ FLUSH,
++ CHANGED,
++ } changes = NO_CHANGE;
+
+ REQUEST(xXIChangeHierarchyReq);
+ REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xXIChangeHierarchyReq);
+@@ -465,8 +470,9 @@ ProcXIChangeHierarchy(ClientPtr client)
+ rc = add_master(client, c, flags);
+ if (rc != Success)
+ goto unwind;
+- }
++ changes = FLUSH;
+ break;
++ }
+ case XIRemoveMaster:
+ {
+ xXIRemoveMasterInfo *r = (xXIRemoveMasterInfo *) any;
+@@ -475,8 +481,9 @@ ProcXIChangeHierarchy(ClientPtr client)
+ rc = remove_master(client, r, flags);
+ if (rc != Success)
+ goto unwind;
+- }
++ changes = FLUSH;
+ break;
++ }
+ case XIDetachSlave:
+ {
+ xXIDetachSlaveInfo *c = (xXIDetachSlaveInfo *) any;
+@@ -485,8 +492,9 @@ ProcXIChangeHierarchy(ClientPtr client)
+ rc = detach_slave(client, c, flags);
+ if (rc != Success)
+ goto unwind;
+- }
++ changes = CHANGED;
+ break;
++ }
+ case XIAttachSlave:
+ {
+ xXIAttachSlaveInfo *c = (xXIAttachSlaveInfo *) any;
+@@ -495,16 +503,25 @@ ProcXIChangeHierarchy(ClientPtr client)
+ rc = attach_slave(client, c, flags);
+ if (rc != Success)
+ goto unwind;
++ changes = CHANGED;
++ break;
+ }
++ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
++ if (changes == FLUSH) {
++ XISendDeviceHierarchyEvent(flags);
++ memset(flags, 0, sizeof(flags));
++ changes = NO_CHANGE;
++ }
++
+ len -= any->length * 4;
+ any = (xXIAnyHierarchyChangeInfo *) ((char *) any + any->length * 4);
+ }
+
+ unwind:
+-
+- XISendDeviceHierarchyEvent(flags);
++ if (changes != NO_CHANGE)
++ XISendDeviceHierarchyEvent(flags);
+ return rc;
+ }
+--
+GitLab
+
new file mode 100644
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+From bc1fdbe46559dd947674375946bbef54dd0ce36b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Jos=C3=A9=20Exp=C3=B3sito?= <jexposit@redhat.com>
+Date: Fri, 22 Dec 2023 18:28:31 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Xi: do not keep linked list pointer during recursion
+
+The `DisableDevice()` function is called whenever an enabled device
+is disabled and it moves the device from the `inputInfo.devices` linked
+list to the `inputInfo.off_devices` linked list.
+
+However, its link/unlink operation has an issue during the recursive
+call to `DisableDevice()` due to the `prev` pointer pointing to a
+removed device.
+
+This issue leads to a length mismatch between the total number of
+devices and the number of device in the list, leading to a heap
+overflow and, possibly, to local privilege escalation.
+
+Simplify the code that checked whether the device passed to
+`DisableDevice()` was in `inputInfo.devices` or not and find the
+previous device after the recursion.
+
+CVE-2024-21886, ZDI-CAN-22840
+
+This vulnerability was discovered by:
+Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/commit/bc1fdbe46559dd947674375946bbef54dd0ce36b]
+CVE: CVE-2024-21886
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ dix/devices.c | 15 ++++++++++++---
+ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/dix/devices.c b/dix/devices.c
+index dca98c8d1b..389d28a23c 100644
+--- a/dix/devices.c
++++ b/dix/devices.c
+@@ -453,14 +453,20 @@ DisableDevice(DeviceIntPtr dev, BOOL sendevent)
+ {
+ DeviceIntPtr *prev, other;
+ BOOL enabled;
++ BOOL dev_in_devices_list = FALSE;
+ int flags[MAXDEVICES] = { 0 };
+
+ if (!dev->enabled)
+ return TRUE;
+
+- for (prev = &inputInfo.devices;
+- *prev && (*prev != dev); prev = &(*prev)->next);
+- if (*prev != dev)
++ for (other = inputInfo.devices; other; other = other->next) {
++ if (other == dev) {
++ dev_in_devices_list = TRUE;
++ break;
++ }
++ }
++
++ if (!dev_in_devices_list)
+ return FALSE;
+
+ TouchEndPhysicallyActiveTouches(dev);
+@@ -511,6 +517,9 @@ DisableDevice(DeviceIntPtr dev, BOOL sendevent)
+ LeaveWindow(dev);
+ SetFocusOut(dev);
+
++ for (prev = &inputInfo.devices;
++ *prev && (*prev != dev); prev = &(*prev)->next);
++
+ *prev = dev->next;
+ dev->next = inputInfo.off_devices;
+ inputInfo.off_devices = dev;
+--
+GitLab
+
new file mode 100644
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+From 26769aa71fcbe0a8403b7fb13b7c9010cc07c3a8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Date: Fri, 5 Jan 2024 09:40:27 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH] dix: when disabling a master, float disabled slaved devices
+ too
+
+Disabling a master device floats all slave devices but we didn't do this
+to already-disabled slave devices. As a result those devices kept their
+reference to the master device resulting in access to already freed
+memory if the master device was removed before the corresponding slave
+device.
+
+And to match this behavior, also forcibly reset that pointer during
+CloseDownDevices().
+
+Related to CVE-2024-21886, ZDI-CAN-22840
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/commit/26769aa71fcbe0a8403b7fb13b7c9010cc07c3a8]
+CVE: CVE-2024-21886
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ dix/devices.c | 12 ++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/dix/devices.c b/dix/devices.c
+index 389d28a23c..84a6406d13 100644
+--- a/dix/devices.c
++++ b/dix/devices.c
+@@ -483,6 +483,13 @@ DisableDevice(DeviceIntPtr dev, BOOL sendevent)
+ flags[other->id] |= XISlaveDetached;
+ }
+ }
++
++ for (other = inputInfo.off_devices; other; other = other->next) {
++ if (!IsMaster(other) && GetMaster(other, MASTER_ATTACHED) == dev) {
++ AttachDevice(NULL, other, NULL);
++ flags[other->id] |= XISlaveDetached;
++ }
++ }
+ }
+ else {
+ for (other = inputInfo.devices; other; other = other->next) {
+@@ -1088,6 +1095,11 @@ CloseDownDevices(void)
+ dev->master = NULL;
+ }
+
++ for (dev = inputInfo.off_devices; dev; dev = dev->next) {
++ if (!IsMaster(dev) && !IsFloating(dev))
++ dev->master = NULL;
++ }
++
+ CloseDeviceList(&inputInfo.devices);
+ CloseDeviceList(&inputInfo.off_devices);
+
+--
+GitLab
+
@@ -20,6 +20,16 @@ SRC_URI += "file://0001-xf86pciBus.c-use-Intel-ddx-only-for-pre-gen4-hardwar.pat
file://CVE-2023-5380.patch \
file://CVE-2023-6377.patch \
file://CVE-2023-6478.patch \
+ file://CVE-2023-6816.patch \
+ file://CVE-2024-0229-1.patch \
+ file://CVE-2024-0229-2.patch \
+ file://CVE-2024-0229-3.patch \
+ file://CVE-2024-0229-4.patch \
+ file://CVE-2024-21885.patch \
+ file://CVE-2024-21886-1.patch \
+ file://CVE-2024-21886-2.patch \
+ file://CVE-2024-0408.patch \
+ file://CVE-2024-0409.patch \
"
SRC_URI[md5sum] = "453fc86aac8c629b3a5b77e8dcca30bf"
SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "54b199c9280ff8bf0f73a54a759645bd0eeeda7255d1c99310d5b7595f3ac066"