new file mode 100644
@@ -0,0 +1,385 @@
+From 4cef5e965a46e9271aed62631b152e4bd23c1e3c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Aris Adamantiadis <aris@0xbadc0de.be>
+Date: Tue, 12 Dec 2023 23:09:57 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2023-48795: client side mitigation
+
+Signed-off-by: Aris Adamantiadis <aris@0xbadc0de.be>
+Signed-off-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.com/libssh/libssh-mirror/-/commit/4cef5e965a46e9271aed62631b152e4bd23c1e3c]
+CVE: CVE-2023-48795
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ include/libssh/packet.h | 1 +
+ include/libssh/session.h | 6 +++++
+ src/curve25519.c | 18 +++----------
+ src/dh.c | 6 +----
+ src/ecdh.c | 7 +----
+ src/ecdh_crypto.c | 10 ++-----
+ src/ecdh_gcrypt.c | 10 +++----
+ src/ecdh_mbedcrypto.c | 11 +++-----
+ src/kex.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++----
+ src/packet.c | 56 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
+ src/packet_cb.c | 12 +++++++++
+ 11 files changed, 118 insertions(+), 53 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/include/libssh/packet.h b/include/libssh/packet.h
+index fbe09700..8800e16b 100644
+--- a/include/libssh/packet.h
++++ b/include/libssh/packet.h
+@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ SSH_PACKET_CALLBACK(ssh_packet_ext_info);
+ SSH_PACKET_CALLBACK(ssh_packet_kexdh_init);
+ #endif
+
++int ssh_packet_send_newkeys(ssh_session session);
+ int ssh_packet_send_unimplemented(ssh_session session, uint32_t seqnum);
+ int ssh_packet_parse_type(ssh_session session);
+ //int packet_flush(ssh_session session, int enforce_blocking);
+diff --git a/include/libssh/session.h b/include/libssh/session.h
+index 23633cc2..b8810f54 100644
+--- a/include/libssh/session.h
++++ b/include/libssh/session.h
+@@ -69,6 +69,12 @@ enum ssh_pending_call_e {
+ /* Client successfully authenticated */
+ #define SSH_SESSION_FLAG_AUTHENTICATED 2
+
++/* The current SSH2 session implements the "strict KEX" feature and should behave
++ * differently on SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS. */
++#define SSH_SESSION_FLAG_KEX_STRICT 0x0010
++/* Unexpected packets have been sent while the session was still unencrypted */
++#define SSH_SESSION_FLAG_KEX_TAINTED 0x0020
++
+ /* codes to use with ssh_handle_packets*() */
+ /* Infinite timeout */
+ #define SSH_TIMEOUT_INFINITE -1
+diff --git a/src/curve25519.c b/src/curve25519.c
+index 167209f4..6eda5feb 100644
+--- a/src/curve25519.c
++++ b/src/curve25519.c
+@@ -166,12 +166,7 @@ int ssh_client_curve25519_reply(ssh_session session, ssh_buffer packet){
+ }
+
+ /* Send the MSG_NEWKEYS */
+- if (ssh_buffer_add_u8(session->out_buffer, SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS) < 0) {
+- goto error;
+- }
+-
+- rc=ssh_packet_send(session);
+- SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_PROTOCOL, "SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS sent");
++ rc = ssh_packet_send_newkeys(session);
+ return rc;
+ error:
+ return SSH_ERROR;
+@@ -297,15 +292,10 @@ int ssh_server_curve25519_init(ssh_session session, ssh_buffer packet){
+ return SSH_ERROR;
+ }
+
+- /* Send the MSG_NEWKEYS */
+- rc = ssh_buffer_add_u8(session->out_buffer, SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS);
+- if (rc < 0) {
+- goto error;
+- }
+-
+ session->dh_handshake_state = DH_STATE_NEWKEYS_SENT;
+- rc = ssh_packet_send(session);
+- SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_PROTOCOL, "SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS sent");
++
++ /* Send the MSG_NEWKEYS */
++ rc = ssh_packet_send_newkeys(session);
+
+ return rc;
+ error:
+diff --git a/src/dh.c b/src/dh.c
+index cc12fd46..33883f2d 100644
+--- a/src/dh.c
++++ b/src/dh.c
+@@ -735,11 +735,7 @@ int ssh_client_dh_reply(ssh_session session, ssh_buffer packet){
+ }
+
+ /* Send the MSG_NEWKEYS */
+- if (ssh_buffer_add_u8(session->out_buffer, SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS) < 0) {
+- goto error;
+- }
+-
+- rc=ssh_packet_send(session);
++ rc = ssh_packet_send_newkeys(session);
+ SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_PROTOCOL, "SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS sent");
+ return rc;
+ error:
+diff --git a/src/ecdh.c b/src/ecdh.c
+index f7fcaf13..1fef7ec9 100644
+--- a/src/ecdh.c
++++ b/src/ecdh.c
+@@ -72,12 +72,7 @@ int ssh_client_ecdh_reply(ssh_session session, ssh_buffer packet){
+ }
+
+ /* Send the MSG_NEWKEYS */
+- if (ssh_buffer_add_u8(session->out_buffer, SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS) < 0) {
+- goto error;
+- }
+-
+- rc=ssh_packet_send(session);
+- SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_PROTOCOL, "SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS sent");
++ rc = ssh_packet_send_newkeys(session);
+ return rc;
+ error:
+ return SSH_ERROR;
+diff --git a/src/ecdh_crypto.c b/src/ecdh_crypto.c
+index 24f21c03..7e5f0cc7 100644
+--- a/src/ecdh_crypto.c
++++ b/src/ecdh_crypto.c
+@@ -318,15 +318,9 @@ int ssh_server_ecdh_init(ssh_session session, ssh_buffer packet){
+ return SSH_ERROR;
+ }
+
+- /* Send the MSG_NEWKEYS */
+- rc = ssh_buffer_add_u8(session->out_buffer, SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS);
+- if (rc < 0) {
+- return SSH_ERROR;;
+- }
+-
+ session->dh_handshake_state = DH_STATE_NEWKEYS_SENT;
+- rc = ssh_packet_send(session);
+- SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_PROTOCOL, "SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS sent");
++ /* Send the MSG_NEWKEYS */
++ rc = ssh_packet_send_newkeys(session);
+
+ return rc;
+ }
+diff --git a/src/ecdh_gcrypt.c b/src/ecdh_gcrypt.c
+index e43cacea..c1db7f5d 100644
+--- a/src/ecdh_gcrypt.c
++++ b/src/ecdh_gcrypt.c
+@@ -362,17 +362,13 @@ int ssh_server_ecdh_init(ssh_session session, ssh_buffer packet) {
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+-
++ session->dh_handshake_state = DH_STATE_NEWKEYS_SENT;
+ /* Send the MSG_NEWKEYS */
+- rc = ssh_buffer_add_u8(session->out_buffer, SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS);
+- if (rc != SSH_OK) {
++ rc = ssh_packet_send_newkeys(session);
++ if (rc == SSH_ERROR) {
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+- session->dh_handshake_state = DH_STATE_NEWKEYS_SENT;
+- rc = ssh_packet_send(session);
+- SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_PROTOCOL, "SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS sent");
+-
+ out:
+ gcry_sexp_release(param);
+ gcry_sexp_release(key);
+diff --git a/src/ecdh_mbedcrypto.c b/src/ecdh_mbedcrypto.c
+index fa350028..24924508 100644
+--- a/src/ecdh_mbedcrypto.c
++++ b/src/ecdh_mbedcrypto.c
+@@ -293,16 +293,13 @@ int ssh_server_ecdh_init(ssh_session session, ssh_buffer packet)
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+- rc = ssh_buffer_add_u8(session->out_buffer, SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS);
+- if (rc < 0) {
+- rc = SSH_ERROR;
++ session->dh_handshake_state = DH_STATE_NEWKEYS_SENT;
++ /* Send the MSG_NEWKEYS */
++ rc = ssh_packet_send_newkeys(session);
++ if (rc == SSH_ERROR) {
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+- session->dh_handshake_state = DH_STATE_NEWKEYS_SENT;
+- rc = ssh_packet_send(session);
+- SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_PROTOCOL, "SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS sent");
+-
+ out:
+ mbedtls_ecp_group_free(&grp);
+ return rc;
+diff --git a/src/kex.c b/src/kex.c
+index 82686e4b..7f1bb324 100644
+--- a/src/kex.c
++++ b/src/kex.c
+@@ -105,6 +105,9 @@
+
+ /* RFC 8308 */
+ #define KEX_EXTENSION_CLIENT "ext-info-c"
++/* Strict kex mitigation against CVE-2023-48795 */
++#define KEX_STRICT_CLIENT "kex-strict-c-v00@openssh.com"
++#define KEX_STRICT_SERVER "kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com"
+
+ /* NOTE: This is a fixed API and the index is defined by ssh_kex_types_e */
+ static const char *default_methods[] = {
+@@ -521,6 +524,27 @@ SSH_PACKET_CALLBACK(ssh_packet_kexinit){
+ goto error;
+ }
+
++ /*
++ * handle the "strict KEX" feature. If supported by peer, then set up the
++ * flag and verify packet sequence numbers.
++ */
++ if (server_kex) {
++ ok = ssh_match_group(session->next_crypto->client_kex.methods[SSH_KEX],
++ KEX_STRICT_CLIENT);
++ if (ok) {
++ SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_DEBUG, "Client supports strict kex, enabling.");
++ session->flags |= SSH_SESSION_FLAG_KEX_STRICT;
++ }
++ } else {
++ /* client kex */
++ ok = ssh_match_group(session->next_crypto->server_kex.methods[SSH_KEX],
++ KEX_STRICT_SERVER);
++ if (ok) {
++ SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_DEBUG, "Server supports strict kex, enabling.");
++ session->flags |= SSH_SESSION_FLAG_KEX_STRICT;
++ }
++ }
++
+ /*
+ * If client sent a ext-info-c message in the kex list, it supports
+ * RFC 8308 extension negotiation.
+@@ -778,21 +802,21 @@ int ssh_set_client_kex(ssh_session session)
+ return SSH_OK;
+ }
+
+- /* Here we append ext-info-c to the list of kex algorithms */
++ /* Here we append ext-info-c and kex-strict-c-v00@openssh.com to the list of kex algorithms */
+ kex = client->methods[SSH_KEX];
+ len = strlen(kex);
+- if (len + strlen(KEX_EXTENSION_CLIENT) + 2 < len) {
++ /* Comma, comma, nul byte */
++ kex_len = len + 1 + strlen(KEX_EXTENSION_CLIENT) + 1 + strlen(KEX_STRICT_CLIENT ) + 1;
++ if (kex_len >= MAX_PACKET_LEN) {
+ /* Overflow */
+ return SSH_ERROR;
+ }
+- kex_len = len + strlen(KEX_EXTENSION_CLIENT) + 2; /* comma, NULL */
+ kex_tmp = realloc(kex, kex_len);
+ if (kex_tmp == NULL) {
+- free(kex);
+ ssh_set_error_oom(session);
+ return SSH_ERROR;
+ }
+- snprintf(kex_tmp + len, kex_len - len, ",%s", KEX_EXTENSION_CLIENT);
++ snprintf(kex_tmp + len, kex_len - len, ",%s,%s", KEX_EXTENSION_CLIENT, KEX_STRICT_CLIENT);
+ client->methods[SSH_KEX] = kex_tmp;
+
+ return SSH_OK;
+diff --git a/src/packet.c b/src/packet.c
+index 61a44237..8025a7ff 100644
+--- a/src/packet.c
++++ b/src/packet.c
+@@ -1126,6 +1126,19 @@ int ssh_packet_socket_callback(const void *data, size_t receivedlen, void *user)
+ }
+ #endif /* WITH_ZLIB */
+ payloadsize = ssh_buffer_get_len(session->in_buffer);
++ if (session->recv_seq == UINT32_MAX) {
++ /* Overflowing sequence numbers is always fishy */
++ if (session->current_crypto == NULL) {
++ /* don't allow sequence number overflow when unencrypted */
++ ssh_set_error(session,
++ SSH_FATAL,
++ "Incoming sequence number overflow");
++ goto error;
++ } else {
++ SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_WARNING,
++ "Incoming sequence number overflow");
++ }
++ }
+ session->recv_seq++;
+ if (session->raw_counter != NULL) {
+ session->raw_counter->in_bytes += payloadsize;
+@@ -1141,7 +1154,19 @@ int ssh_packet_socket_callback(const void *data, size_t receivedlen, void *user)
+ SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_PACKET,
+ "packet: read type %hhd [len=%d,padding=%hhd,comp=%d,payload=%d]",
+ session->in_packet.type, packet_len, padding, compsize, payloadsize);
+-
++ if (session->current_crypto == NULL) {
++ /* In strict kex, only a few packets are allowed. Taint the session
++ * if we received packets that are normally allowed but to be
++ * refused if we are in strict kex when KEX is over.
++ */
++ uint8_t type = session->in_packet.type;
++
++ if (type != SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT && type != SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS &&
++ (type < SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT ||
++ type > SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST)) {
++ session->flags |= SSH_SESSION_FLAG_KEX_TAINTED;
++ }
++ }
+ /* Check if the packet is expected */
+ filter_result = ssh_packet_incoming_filter(session);
+
+@@ -1153,6 +1178,9 @@ int ssh_packet_socket_callback(const void *data, size_t receivedlen, void *user)
+ case SSH_PACKET_DENIED:
+ goto error;
+ case SSH_PACKET_UNKNOWN:
++ if (session->current_crypto == NULL) {
++ session->flags |= SSH_SESSION_FLAG_KEX_TAINTED;
++ }
+ ssh_packet_send_unimplemented(session, session->recv_seq - 1);
+ break;
+ }
+@@ -1276,9 +1304,35 @@ void ssh_packet_process(ssh_session session, uint8_t type){
+ if(r==SSH_PACKET_NOT_USED){
+ SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_RARE,"Couldn't do anything with packet type %d",type);
+ ssh_packet_send_unimplemented(session, session->recv_seq-1);
++ if (session->current_crypto == NULL) {
++ session->flags |= SSH_SESSION_FLAG_KEX_TAINTED;
++ }
+ }
+ }
+
++/** @internal
++ * @brief sends a SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS when enabling the new negotiated ciphers
++ * @param session the SSH session
++ * @return SSH_ERROR on error, else SSH_OK
++ */
++int ssh_packet_send_newkeys(ssh_session session)
++{
++ int rc;
++
++ /* Send the MSG_NEWKEYS */
++ rc = ssh_buffer_add_u8(session->out_buffer, SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS);
++ if (rc < 0) {
++ return rc;
++ }
++
++ rc = ssh_packet_send(session);
++ if (rc == SSH_ERROR) {
++ return rc;
++ }
++ SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_DEBUG, "SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS sent");
++ return rc;
++}
++
+ /** @internal
+ * @brief sends a SSH_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED answer to an unhandled packet
+ * @param session the SSH session
+diff --git a/src/packet_cb.c b/src/packet_cb.c
+index 6aa64766..de03fb07 100644
+--- a/src/packet_cb.c
++++ b/src/packet_cb.c
+@@ -154,6 +154,18 @@ SSH_PACKET_CALLBACK(ssh_packet_newkeys){
+ goto error;
+ }
+
++ if (session->flags & SSH_SESSION_FLAG_KEX_STRICT) {
++ /* reset packet sequence number when running in strict kex mode */
++ session->recv_seq = 0;
++ /* Check that we aren't tainted */
++ if (session->flags & SSH_SESSION_FLAG_KEX_TAINTED) {
++ ssh_set_error(session,
++ SSH_FATAL,
++ "Received unexpected packets in strict KEX mode.");
++ goto error;
++ }
++}
++
+ if(session->server){
+ /* server things are done in server.c */
+ session->dh_handshake_state=DH_STATE_FINISHED;
+--
+2.25.1
+
new file mode 100644
@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+From 0870c8db28be9eb457ee3d4f9a168959d9507efd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Aris Adamantiadis <aris@0xbadc0de.be>
+Date: Tue, 12 Dec 2023 23:30:26 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2023-48795: Server side mitigations
+
+Signed-off-by: Aris Adamantiadis <aris@0xbadc0de.be>
+Signed-off-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.com/libssh/libssh-mirror/-/commit/0870c8db28be9eb457ee3d4f9a168959d9507efd]
+CVE: CVE-2023-48795
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ include/libssh/kex.h | 1 +
+ src/kex.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
+ src/server.c | 8 +++++++-
+ 3 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/include/libssh/kex.h b/include/libssh/kex.h
+index a626d105..2b1a74d5 100644
+--- a/include/libssh/kex.h
++++ b/include/libssh/kex.h
+@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ SSH_PACKET_CALLBACK(ssh_packet_kexinit);
+ int ssh_send_kex(ssh_session session, int server_kex);
+ void ssh_list_kex(struct ssh_kex_struct *kex);
+ int ssh_set_client_kex(ssh_session session);
++int ssh_kex_append_extensions(ssh_session session, struct ssh_kex_struct *pkex);
+ int ssh_kex_select_methods(ssh_session session);
+ int ssh_verify_existing_algo(enum ssh_kex_types_e algo, const char *name);
+ char *ssh_keep_known_algos(enum ssh_kex_types_e algo, const char *list);
+diff --git a/src/kex.c b/src/kex.c
+index 2ed90235..b03e6484 100644
+--- a/src/kex.c
++++ b/src/kex.c
+@@ -766,11 +766,8 @@ int ssh_set_client_kex(ssh_session session)
+ {
+ struct ssh_kex_struct *client= &session->next_crypto->client_kex;
+ const char *wanted;
+- char *kex = NULL;
+- char *kex_tmp = NULL;
+ int ok;
+ int i;
+- size_t kex_len, len;
+
+ ok = ssh_get_random(client->cookie, 16, 0);
+ if (!ok) {
+@@ -802,11 +799,33 @@ int ssh_set_client_kex(ssh_session session)
+ return SSH_OK;
+ }
+
+- /* Here we append ext-info-c and kex-strict-c-v00@openssh.com to the list of kex algorithms */
+- kex = client->methods[SSH_KEX];
++ ok = ssh_kex_append_extensions(session, client);
++ if (ok != SSH_OK){
++ return ok;
++ }
++
++ return SSH_OK;
++}
++
++int ssh_kex_append_extensions(ssh_session session, struct ssh_kex_struct *pkex)
++{
++ char *kex = NULL;
++ char *kex_tmp = NULL;
++ size_t kex_len, len;
++
++ /* Here we append ext-info-c and kex-strict-c-v00@openssh.com for client
++ * and kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com for server to the list of kex algorithms
++ */
++ kex = pkex->methods[SSH_KEX];
+ len = strlen(kex);
+- /* Comma, comma, nul byte */
+- kex_len = len + 1 + strlen(KEX_EXTENSION_CLIENT) + 1 + strlen(KEX_STRICT_CLIENT ) + 1;
++ if (session->server) {
++ /* Comma, nul byte */
++ kex_len = len + 1 + strlen(KEX_STRICT_SERVER) + 1;
++ } else {
++ /* Comma, comma, nul byte */
++ kex_len = len + 1 + strlen(KEX_EXTENSION_CLIENT) + 1 +
++ strlen(KEX_STRICT_CLIENT) + 1;
++ }
+ if (kex_len >= MAX_PACKET_LEN) {
+ /* Overflow */
+ return SSH_ERROR;
+@@ -816,9 +835,16 @@ int ssh_set_client_kex(ssh_session session)
+ ssh_set_error_oom(session);
+ return SSH_ERROR;
+ }
+- snprintf(kex_tmp + len, kex_len - len, ",%s,%s", KEX_EXTENSION_CLIENT, KEX_STRICT_CLIENT);
+- client->methods[SSH_KEX] = kex_tmp;
+-
++ if (session->server){
++ snprintf(kex_tmp + len, kex_len - len, ",%s", KEX_STRICT_SERVER);
++ } else {
++ snprintf(kex_tmp + len,
++ kex_len - len,
++ ",%s,%s",
++ KEX_EXTENSION_CLIENT,
++ KEX_STRICT_CLIENT);
++ }
++ pkex->methods[SSH_KEX] = kex_tmp;
+ return SSH_OK;
+ }
+
+diff --git a/src/server.c b/src/server.c
+index bc98da4f..f3d24a7b 100644
+--- a/src/server.c
++++ b/src/server.c
+@@ -158,7 +158,13 @@ static int server_set_kex(ssh_session session) {
+ }
+ }
+
+- return 0;
++ /* Do not append the extensions during rekey */
++ if (session->flags & SSH_SESSION_FLAG_AUTHENTICATED) {
++ return SSH_OK;
++ }
++
++ rc = ssh_kex_append_extensions(session, server);
++ return rc;
+ }
+
+ int ssh_server_init_kex(ssh_session session) {
+--
+2.25.1
+
new file mode 100644
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+From 5846e57538c750c5ce67df887d09fa99861c79c6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 14 Dec 2023 12:22:01 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2023-48795: Strip extensions from both kex lists for
+ matching
+
+Signed-off-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.com/libssh/libssh-mirror/-/commit/5846e57538c750c5ce67df887d09fa99861c79c6]
+CVE: CVE-2023-48795
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ src/kex.c | 16 ++++++++++++----
+ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/kex.c b/src/kex.c
+index b03e6484..c100d908 100644
+--- a/src/kex.c
++++ b/src/kex.c
+@@ -857,11 +857,19 @@ int ssh_kex_select_methods (ssh_session session){
+ char *ext_start = NULL;
+ int i;
+
+- /* Here we should drop the ext-info-c from the list so we avoid matching.
++ /* Here we should drop the extensions from the list so we avoid matching.
+ * it. We added it to the end, so we can just truncate the string here */
+- ext_start = strstr(client->methods[SSH_KEX], ","KEX_EXTENSION_CLIENT);
+- if (ext_start != NULL) {
+- ext_start[0] = '\0';
++ if (session->client) {
++ ext_start = strstr(client->methods[SSH_KEX], "," KEX_EXTENSION_CLIENT);
++ if (ext_start != NULL) {
++ ext_start[0] = '\0';
++ }
++ }
++ if (session->server) {
++ ext_start = strstr(server->methods[SSH_KEX], "," KEX_STRICT_SERVER);
++ if (ext_start != NULL) {
++ ext_start[0] = '\0';
++ }
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < KEX_METHODS_SIZE; i++) {
+--
+2.25.1
+
@@ -8,6 +8,9 @@ DEPENDS = "zlib openssl"
SRC_URI = "git://git.libssh.org/projects/libssh.git;protocol=https;branch=stable-0.8 \
file://CVE-2020-16135.patch \
+ file://CVE-2023-48795-1.patch \
+ file://CVE-2023-48795-2.patch \
+ file://CVE-2023-48795-3.patch \
"
SRCREV = "04685a74df9ce1db1bc116a83a0da78b4f4fa1f8"