From patchwork Tue Aug 15 09:50:51 2023 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Adrian Freihofer X-Patchwork-Id: 28794 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7ADE9C001B0 for ; Tue, 15 Aug 2023 09:52:01 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail-wm1-f50.google.com (mail-wm1-f50.google.com [209.85.128.50]) by mx.groups.io with SMTP id smtpd.web11.130912.1692093111712886726 for ; Tue, 15 Aug 2023 02:51:52 -0700 Authentication-Results: mx.groups.io; dkim=pass header.i=@gmail.com header.s=20221208 header.b=hK9iEjT7; spf=pass (domain: gmail.com, ip: 209.85.128.50, mailfrom: adrian.freihofer@gmail.com) Received: by mail-wm1-f50.google.com with SMTP id 5b1f17b1804b1-3fea0640d88so12979355e9.2 for ; Tue, 15 Aug 2023 02:51:51 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20221208; t=1692093110; x=1692697910; h=content-transfer-encoding:mime-version:references:in-reply-to :message-id:date:subject:cc:to:from:from:to:cc:subject:date :message-id:reply-to; bh=84P/mtDSDnX/VjR6ZR4LHh8P71yy7C9xiUdhRFi2sjk=; b=hK9iEjT7/ZD3EPjEYhY8GJyYr6lYojPZbqTSMeG2OAnSVyFmbYNVuJF3etnRttrq4g EJh2/n33zLvb4j3+BzzHTZIrUukO4lCJvaPCiMhUQ4r+On/kXtgrfSiVIE2IRPUzqXiV 55ybhhuRV0Gs7K6LBMHrw/oGLPgzfavGiF5LdhJ37X1x5IbxEDCZw1IPzF3Xm1zkrfG9 sEagOWsdqfO9qS8EI1uWMsomUYcpZtEG3THIiexX+ixkkI/zpEUUoZIvbOgmhxijUesT Lea9QyCxFIST9Ar5uHQhRSyWHpQqRIywJVr1wMzuuIZQnTBQ7EjH30w1IdXlarqr4+LG o5tw== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20221208; t=1692093110; x=1692697910; h=content-transfer-encoding:mime-version:references:in-reply-to :message-id:date:subject:cc:to:from:x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc :subject:date:message-id:reply-to; bh=84P/mtDSDnX/VjR6ZR4LHh8P71yy7C9xiUdhRFi2sjk=; b=V5182eNTJMsmm571+gUPJ4OJEtSU4WFlapYmWYzqVYF/307dSE07u3chySg6ADWVsk 9ZpM9dGnosJafXVUf+e6UMnGnxTaEOUX4t9MobMHkYVxpWyFyHE0MfGyIxCjVGPVh4PO FR/QBZArVVR3Tjwk7lCqhDewTCPtOIa6QngTMxBaryxKW7vguPXH91C3ZcCzQZPuCebe GCyRQDJETw9F1w66RyofACh3j5OZYHuVMdygtMc2c7uGSd+8N+rN5P9oTFvh+NrcmCJy WMbyr3x2ABRCXb8Fej4HUze1J82PMbeGRLzU0jWb94Xyt6bp2cgKNpRGDNC97cPIbAK+ o92A== X-Gm-Message-State: AOJu0YwHSQqM6aMEz/iyROWqGsU/F/h10Yuynw5PGfrPp2maXna6Li64 Wsi0nyM9J1sKU/5pJDxzCGilImXFCNc= X-Google-Smtp-Source: AGHT+IEJsmjXK66f++37HriMpdYH7JC1SeKVFCrN/43YjIeN5wSbGIsRapuKa6QgKO/pRkTWCTvpyQ== X-Received: by 2002:a5d:6d51:0:b0:317:dd94:ed38 with SMTP id k17-20020a5d6d51000000b00317dd94ed38mr8040770wri.42.1692093109505; Tue, 15 Aug 2023 02:51:49 -0700 (PDT) Received: from t14s-af.fritz.box ([2a02:169:59a6:0:5488:f785:9061:cf6c]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id k3-20020a5d6283000000b00317643a93f4sm17243434wru.96.2023.08.15.02.51.48 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Tue, 15 Aug 2023 02:51:49 -0700 (PDT) From: Adrian Freihofer X-Google-Original-From: Adrian Freihofer To: openembedded-core@lists.openembedded.org Cc: Adrian Freihofer Subject: [kirkstone][PATCH 1/1] dmidecode: fixup for CVE-2023-30630 Date: Tue, 15 Aug 2023 11:50:51 +0200 Message-ID: <20230815095122.188614-2-adrian.freihofer@siemens.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.41.0 In-Reply-To: <20230815095122.188614-1-adrian.freihofer@siemens.com> References: <20230815095122.188614-1-adrian.freihofer@siemens.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 List-Id: X-Webhook-Received: from li982-79.members.linode.com [45.33.32.79] by aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org with HTTPS for ; Tue, 15 Aug 2023 09:52:01 -0000 X-Groupsio-URL: https://lists.openembedded.org/g/openembedded-core/message/186055 The previous CVE-2023-30630_1.patch picked only the patch "dmidecode: Write the whole dump file at once" d8cfbc808f. But there was a refactoring which does not allow to cherry-pick it fast forward. Resolving this conflict was not correctly done. The patch was: + u32 len; + u8 *table; ... - if (!(opt.flags & FLAG_QUIET)) - pr_comment("Writing %d bytes to %s.", crafted[0x05], - opt.dumpfile); - write_dump(0, crafted[0x05], crafted, opt.dumpfile, 1); + dmi_table_dump(crafted, crafted[0x05], table, len); It looks like the variables len and table have been added without initialization. Now this problem is solved by applying the previous refactoring as well. Signed-off-by: Adrian Freihofer --- .../dmidecode/CVE-2023-30630_1.patch | 397 +++++++++--------- .../dmidecode/CVE-2023-30630_2.patch | 229 +++++++--- .../dmidecode/CVE-2023-30630_3.patch | 122 +++--- .../dmidecode/CVE-2023-30630_4.patch | 174 +++----- .../dmidecode/CVE-2023-30630_5.patch | 138 ++++++ 5 files changed, 631 insertions(+), 429 deletions(-) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/dmidecode/dmidecode/CVE-2023-30630_5.patch diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/dmidecode/dmidecode/CVE-2023-30630_1.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/dmidecode/dmidecode/CVE-2023-30630_1.patch index 53480d6299..bf93fbc13c 100644 --- a/meta/recipes-devtools/dmidecode/dmidecode/CVE-2023-30630_1.patch +++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/dmidecode/dmidecode/CVE-2023-30630_1.patch @@ -1,237 +1,236 @@ -From d8cfbc808f387e87091c25e7d5b8c2bb348bb206 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From ee6db10dd70b8fdc7a93cffd7cf5bc7a28f9d3d7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jean Delvare -Date: Tue, 27 Jun 2023 09:40:23 +0000 -Subject: [PATCH] dmidecode: Write the whole dump file at once +Date: Mon, 20 Feb 2023 14:53:21 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 1/5] dmidecode: Split table fetching from decoding -When option --dump-bin is used, write the whole dump file at once, -instead of opening and closing the file separately for the table -and then for the entry point. +Clean up function dmi_table so that it does only one thing: +* dmi_table() is renamed to dmi_table_get(). It now retrieves the + DMI table, but does not process it any longer. +* Decoding or dumping the table is now done in smbios3_decode(), + smbios_decode() and legacy_decode(). +No functional change. -As the file writing function is no longer generic, it gets moved -from util.c to dmidecode.c. - -One minor functional change resulting from the new implementation is -that the entry point is written first now, so the messages printed -are swapped. +A side effect of this change is that writing the header and body of +dump files is now done in a single location. This is required to +further consolidate the writing of dump files. Signed-off-by: Jean Delvare Reviewed-by: Jerry Hoemann CVE: CVE-2023-30630 -Reference: https://github.com/mirror/dmidecode/commit/39b2dd7b6ab719b920e96ed832cfb4bdd664e808 - -Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/mirror/dmidecode/commit/d8cfbc808f387e87091c25e7d5b8c2bb348bb206] +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.nongnu.org/cgit/dmidecode.git/commit/?id=39b2dd7b6ab719b920e96ed832cfb4bdd664e808] -Signed-off-by: Yogita Urade +Signed-off-by: Adrian Freihofer --- - dmidecode.c | 79 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- - util.c | 40 --------------------------- - util.h | 1 - - 3 files changed, 58 insertions(+), 62 deletions(-) + dmidecode.c | 86 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------- + 1 file changed, 62 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-) diff --git a/dmidecode.c b/dmidecode.c -index 9aeff91..5477309 100644 +index cd2b5c9..b082c03 100644 --- a/dmidecode.c +++ b/dmidecode.c -@@ -5427,11 +5427,56 @@ static void dmi_table_string(const struct dmi_header *h, const u8 *data, u16 ver - } +@@ -5247,8 +5247,9 @@ static void dmi_table_decode(u8 *buf, u32 len, u16 num, u16 ver, u32 flags) + } } - --static void dmi_table_dump(const u8 *buf, u32 len) -+static int dmi_table_dump(const u8 *ep, u32 ep_len, const u8 *table, -+ u32 table_len) + +-static void dmi_table(off_t base, u32 len, u16 num, u32 ver, const char *devmem, +- u32 flags) ++/* Allocates a buffer for the table, must be freed by the caller */ ++static u8 *dmi_table_get(off_t base, u32 *len, u16 num, u32 ver, ++ const char *devmem, u32 flags) { -+ FILE *f; -+ -+ f = fopen(opt.dumpfile, "wb"); -+ if (!f) -+ { -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", opt.dumpfile); -+ perror("fopen"); -+ return -1; -+ } -+ -+ if (!(opt.flags & FLAG_QUIET)) -+ pr_comment("Writing %d bytes to %s.", ep_len, opt.dumpfile); -+ if (fwrite(ep, ep_len, 1, f) != 1) -+ { -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", opt.dumpfile); -+ perror("fwrite"); -+ goto err_close; -+ } -+ -+ if (fseek(f, 32, SEEK_SET) != 0) -+ { -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", opt.dumpfile); -+ perror("fseek"); -+ goto err_close; -+ } -+ - if (!(opt.flags & FLAG_QUIET)) -- pr_comment("Writing %d bytes to %s.", len, opt.dumpfile); -- write_dump(32, len, buf, opt.dumpfile, 0); -+ pr_comment("Writing %d bytes to %s.", table_len, opt.dumpfile); -+ if (fwrite(table, table_len, 1, f) != 1) -+ { -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", opt.dumpfile); -+ perror("fwrite"); -+ goto err_close; -+ } -+ -+ if (fclose(f)) -+ { -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", opt.dumpfile); -+ perror("fclose"); -+ return -1; -+ } -+ -+ return 0; -+ -+err_close: -+ fclose(f); -+ return -1; - } - - static void dmi_table_decode(u8 *buf, u32 len, u16 num, u16 ver, u32 flags) -@@ -5648,11 +5693,6 @@ static void dmi_table(off_t base, u32 len, u16 num, u32 ver, const char *devmem, - return; - } - + u8 *buf; + +@@ -5267,7 +5268,7 @@ static void dmi_table(off_t base, u32 len, u16 num, u32 ver, const char *devmem, + { + if (num) + pr_info("%u structures occupying %u bytes.", +- num, len); ++ num, *len); + if (!(opt.flags & FLAG_FROM_DUMP)) + pr_info("Table at 0x%08llX.", + (unsigned long long)base); +@@ -5285,19 +5286,19 @@ static void dmi_table(off_t base, u32 len, u16 num, u32 ver, const char *devmem, + * would be the result of the kernel truncating the table on + * parse error. + */ +- size_t size = len; ++ size_t size = *len; + buf = read_file(flags & FLAG_NO_FILE_OFFSET ? 0 : base, + &size, devmem); +- if (!(opt.flags & FLAG_QUIET) && num && size != (size_t)len) ++ if (!(opt.flags & FLAG_QUIET) && num && size != (size_t)*len) + { + fprintf(stderr, "Wrong DMI structures length: %u bytes " + "announced, only %lu bytes available.\n", +- len, (unsigned long)size); ++ *len, (unsigned long)size); + } +- len = size; ++ *len = size; + } + else +- buf = mem_chunk(base, len, devmem); ++ buf = mem_chunk(base, *len, devmem); + + if (buf == NULL) + { +@@ -5307,15 +5308,9 @@ static void dmi_table(off_t base, u32 len, u16 num, u32 ver, const char *devmem, + fprintf(stderr, + "Try compiling dmidecode with -DUSE_MMAP.\n"); + #endif +- return; + } + - if (opt.flags & FLAG_DUMP_BIN) - dmi_table_dump(buf, len); - else - dmi_table_decode(buf, len, num, ver >> 8, flags); - - free(buf); +- free(buf); ++ return buf; } - -@@ -5688,8 +5728,9 @@ static void overwrite_smbios3_address(u8 *buf) - + + +@@ -5350,8 +5345,9 @@ static void overwrite_smbios3_address(u8 *buf) + static int smbios3_decode(u8 *buf, const char *devmem, u32 flags) { - u32 ver; + u32 ver, len; - u64 offset; + u64 offset; + u8 *table; - - /* Don't let checksum run beyond the buffer */ - if (buf[0x06] > 0x20) -@@ -5725,10 +5766,7 @@ static int smbios3_decode(u8 *buf, const char *devmem, u32 flags) - memcpy(crafted, buf, 32); - overwrite_smbios3_address(crafted); - -- if (!(opt.flags & FLAG_QUIET)) -- pr_comment("Writing %d bytes to %s.", crafted[0x06], -- opt.dumpfile); -- write_dump(0, crafted[0x06], crafted, opt.dumpfile, 1); -+ dmi_table_dump(crafted, crafted[0x06], table, len); - } - - return 1; -@@ -5737,6 +5775,8 @@ static int smbios3_decode(u8 *buf, const char *devmem, u32 flags) + + /* Don't let checksum run beyond the buffer */ + if (buf[0x06] > 0x20) +@@ -5377,8 +5373,12 @@ static int smbios3_decode(u8 *buf, const char *devmem, u32 flags) + return 0; + } + +- dmi_table(((off_t)offset.h << 32) | offset.l, +- DWORD(buf + 0x0C), 0, ver, devmem, flags | FLAG_STOP_AT_EOT); ++ /* Maximum length, may get trimmed */ ++ len = DWORD(buf + 0x0C); ++ table = dmi_table_get(((off_t)offset.h << 32) | offset.l, &len, 0, ver, ++ devmem, flags | FLAG_STOP_AT_EOT); ++ if (table == NULL) ++ return 1; + + if (opt.flags & FLAG_DUMP_BIN) + { +@@ -5387,18 +5387,28 @@ static int smbios3_decode(u8 *buf, const char *devmem, u32 flags) + memcpy(crafted, buf, 32); + overwrite_smbios3_address(crafted); + ++ dmi_table_dump(table, len); + if (!(opt.flags & FLAG_QUIET)) + pr_comment("Writing %d bytes to %s.", crafted[0x06], + opt.dumpfile); + write_dump(0, crafted[0x06], crafted, opt.dumpfile, 1); + } ++ else ++ { ++ dmi_table_decode(table, len, 0, ver >> 8, ++ flags | FLAG_STOP_AT_EOT); ++ } ++ ++ free(table); + + return 1; + } + static int smbios_decode(u8 *buf, const char *devmem, u32 flags) { - u16 ver; +- u16 ver; ++ u16 ver, num; + u32 len; -+ u8 *table; - - /* Don't let checksum run beyond the buffer */ - if (buf[0x05] > 0x20) -@@ -5786,10 +5826,7 @@ static int smbios_decode(u8 *buf, const char *devmem, u32 flags) - memcpy(crafted, buf, 32); - overwrite_dmi_address(crafted + 0x10); - -- if (!(opt.flags & FLAG_QUIET)) -- pr_comment("Writing %d bytes to %s.", crafted[0x05], -- opt.dumpfile); -- write_dump(0, crafted[0x05], crafted, opt.dumpfile, 1); -+ dmi_table_dump(crafted, crafted[0x05], table, len); - } - - return 1; -@@ -5797,6 +5834,9 @@ static int smbios_decode(u8 *buf, const char *devmem, u32 flags) - ++ u8 *table; + + /* Don't let checksum run beyond the buffer */ + if (buf[0x05] > 0x20) +@@ -5438,8 +5448,13 @@ static int smbios_decode(u8 *buf, const char *devmem, u32 flags) + pr_info("SMBIOS %u.%u present.", + ver >> 8, ver & 0xFF); + +- dmi_table(DWORD(buf + 0x18), WORD(buf + 0x16), WORD(buf + 0x1C), +- ver << 8, devmem, flags); ++ /* Maximum length, may get trimmed */ ++ len = WORD(buf + 0x16); ++ num = WORD(buf + 0x1C); ++ table = dmi_table_get(DWORD(buf + 0x18), &len, num, ver << 8, ++ devmem, flags); ++ if (table == NULL) ++ return 1; + + if (opt.flags & FLAG_DUMP_BIN) + { +@@ -5448,27 +5463,43 @@ static int smbios_decode(u8 *buf, const char *devmem, u32 flags) + memcpy(crafted, buf, 32); + overwrite_dmi_address(crafted + 0x10); + ++ dmi_table_dump(table, len); + if (!(opt.flags & FLAG_QUIET)) + pr_comment("Writing %d bytes to %s.", crafted[0x05], + opt.dumpfile); + write_dump(0, crafted[0x05], crafted, opt.dumpfile, 1); + } ++ else ++ { ++ dmi_table_decode(table, len, num, ver, flags); ++ } ++ ++ free(table); + + return 1; + } + static int legacy_decode(u8 *buf, const char *devmem, u32 flags) { ++ u16 ver, num; + u32 len; + u8 *table; + - if (!checksum(buf, 0x0F)) - return 0; - -@@ -5815,10 +5855,7 @@ static int legacy_decode(u8 *buf, const char *devmem, u32 flags) - memcpy(crafted, buf, 16); - overwrite_dmi_address(crafted); - -- if (!(opt.flags & FLAG_QUIET)) -- pr_comment("Writing %d bytes to %s.", 0x0F, -- opt.dumpfile); -- write_dump(0, 0x0F, crafted, opt.dumpfile, 1); -+ dmi_table_dump(crafted, 0x0F, table, len); - } - - return 1; -diff --git a/util.c b/util.c -index 04aaadd..1547096 100644 ---- a/util.c -+++ b/util.c -@@ -259,46 +259,6 @@ out: - return p; + if (!checksum(buf, 0x0F)) + return 0; + ++ ver = ((buf[0x0E] & 0xF0) << 4) + (buf[0x0E] & 0x0F); + if (!(opt.flags & FLAG_QUIET)) + pr_info("Legacy DMI %u.%u present.", + buf[0x0E] >> 4, buf[0x0E] & 0x0F); + +- dmi_table(DWORD(buf + 0x08), WORD(buf + 0x06), WORD(buf + 0x0C), +- ((buf[0x0E] & 0xF0) << 12) + ((buf[0x0E] & 0x0F) << 8), +- devmem, flags); ++ /* Maximum length, may get trimmed */ ++ len = WORD(buf + 0x06); ++ num = WORD(buf + 0x0C); ++ table = dmi_table_get(DWORD(buf + 0x08), &len, num, ver << 8, ++ devmem, flags); ++ if (table == NULL) ++ return 1; + + if (opt.flags & FLAG_DUMP_BIN) + { +@@ -5477,11 +5508,18 @@ static int legacy_decode(u8 *buf, const char *devmem, u32 flags) + memcpy(crafted, buf, 16); + overwrite_dmi_address(crafted); + ++ dmi_table_dump(table, len); + if (!(opt.flags & FLAG_QUIET)) + pr_comment("Writing %d bytes to %s.", 0x0F, + opt.dumpfile); + write_dump(0, 0x0F, crafted, opt.dumpfile, 1); + } ++ else ++ { ++ dmi_table_decode(table, len, num, ver, flags); ++ } ++ ++ free(table); + + return 1; } +-- +2.41.0 --int write_dump(size_t base, size_t len, const void *data, const char *dumpfile, int add) --{ -- FILE *f; -- -- f = fopen(dumpfile, add ? "r+b" : "wb"); -- if (!f) -- { -- fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", dumpfile); -- perror("fopen"); -- return -1; -- } -- -- if (fseek(f, base, SEEK_SET) != 0) -- { -- fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", dumpfile); -- perror("fseek"); -- goto err_close; -- } -- -- if (fwrite(data, len, 1, f) != 1) -- { -- fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", dumpfile); -- perror("fwrite"); -- goto err_close; -- } -- -- if (fclose(f)) -- { -- fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", dumpfile); -- perror("fclose"); -- return -1; -- } -- -- return 0; -- --err_close: -- fclose(f); -- return -1; --} -- - /* Returns end - start + 1, assuming start < end */ - u64 u64_range(u64 start, u64 end) - { -diff --git a/util.h b/util.h -index 3094cf8..ef24eb9 100644 ---- a/util.h -+++ b/util.h -@@ -27,5 +27,4 @@ - int checksum(const u8 *buf, size_t len); - void *read_file(off_t base, size_t *len, const char *filename); - void *mem_chunk(off_t base, size_t len, const char *devmem); --int write_dump(size_t base, size_t len, const void *data, const char *dumpfile, int add); - u64 u64_range(u64 start, u64 end); --- -2.35.5 diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/dmidecode/dmidecode/CVE-2023-30630_2.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/dmidecode/dmidecode/CVE-2023-30630_2.patch index 9f53a205ac..e03bda05e4 100644 --- a/meta/recipes-devtools/dmidecode/dmidecode/CVE-2023-30630_2.patch +++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/dmidecode/dmidecode/CVE-2023-30630_2.patch @@ -1,80 +1,197 @@ -From 47101389dd52b50123a3ec59fed4d2021752e489 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From d362549bce92ac22860cda8cad4532c1a3fe6928 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jean Delvare -Date: Tue, 27 Jun 2023 10:03:53 +0000 -Subject: [PATCH] dmidecode: Do not let --dump-bin overwrite an existing file +Date: Mon, 20 Feb 2023 14:53:25 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 2/5] dmidecode: Write the whole dump file at once -Make sure that the file passed to option --dump-bin does not already -exist. In practice, it is rather unlikely that an honest user would -want to overwrite an existing dump file, while this possibility -could be used by a rogue user to corrupt a system file. +When option --dump-bin is used, write the whole dump file at once, +instead of opening and closing the file separately for the table +and then for the entry point. + +As the file writing function is no longer generic, it gets moved +from util.c to dmidecode.c. + +One minor functional change resulting from the new implementation is +that the entry point is written first now, so the messages printed +are swapped. Signed-off-by: Jean Delvare Reviewed-by: Jerry Hoemann CVE: CVE-2023-30630 -Upstream-Status: Backport -[https://github.com/mirror/dmidecode/commit/6ca381c1247c81f74e1ca4e7706f70bdda72e6f2] - -Signed-off-by: Yogita Urade +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.nongnu.org/cgit/dmidecode.git/commit/?id=d8cfbc808f387e87091c25e7d5b8c2bb348bb206] +Signed-off-by: Adrian Freihofer --- - dmidecode.c | 14 ++++++++++++-- - man/dmidecode.8 | 3 ++- - 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + dmidecode.c | 69 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- + util.c | 40 ------------------------------- + util.h | 1 - + 3 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 59 deletions(-) diff --git a/dmidecode.c b/dmidecode.c -index ae461de..6446040 100644 +index b082c03..a80a140 100644 --- a/dmidecode.c +++ b/dmidecode.c -@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ - * https://www.dmtf.org/sites/default/files/DSP0270_1.0.1.pdf - */ +@@ -5130,11 +5130,56 @@ static void dmi_table_string(const struct dmi_header *h, const u8 *data, u16 ver + } + } -+#include - #include - #include - #include -@@ -5133,13 +5134,22 @@ static void dmi_table_string(const struct dmi_header *h, const u8 *data, u16 ver - static int dmi_table_dump(const u8 *ep, u32 ep_len, const u8 *table, - u32 table_len) +-static void dmi_table_dump(const u8 *buf, u32 len) ++static int dmi_table_dump(const u8 *ep, u32 ep_len, const u8 *table, ++ u32 table_len) { -+ int fd; - FILE *f; - -- f = fopen(opt.dumpfile, "wb"); -+ fd = open(opt.dumpfile, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_EXCL, 0666); -+ if (fd == -1) ++ FILE *f; ++ ++ f = fopen(opt.dumpfile, "wb"); ++ if (!f) ++ { ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", opt.dumpfile); ++ perror("fopen"); ++ return -1; ++ } ++ ++ if (!(opt.flags & FLAG_QUIET)) ++ pr_comment("Writing %d bytes to %s.", ep_len, opt.dumpfile); ++ if (fwrite(ep, ep_len, 1, f) != 1) ++ { ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", opt.dumpfile); ++ perror("fwrite"); ++ goto err_close; ++ } ++ ++ if (fseek(f, 32, SEEK_SET) != 0) ++ { ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", opt.dumpfile); ++ perror("fseek"); ++ goto err_close; ++ } ++ + if (!(opt.flags & FLAG_QUIET)) +- pr_comment("Writing %d bytes to %s.", len, opt.dumpfile); +- write_dump(32, len, buf, opt.dumpfile, 0); ++ pr_comment("Writing %d bytes to %s.", table_len, opt.dumpfile); ++ if (fwrite(table, table_len, 1, f) != 1) ++ { ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", opt.dumpfile); ++ perror("fwrite"); ++ goto err_close; ++ } ++ ++ if (fclose(f)) + { + fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", opt.dumpfile); -+ perror("open"); ++ perror("fclose"); + return -1; + } + -+ f = fdopen(fd, "wb"); - if (!f) ++ return 0; ++ ++err_close: ++ fclose(f); ++ return -1; + } + + static void dmi_table_decode(u8 *buf, u32 len, u16 num, u16 ver, u32 flags) +@@ -5387,11 +5432,7 @@ static int smbios3_decode(u8 *buf, const char *devmem, u32 flags) + memcpy(crafted, buf, 32); + overwrite_smbios3_address(crafted); + +- dmi_table_dump(table, len); +- if (!(opt.flags & FLAG_QUIET)) +- pr_comment("Writing %d bytes to %s.", crafted[0x06], +- opt.dumpfile); +- write_dump(0, crafted[0x06], crafted, opt.dumpfile, 1); ++ dmi_table_dump(crafted, crafted[0x06], table, len); + } + else { - fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", opt.dumpfile); -- perror("fopen"); -+ perror("fdopen"); - return -1; +@@ -5463,11 +5504,7 @@ static int smbios_decode(u8 *buf, const char *devmem, u32 flags) + memcpy(crafted, buf, 32); + overwrite_dmi_address(crafted + 0x10); + +- dmi_table_dump(table, len); +- if (!(opt.flags & FLAG_QUIET)) +- pr_comment("Writing %d bytes to %s.", crafted[0x05], +- opt.dumpfile); +- write_dump(0, crafted[0x05], crafted, opt.dumpfile, 1); ++ dmi_table_dump(crafted, crafted[0x05], table, len); } + else + { +@@ -5508,11 +5545,7 @@ static int legacy_decode(u8 *buf, const char *devmem, u32 flags) + memcpy(crafted, buf, 16); + overwrite_dmi_address(crafted); -diff --git a/man/dmidecode.8 b/man/dmidecode.8 -index 64dc7e7..d5b7f01 100644 ---- a/man/dmidecode.8 -+++ b/man/dmidecode.8 -@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ --.TH DMIDECODE 8 "January 2019" "dmidecode" -+.TH DMIDECODE 8 "February 2023" "dmidecode" - .\" - .SH NAME - dmidecode \- \s-1DMI\s0 table decoder -@@ -132,6 +132,7 @@ hexadecimal and \s-1ASCII\s0. This option is mainly useful for debugging. - Do not decode the entries, instead dump the DMI data to a file in binary - form. The generated file is suitable to pass to \fB--from-dump\fR - later. -+\fIFILE\fP must not exist. - .TP - .BR " " " " "--from-dump FILE" - Read the DMI data from a binary file previously generated using +- dmi_table_dump(table, len); +- if (!(opt.flags & FLAG_QUIET)) +- pr_comment("Writing %d bytes to %s.", 0x0F, +- opt.dumpfile); +- write_dump(0, 0x0F, crafted, opt.dumpfile, 1); ++ dmi_table_dump(crafted, 0x0F, table, len); + } + else + { +diff --git a/util.c b/util.c +index 04aaadd..1547096 100644 +--- a/util.c ++++ b/util.c +@@ -259,46 +259,6 @@ out: + return p; + } + +-int write_dump(size_t base, size_t len, const void *data, const char *dumpfile, int add) +-{ +- FILE *f; +- +- f = fopen(dumpfile, add ? "r+b" : "wb"); +- if (!f) +- { +- fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", dumpfile); +- perror("fopen"); +- return -1; +- } +- +- if (fseek(f, base, SEEK_SET) != 0) +- { +- fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", dumpfile); +- perror("fseek"); +- goto err_close; +- } +- +- if (fwrite(data, len, 1, f) != 1) +- { +- fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", dumpfile); +- perror("fwrite"); +- goto err_close; +- } +- +- if (fclose(f)) +- { +- fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", dumpfile); +- perror("fclose"); +- return -1; +- } +- +- return 0; +- +-err_close: +- fclose(f); +- return -1; +-} +- + /* Returns end - start + 1, assuming start < end */ + u64 u64_range(u64 start, u64 end) + { +diff --git a/util.h b/util.h +index 3094cf8..ef24eb9 100644 +--- a/util.h ++++ b/util.h +@@ -27,5 +27,4 @@ + int checksum(const u8 *buf, size_t len); + void *read_file(off_t base, size_t *len, const char *filename); + void *mem_chunk(off_t base, size_t len, const char *devmem); +-int write_dump(size_t base, size_t len, const void *data, const char *dumpfile, int add); + u64 u64_range(u64 start, u64 end); +-- +2.41.0 + diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/dmidecode/dmidecode/CVE-2023-30630_3.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/dmidecode/dmidecode/CVE-2023-30630_3.patch index 01d0d1f867..37167a9c4f 100644 --- a/meta/recipes-devtools/dmidecode/dmidecode/CVE-2023-30630_3.patch +++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/dmidecode/dmidecode/CVE-2023-30630_3.patch @@ -1,69 +1,83 @@ -From c76ddda0ba0aa99a55945e3290095c2ec493c892 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 2d26f187c734635d072d24ea401255b84f03f4c4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jean Delvare -Date: Tue, 27 Jun 2023 10:25:50 +0000 -Subject: [PATCH] Consistently use read_file() when reading from a dump file +Date: Tue, 27 Jun 2023 10:03:53 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 3/5] dmidecode: Do not let --dump-bin overwrite an existing + file -Use read_file() instead of mem_chunk() to read the entry point from a -dump file. This is faster, and consistent with how we then read the -actual DMI table from that dump file. - -This made no functional difference so far, which is why it went -unnoticed for years. But now that a file type check was added to the -mem_chunk() function, we must stop using it to read from regular -files. - -This will again allow root to use the --from-dump option. +Make sure that the file passed to option --dump-bin does not already +exist. In practice, it is rather unlikely that an honest user would +want to overwrite an existing dump file, while this possibility +could be used by a rogue user to corrupt a system file. Signed-off-by: Jean Delvare -Tested-by: Jerry Hoemann +Reviewed-by: Jerry Hoemann CVE: CVE-2023-30630 -Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.nongnu.org/cgit/dmidecode.git/commit/?id=c76ddda0ba0aa99a55945e3290095c2ec493c892] +Upstream-Status: Backport +[https://github.com/mirror/dmidecode/commit/6ca381c1247c81f74e1ca4e7706f70bdda72e6f2] Signed-off-by: Yogita Urade --- - dmidecode.c | 11 +++++++++-- - 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + dmidecode.c | 14 ++++++++++++-- + man/dmidecode.8 | 3 ++- + 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/dmidecode.c b/dmidecode.c -index 98f9692..b4dbc9d 100644 +index a80a140..32a77cc 100644 --- a/dmidecode.c +++ b/dmidecode.c -@@ -5997,17 +5997,25 @@ int main(int argc, char * const argv[]) - pr_comment("dmidecode %s", VERSION); - - /* Read from dump if so instructed */ -+ size = 0x20; - if (opt.flags & FLAG_FROM_DUMP) - { - if (!(opt.flags & FLAG_QUIET)) - pr_info("Reading SMBIOS/DMI data from file %s.", - opt.dumpfile); -- if ((buf = mem_chunk(0, 0x20, opt.dumpfile)) == NULL) -+ if ((buf = read_file(0, &size, opt.dumpfile)) == NULL) - { - ret = 1; - goto exit_free; - } - -+ /* Truncated entry point can't be processed */ -+ if (size < 0x20) -+ { -+ ret = 1; -+ goto done; -+ } +@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ + * https://www.dmtf.org/sites/default/files/DSP0270_1.0.1.pdf + */ + ++#include + #include + #include + #include +@@ -5133,13 +5134,22 @@ static void dmi_table_string(const struct dmi_header *h, const u8 *data, u16 ver + static int dmi_table_dump(const u8 *ep, u32 ep_len, const u8 *table, + u32 table_len) + { ++ int fd; + FILE *f; + +- f = fopen(opt.dumpfile, "wb"); ++ fd = open(opt.dumpfile, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_EXCL, 0666); ++ if (fd == -1) ++ { ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", opt.dumpfile); ++ perror("open"); ++ return -1; ++ } + - if (memcmp(buf, "_SM3_", 5) == 0) - { - if (smbios3_decode(buf, opt.dumpfile, 0)) -@@ -6031,7 +6039,6 @@ int main(int argc, char * const argv[]) - * contain one of several types of entry points, so read enough for - * the largest one, then determine what type it contains. - */ -- size = 0x20; - if (!(opt.flags & FLAG_NO_SYSFS) - && (buf = read_file(0, &size, SYS_ENTRY_FILE)) != NULL) - { --- -2.40.0 ++ f = fdopen(fd, "wb"); + if (!f) + { + fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", opt.dumpfile); +- perror("fopen"); ++ perror("fdopen"); + return -1; + } + +diff --git a/man/dmidecode.8 b/man/dmidecode.8 +index 64dc7e7..d5b7f01 100644 +--- a/man/dmidecode.8 ++++ b/man/dmidecode.8 +@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ +-.TH DMIDECODE 8 "January 2019" "dmidecode" ++.TH DMIDECODE 8 "February 2023" "dmidecode" + .\" + .SH NAME + dmidecode \- \s-1DMI\s0 table decoder +@@ -132,6 +132,7 @@ hexadecimal and \s-1ASCII\s0. This option is mainly useful for debugging. + Do not decode the entries, instead dump the DMI data to a file in binary + form. The generated file is suitable to pass to \fB--from-dump\fR + later. ++\fIFILE\fP must not exist. + .TP + .BR " " " " "--from-dump FILE" + Read the DMI data from a binary file previously generated using +-- +2.41.0 + diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/dmidecode/dmidecode/CVE-2023-30630_4.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/dmidecode/dmidecode/CVE-2023-30630_4.patch index 5fa72b4f9b..181092a3fd 100644 --- a/meta/recipes-devtools/dmidecode/dmidecode/CVE-2023-30630_4.patch +++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/dmidecode/dmidecode/CVE-2023-30630_4.patch @@ -1,137 +1,71 @@ -From 2b83c4b898f8325313162f588765411e8e3e5561 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From ac881f801b92b57fd8daac65fb16fff6d84fd366 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jean Delvare -Date: Tue, 27 Jun 2023 10:58:11 +0000 -Subject: [PATCH] Don't read beyond sysfs entry point buffer +Date: Tue, 27 Jun 2023 10:25:50 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 4/5] Consistently use read_file() when reading from a dump + file -Functions smbios_decode() and smbios3_decode() include a check -against buffer overrun. This check assumes that the buffer length is -always 32 bytes. This is true when reading from /dev/mem or from a -dump file, however when reading from sysfs, the buffer length is the -size of the actual sysfs attribute file, typically 31 bytes for an -SMBIOS 2.x entry point and 24 bytes for an SMBIOS 3.x entry point. +Use read_file() instead of mem_chunk() to read the entry point from a +dump file. This is faster, and consistent with how we then read the +actual DMI table from that dump file. -In the unlikely event of a malformed entry point, with encoded length -larger than expected but smaller than or equal to 32, we would hit a -buffer overrun. So properly pass the actual buffer length as an -argument and perform the check against it. +This made no functional difference so far, which is why it went +unnoticed for years. But now that a file type check was added to the +mem_chunk() function, we must stop using it to read from regular +files. -In practice, this will never happen, because on the Linux kernel -side, the size of the sysfs attribute file is decided from the entry -point length field. So it is technically impossible for them not to -match. But user-space code should not make such assumptions. +This will again allow root to use the --from-dump option. Signed-off-by: Jean Delvare +Tested-by: Jerry Hoemann CVE: CVE-2023-30630 -Upstream-Status: Backport -[https://git.savannah.nongnu.org/cgit/dmidecode.git/commit/?id=2b83c4b898f8325313162f588765411e8e3e5561] +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.nongnu.org/cgit/dmidecode.git/commit/?id=c76ddda0ba0aa99a55945e3290095c2ec493c892] Signed-off-by: Yogita Urade --- - dmidecode.c | 24 ++++++++++++------------ - 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) + dmidecode.c | 11 +++++++++-- + 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/dmidecode.c b/dmidecode.c -index b4dbc9d..870d94e 100644 +index 32a77cc..9a691e0 100644 --- a/dmidecode.c +++ b/dmidecode.c -@@ -5736,14 +5736,14 @@ static void overwrite_smbios3_address(u8 *buf) - buf[0x17] = 0; - } +@@ -5693,17 +5693,25 @@ int main(int argc, char * const argv[]) + pr_comment("dmidecode %s", VERSION); + + /* Read from dump if so instructed */ ++ size = 0x20; + if (opt.flags & FLAG_FROM_DUMP) + { + if (!(opt.flags & FLAG_QUIET)) + pr_info("Reading SMBIOS/DMI data from file %s.", + opt.dumpfile); +- if ((buf = mem_chunk(0, 0x20, opt.dumpfile)) == NULL) ++ if ((buf = read_file(0, &size, opt.dumpfile)) == NULL) + { + ret = 1; + goto exit_free; + } + ++ /* Truncated entry point can't be processed */ ++ if (size < 0x20) ++ { ++ ret = 1; ++ goto done; ++ } ++ + if (memcmp(buf, "_SM3_", 5) == 0) + { + if (smbios3_decode(buf, opt.dumpfile, 0)) +@@ -5727,7 +5735,6 @@ int main(int argc, char * const argv[]) + * contain one of several types of entry points, so read enough for + * the largest one, then determine what type it contains. + */ +- size = 0x20; + if (!(opt.flags & FLAG_NO_SYSFS) + && (buf = read_file(0, &size, SYS_ENTRY_FILE)) != NULL) + { +-- +2.41.0 --static int smbios3_decode(u8 *buf, const char *devmem, u32 flags) -+static int smbios3_decode(u8 *buf, size_t buf_len, const char *devmem, u32 flags) - { - u32 ver, len; - u64 offset; - u8 *table; - - /* Don't let checksum run beyond the buffer */ -- if (buf[0x06] > 0x20) -+ if (buf[0x06] > buf_len) - { - fprintf(stderr, - "Entry point length too large (%u bytes, expected %u).\n", -@@ -5782,14 +5782,14 @@ static int smbios3_decode(u8 *buf, const char *devmem, u32 flags) - return 1; - } - --static int smbios_decode(u8 *buf, const char *devmem, u32 flags) -+static int smbios_decode(u8 *buf, size_t buf_len, const char *devmem, u32 flags) - { - u16 ver; - u32 len; - u8 *table; - - /* Don't let checksum run beyond the buffer */ -- if (buf[0x05] > 0x20) -+ if (buf[0x05] > buf_len) - { - fprintf(stderr, - "Entry point length too large (%u bytes, expected %u).\n", -@@ -6018,12 +6018,12 @@ int main(int argc, char * const argv[]) - - if (memcmp(buf, "_SM3_", 5) == 0) - { -- if (smbios3_decode(buf, opt.dumpfile, 0)) -+ if (smbios3_decode(buf, size, opt.dumpfile, 0)) - found++; - } - else if (memcmp(buf, "_SM_", 4) == 0) - { -- if (smbios_decode(buf, opt.dumpfile, 0)) -+ if (smbios_decode(buf, size, opt.dumpfile, 0)) - found++; - } - else if (memcmp(buf, "_DMI_", 5) == 0) -@@ -6046,12 +6046,12 @@ int main(int argc, char * const argv[]) - pr_info("Getting SMBIOS data from sysfs."); - if (size >= 24 && memcmp(buf, "_SM3_", 5) == 0) - { -- if (smbios3_decode(buf, SYS_TABLE_FILE, FLAG_NO_FILE_OFFSET)) -+ if (smbios3_decode(buf, size, SYS_TABLE_FILE, FLAG_NO_FILE_OFFSET)) - found++; - } - else if (size >= 31 && memcmp(buf, "_SM_", 4) == 0) - { -- if (smbios_decode(buf, SYS_TABLE_FILE, FLAG_NO_FILE_OFFSET)) -+ if (smbios_decode(buf, size, SYS_TABLE_FILE, FLAG_NO_FILE_OFFSET)) - found++; - } - else if (size >= 15 && memcmp(buf, "_DMI_", 5) == 0) -@@ -6088,12 +6088,12 @@ int main(int argc, char * const argv[]) - - if (memcmp(buf, "_SM3_", 5) == 0) - { -- if (smbios3_decode(buf, opt.devmem, 0)) -+ if (smbios3_decode(buf, 0x20, opt.devmem, 0)) - found++; - } - else if (memcmp(buf, "_SM_", 4) == 0) - { -- if (smbios_decode(buf, opt.devmem, 0)) -+ if (smbios_decode(buf, 0x20, opt.devmem, 0)) - found++; - } - goto done; -@@ -6114,7 +6114,7 @@ memory_scan: - { - if (memcmp(buf + fp, "_SM3_", 5) == 0) - { -- if (smbios3_decode(buf + fp, opt.devmem, 0)) -+ if (smbios3_decode(buf + fp, 0x20, opt.devmem, 0)) - { - found++; - goto done; -@@ -6127,7 +6127,7 @@ memory_scan: - { - if (memcmp(buf + fp, "_SM_", 4) == 0 && fp <= 0xFFE0) - { -- if (smbios_decode(buf + fp, opt.devmem, 0)) -+ if (smbios_decode(buf + fp, 0x20, opt.devmem, 0)) - { - found++; - goto done; --- -2.35.5 diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/dmidecode/dmidecode/CVE-2023-30630_5.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/dmidecode/dmidecode/CVE-2023-30630_5.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b7d7f4ff96 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/dmidecode/dmidecode/CVE-2023-30630_5.patch @@ -0,0 +1,138 @@ +From 2fb126eef436389a2dc48d4225b4a9888b0625a8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jean Delvare +Date: Tue, 27 Jun 2023 10:58:11 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 5/5] Don't read beyond sysfs entry point buffer + +Functions smbios_decode() and smbios3_decode() include a check +against buffer overrun. This check assumes that the buffer length is +always 32 bytes. This is true when reading from /dev/mem or from a +dump file, however when reading from sysfs, the buffer length is the +size of the actual sysfs attribute file, typically 31 bytes for an +SMBIOS 2.x entry point and 24 bytes for an SMBIOS 3.x entry point. + +In the unlikely event of a malformed entry point, with encoded length +larger than expected but smaller than or equal to 32, we would hit a +buffer overrun. So properly pass the actual buffer length as an +argument and perform the check against it. + +In practice, this will never happen, because on the Linux kernel +side, the size of the sysfs attribute file is decided from the entry +point length field. So it is technically impossible for them not to +match. But user-space code should not make such assumptions. + +Signed-off-by: Jean Delvare + +CVE: CVE-2023-30630 + +Upstream-Status: Backport +[https://git.savannah.nongnu.org/cgit/dmidecode.git/commit/?id=2b83c4b898f8325313162f588765411e8e3e5561] + +Signed-off-by: Yogita Urade +--- + dmidecode.c | 24 ++++++++++++------------ + 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/dmidecode.c b/dmidecode.c +index 9a691e0..e725801 100644 +--- a/dmidecode.c ++++ b/dmidecode.c +@@ -5398,14 +5398,14 @@ static void overwrite_smbios3_address(u8 *buf) + buf[0x17] = 0; + } + +-static int smbios3_decode(u8 *buf, const char *devmem, u32 flags) ++static int smbios3_decode(u8 *buf, size_t buf_len, const char *devmem, u32 flags) + { + u32 ver, len; + u64 offset; + u8 *table; + + /* Don't let checksum run beyond the buffer */ +- if (buf[0x06] > 0x20) ++ if (buf[0x06] > buf_len) + { + fprintf(stderr, + "Entry point length too large (%u bytes, expected %u).\n", +@@ -5455,14 +5455,14 @@ static int smbios3_decode(u8 *buf, const char *devmem, u32 flags) + return 1; + } + +-static int smbios_decode(u8 *buf, const char *devmem, u32 flags) ++static int smbios_decode(u8 *buf, size_t buf_len, const char *devmem, u32 flags) + { + u16 ver, num; + u32 len; + u8 *table; + + /* Don't let checksum run beyond the buffer */ +- if (buf[0x05] > 0x20) ++ if (buf[0x05] > buf_len) + { + fprintf(stderr, + "Entry point length too large (%u bytes, expected %u).\n", +@@ -5714,12 +5714,12 @@ int main(int argc, char * const argv[]) + + if (memcmp(buf, "_SM3_", 5) == 0) + { +- if (smbios3_decode(buf, opt.dumpfile, 0)) ++ if (smbios3_decode(buf, size, opt.dumpfile, 0)) + found++; + } + else if (memcmp(buf, "_SM_", 4) == 0) + { +- if (smbios_decode(buf, opt.dumpfile, 0)) ++ if (smbios_decode(buf, size, opt.dumpfile, 0)) + found++; + } + else if (memcmp(buf, "_DMI_", 5) == 0) +@@ -5742,12 +5742,12 @@ int main(int argc, char * const argv[]) + pr_info("Getting SMBIOS data from sysfs."); + if (size >= 24 && memcmp(buf, "_SM3_", 5) == 0) + { +- if (smbios3_decode(buf, SYS_TABLE_FILE, FLAG_NO_FILE_OFFSET)) ++ if (smbios3_decode(buf, size, SYS_TABLE_FILE, FLAG_NO_FILE_OFFSET)) + found++; + } + else if (size >= 31 && memcmp(buf, "_SM_", 4) == 0) + { +- if (smbios_decode(buf, SYS_TABLE_FILE, FLAG_NO_FILE_OFFSET)) ++ if (smbios_decode(buf, size, SYS_TABLE_FILE, FLAG_NO_FILE_OFFSET)) + found++; + } + else if (size >= 15 && memcmp(buf, "_DMI_", 5) == 0) +@@ -5784,12 +5784,12 @@ int main(int argc, char * const argv[]) + + if (memcmp(buf, "_SM3_", 5) == 0) + { +- if (smbios3_decode(buf, opt.devmem, 0)) ++ if (smbios3_decode(buf, 0x20, opt.devmem, 0)) + found++; + } + else if (memcmp(buf, "_SM_", 4) == 0) + { +- if (smbios_decode(buf, opt.devmem, 0)) ++ if (smbios_decode(buf, 0x20, opt.devmem, 0)) + found++; + } + goto done; +@@ -5810,7 +5810,7 @@ memory_scan: + { + if (memcmp(buf + fp, "_SM3_", 5) == 0) + { +- if (smbios3_decode(buf + fp, opt.devmem, 0)) ++ if (smbios3_decode(buf + fp, 0x20, opt.devmem, 0)) + { + found++; + goto done; +@@ -5823,7 +5823,7 @@ memory_scan: + { + if (memcmp(buf + fp, "_SM_", 4) == 0 && fp <= 0xFFE0) + { +- if (smbios_decode(buf + fp, opt.devmem, 0)) ++ if (smbios_decode(buf + fp, 0x20, opt.devmem, 0)) + { + found++; + goto done; +-- +2.41.0 +