From patchwork Wed Mar 15 14:00:54 2023 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Steve Sakoman X-Patchwork-Id: 20981 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id B4922C7618D for ; Wed, 15 Mar 2023 14:01:30 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail-pj1-f45.google.com (mail-pj1-f45.google.com [209.85.216.45]) by mx.groups.io with SMTP id smtpd.web10.8777.1678888888323139588 for ; Wed, 15 Mar 2023 07:01:28 -0700 Authentication-Results: mx.groups.io; dkim=pass header.i=@sakoman-com.20210112.gappssmtp.com header.s=20210112 header.b=M3qM7mh2; spf=softfail (domain: sakoman.com, ip: 209.85.216.45, mailfrom: steve@sakoman.com) Received: by mail-pj1-f45.google.com with SMTP id y2so18912644pjg.3 for ; Wed, 15 Mar 2023 07:01:28 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=sakoman-com.20210112.gappssmtp.com; s=20210112; t=1678888887; h=content-transfer-encoding:mime-version:references:in-reply-to :message-id:date:subject:to:from:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id :reply-to; bh=DaCjpzBFMljmhm/pAMgvVMr4NbV5roYDfhkAXubkpXk=; b=M3qM7mh2IXafVkdCwPOLjs1roP+pLSK6ojDH8IrMWj2gxk83FdEi9kWA9JT6BJT7km 1Ta0A82Ky/J/1mYciEVUDeL36dWMtdNB6lxmGrJQbt32vCU3iJLRpRdDSYlL4gZExXh3 nj2wolvtlaqdDLiqLEU4bb7TqZi4UOUt3WkKYAKzurQ7L8EgmiwJUbOMcUKi/DZ+kYEg 54MbZbH4i+oEamPt390FwSL5M46wSKZaCU7I8wQvKHiUmA6xXQ2GxgAb8ITKCVDG5/WW K+K9ft9KBMeUQQJkzXZHxjCBKSYj3+h8JotvF21EyosJXpytqdXCDBwtc2jLeBXhUmZ5 2Htg== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20210112; t=1678888887; h=content-transfer-encoding:mime-version:references:in-reply-to :message-id:date:subject:to:from:x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc :subject:date:message-id:reply-to; bh=DaCjpzBFMljmhm/pAMgvVMr4NbV5roYDfhkAXubkpXk=; b=Y37YkhYm+5VsWrKwzqaqhLNPwFaS5fB77llpgt0jt0jbpHRBgCtlyitMLrR3nfrm7R /pEUgn/cT9nYHZmQSIaxtDZAH2bxKtOOYT+BYYRLacboKsUX4cQujHEvBg9C8ZS0R7q0 x/cEXF7UGuuvVB8PDb+olrx2HX42Z9hZysmDfbi0sJ/P2dQSuqDyrzrUYPi0wS4cPcts YY7I0K6/9iaWoLn9MCeYLfFlqIiDVQhyj9dIdxE0T/O1uORtDfMGnqU+xu6YqALsLL5y 9dQYi2G8jm3BOV1ZCpNnoI0CXtOUDafnN/9YnBVAAgHL28P3pNFOx+ZuXewvMDHUsmsy Xwyg== X-Gm-Message-State: AO0yUKXp2lAeU0UKyhsrVWNqp34ynUEPvWgcV7pfwvRTpFuCHn8pVA3k 93JGhM0N9uUte+S8M9TwOYvfPz9R1HGWP6IRujc= X-Google-Smtp-Source: AK7set+itIVUVt8nz4ZpbFHVpvXjzM4yx9lE1POTlHkMIRKi3OcUA/WQ0IjqaZCnm35wlyhjMx4fOw== X-Received: by 2002:a17:903:42c4:b0:1a1:6584:31b0 with SMTP id jy4-20020a17090342c400b001a1658431b0mr1906040plb.30.1678888887194; Wed, 15 Mar 2023 07:01:27 -0700 (PDT) Received: from hexa.router0800d9.com (dhcp-72-253-4-112.hawaiiantel.net. [72.253.4.112]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id h6-20020a170902f54600b001a0432ca99csm3663755plf.269.2023.03.15.07.01.26 for (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Wed, 15 Mar 2023 07:01:26 -0700 (PDT) From: Steve Sakoman To: openembedded-core@lists.openembedded.org Subject: [OE-core][kirkstone 03/22] gnutls: fix CVE-2023-0361 timing side-channel in the TLS RSA key exchange code Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2023 04:00:54 -1000 Message-Id: <05b1222815bec400d573f7b06c0ad6b7b2d78a80.1678888649.git.steve@sakoman.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.34.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 List-Id: X-Webhook-Received: from li982-79.members.linode.com [45.33.32.79] by aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org with HTTPS for ; Wed, 15 Mar 2023 14:01:30 -0000 X-Groupsio-URL: https://lists.openembedded.org/g/openembedded-core/message/178554 From: Vivek Kumbhar Remove branching that depends on secret data. since the `ok` variable isn't used any more, we can remove all code used to calculate it Signed-off-by: Vivek Kumbhar Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman --- .../gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2023-0361.patch | 85 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls_3.7.4.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 86 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2023-0361.patch diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2023-0361.patch b/meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2023-0361.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..943f4ca704 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2023-0361.patch @@ -0,0 +1,85 @@ +From 80a6ce8ddb02477cd724cd5b2944791aaddb702a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Alexander Sosedkin +Date: Tue, 9 Aug 2022 16:05:53 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] auth/rsa: side-step potential side-channel + +Signed-off-by: Alexander Sosedkin +Signed-off-by: Hubert Kario +Tested-by: Hubert Kario +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.com/gnutls/gnutls/-/commit/80a6ce8ddb02477cd724cd5b2944791aaddb702a + https://gitlab.com/gnutls/gnutls/-/commit/4b7ff428291c7ed77c6d2635577c83a43bbae558] +CVE: CVE-2023-0361 +Signed-off-by: Vivek Kumbhar +--- + lib/auth/rsa.c | 30 +++--------------------------- + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/lib/auth/rsa.c b/lib/auth/rsa.c +index 8108ee8..858701f 100644 +--- a/lib/auth/rsa.c ++++ b/lib/auth/rsa.c +@@ -155,13 +155,10 @@ static int + proc_rsa_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t * data, + size_t _data_size) + { +- const char attack_error[] = "auth_rsa: Possible PKCS #1 attack\n"; + gnutls_datum_t ciphertext; + int ret, dsize; + ssize_t data_size = _data_size; + volatile uint8_t ver_maj, ver_min; +- volatile uint8_t check_ver_min; +- volatile uint32_t ok; + + #ifdef ENABLE_SSL3 + if (get_num_version(session) == GNUTLS_SSL3) { +@@ -187,7 +184,6 @@ proc_rsa_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t * data, + + ver_maj = _gnutls_get_adv_version_major(session); + ver_min = _gnutls_get_adv_version_minor(session); +- check_ver_min = (session->internals.allow_wrong_pms == 0); + + session->key.key.data = gnutls_malloc(GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE); + if (session->key.key.data == NULL) { +@@ -206,10 +202,9 @@ proc_rsa_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t * data, + return ret; + } + +- ret = +- gnutls_privkey_decrypt_data2(session->internals.selected_key, +- 0, &ciphertext, session->key.key.data, +- session->key.key.size); ++ gnutls_privkey_decrypt_data2(session->internals.selected_key, ++ 0, &ciphertext, session->key.key.data, ++ session->key.key.size); + /* After this point, any conditional on failure that cause differences + * in execution may create a timing or cache access pattern side + * channel that can be used as an oracle, so treat very carefully */ +@@ -225,25 +220,6 @@ proc_rsa_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t * data, + * Vlastimil Klima, Ondej Pokorny and Tomas Rosa. + */ + +- /* ok is 0 in case of error and 1 in case of success. */ +- +- /* if ret < 0 */ +- ok = CONSTCHECK_EQUAL(ret, 0); +- /* session->key.key.data[0] must equal ver_maj */ +- ok &= CONSTCHECK_EQUAL(session->key.key.data[0], ver_maj); +- /* if check_ver_min then session->key.key.data[1] must equal ver_min */ +- ok &= CONSTCHECK_NOT_EQUAL(check_ver_min, 0) & +- CONSTCHECK_EQUAL(session->key.key.data[1], ver_min); +- +- if (ok) { +- /* call logging function unconditionally so all branches are +- * indistinguishable for timing and cache access when debug +- * logging is disabled */ +- _gnutls_no_log("%s", attack_error); +- } else { +- _gnutls_debug_log("%s", attack_error); +- } +- + /* This is here to avoid the version check attack + * discussed above. + */ +-- +2.25.1 + diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls_3.7.4.bb b/meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls_3.7.4.bb index fb06337efb..fcd9af05dc 100644 --- a/meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls_3.7.4.bb +++ b/meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls_3.7.4.bb @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ SHRT_VER = "${@d.getVar('PV').split('.')[0]}.${@d.getVar('PV').split('.')[1]}" SRC_URI = "https://www.gnupg.org/ftp/gcrypt/gnutls/v${SHRT_VER}/gnutls-${PV}.tar.xz \ file://arm_eabi.patch \ file://CVE-2022-2509.patch \ + file://CVE-2023-0361.patch \ " SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "e6adbebcfbc95867de01060d93c789938cf89cc1d1f6ef9ef661890f6217451f"