new file mode 100644
@@ -0,0 +1,673 @@
+From f80ee15e27b67b6fdd101d5f91cf584d19b2b26e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jason Madden <jamadden@gmail.com>
+Date: Fri, 6 Oct 2023 12:41:59 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] gevent.pywsgi: Much improved handling of chunk trailers.
+ Validation is much stricter to the specification.
+
+Fixes #1989
+
+CVE: CVE-2023-41419
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/gevent/gevent/commit/2f53c851eaf926767fbac62385615efd4886221c]
+
+Signed-off-by: Narpat Mali <narpat.mali@windriver.com>
+---
+ docs/changes/1989.bugfix | 26 ++++
+ src/gevent/pywsgi.py | 229 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
+ src/gevent/subprocess.py | 7 +-
+ src/gevent/testing/testcase.py | 2 +-
+ src/gevent/tests/test__pywsgi.py | 193 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--
+ 5 files changed, 390 insertions(+), 67 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 docs/changes/1989.bugfix
+
+diff --git a/docs/changes/1989.bugfix b/docs/changes/1989.bugfix
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..7ce4a93
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/docs/changes/1989.bugfix
+@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
++Make ``gevent.pywsgi`` comply more closely with the HTTP specification
++for chunked transfer encoding. In particular, we are much stricter
++about trailers, and trailers that are invalid (too long or featuring
++disallowed characters) forcibly close the connection to the client
++*after* the results have been sent.
++
++Trailers otherwise continue to be ignored and are not available to the
++WSGI application.
++
++Previously, carefully crafted invalid trailers in chunked requests on
++keep-alive connections might appear as two requests to
++``gevent.pywsgi``. Because this was handled exactly as a normal
++keep-alive connection with two requests, the WSGI application should
++handle it normally. However, if you were counting on some upstream
++server to filter incoming requests based on paths or header fields,
++and the upstream server simply passed trailers through without
++validating them, then this embedded second request would bypass those
++checks. (If the upstream server validated that the trailers meet the
++HTTP specification, this could not occur, because characters that are
++required in an HTTP request, like a space, are not allowed in
++trailers.) CVE-2023-41419 was reserved for this.
++
++Our thanks to the original reporters, Keran Mu
++(mkr22@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn) and Jianjun Chen
++(jianjun@tsinghua.edu.cn), from Tsinghua University and Zhongguancun
++Laboratory.
+diff --git a/src/gevent/pywsgi.py b/src/gevent/pywsgi.py
+index 0ebe095..078398a 100644
+--- a/src/gevent/pywsgi.py
++++ b/src/gevent/pywsgi.py
+@@ -1,13 +1,28 @@
+ # Copyright (c) 2005-2009, eventlet contributors
+ # Copyright (c) 2009-2018, gevent contributors
+ """
+-A pure-Python, gevent-friendly WSGI server.
++A pure-Python, gevent-friendly WSGI server implementing HTTP/1.1.
+
+ The server is provided in :class:`WSGIServer`, but most of the actual
+ WSGI work is handled by :class:`WSGIHandler` --- a new instance is
+ created for each request. The server can be customized to use
+ different subclasses of :class:`WSGIHandler`.
+
++.. important::
++ This server is intended primarily for development and testing, and
++ secondarily for other "safe" scenarios where it will not be exposed to
++ potentially malicious input. The code has not been security audited,
++ and is not intended for direct exposure to the public Internet. For production
++ usage on the Internet, either choose a production-strength server such as
++ gunicorn, or put a reverse proxy between gevent and the Internet.
++.. versionchanged:: NEXT
++ Complies more closely with the HTTP specification for chunked transfer encoding.
++ In particular, we are much stricter about trailers, and trailers that
++ are invalid (too long or featuring disallowed characters) forcibly close
++ the connection to the client *after* the results have been sent.
++ Trailers otherwise continue to be ignored and are not available to the
++ WSGI application.
++
+ """
+ from __future__ import absolute_import
+
+@@ -22,10 +37,7 @@ import time
+ import traceback
+ from datetime import datetime
+
+-try:
+- from urllib import unquote
+-except ImportError:
+- from urllib.parse import unquote # python 2 pylint:disable=import-error,no-name-in-module
++from urllib.parse import unquote
+
+ from gevent import socket
+ import gevent
+@@ -53,29 +65,52 @@ __all__ = [
+
+ MAX_REQUEST_LINE = 8192
+ # Weekday and month names for HTTP date/time formatting; always English!
+-_WEEKDAYNAME = ["Mon", "Tue", "Wed", "Thu", "Fri", "Sat", "Sun"]
+-_MONTHNAME = [None, # Dummy so we can use 1-based month numbers
++_WEEKDAYNAME = ("Mon", "Tue", "Wed", "Thu", "Fri", "Sat", "Sun")
++_MONTHNAME = (None, # Dummy so we can use 1-based month numbers
+ "Jan", "Feb", "Mar", "Apr", "May", "Jun",
+- "Jul", "Aug", "Sep", "Oct", "Nov", "Dec"]
++ "Jul", "Aug", "Sep", "Oct", "Nov", "Dec")
+
+ # The contents of the "HEX" grammar rule for HTTP, upper and lowercase A-F plus digits,
+ # in byte form for comparing to the network.
+ _HEX = string.hexdigits.encode('ascii')
+
++# The characters allowed in "token" rules.
++
++# token = 1*tchar
++# tchar = "!" / "#" / "$" / "%" / "&" / "'" / "*"
++# / "+" / "-" / "." / "^" / "_" / "`" / "|" / "~"
++# / DIGIT / ALPHA
++# ; any VCHAR, except delimiters
++# ALPHA = %x41-5A / %x61-7A ; A-Z / a-z
++_ALLOWED_TOKEN_CHARS = frozenset(
++ # Remember we have to be careful because bytestrings
++ # inexplicably iterate as integers, which are not equal to bytes.
++
++ # explicit chars then DIGIT
++ (c.encode('ascii') for c in "!#$%&'*+-.^_`|~0123456789")
++ # Then we add ALPHA
++) | {c.encode('ascii') for c in string.ascii_letters}
++assert b'A' in _ALLOWED_TOKEN_CHARS
++
++
+ # Errors
+ _ERRORS = {}
+ _INTERNAL_ERROR_STATUS = '500 Internal Server Error'
+ _INTERNAL_ERROR_BODY = b'Internal Server Error'
+-_INTERNAL_ERROR_HEADERS = [('Content-Type', 'text/plain'),
+- ('Connection', 'close'),
+- ('Content-Length', str(len(_INTERNAL_ERROR_BODY)))]
++_INTERNAL_ERROR_HEADERS = (
++ ('Content-Type', 'text/plain'),
++ ('Connection', 'close'),
++ ('Content-Length', str(len(_INTERNAL_ERROR_BODY)))
++)
+ _ERRORS[500] = (_INTERNAL_ERROR_STATUS, _INTERNAL_ERROR_HEADERS, _INTERNAL_ERROR_BODY)
+
+ _BAD_REQUEST_STATUS = '400 Bad Request'
+ _BAD_REQUEST_BODY = ''
+-_BAD_REQUEST_HEADERS = [('Content-Type', 'text/plain'),
+- ('Connection', 'close'),
+- ('Content-Length', str(len(_BAD_REQUEST_BODY)))]
++_BAD_REQUEST_HEADERS = (
++ ('Content-Type', 'text/plain'),
++ ('Connection', 'close'),
++ ('Content-Length', str(len(_BAD_REQUEST_BODY)))
++)
+ _ERRORS[400] = (_BAD_REQUEST_STATUS, _BAD_REQUEST_HEADERS, _BAD_REQUEST_BODY)
+
+ _REQUEST_TOO_LONG_RESPONSE = b"HTTP/1.1 414 Request URI Too Long\r\nConnection: close\r\nContent-length: 0\r\n\r\n"
+@@ -204,23 +239,32 @@ class Input(object):
+ # Read and return the next integer chunk length. If no
+ # chunk length can be read, raises _InvalidClientInput.
+
+- # Here's the production for a chunk:
+- # (http://www.w3.org/Protocols/rfc2616/rfc2616-sec3.html)
+- # chunk = chunk-size [ chunk-extension ] CRLF
+- # chunk-data CRLF
+- # chunk-size = 1*HEX
+- # chunk-extension= *( ";" chunk-ext-name [ "=" chunk-ext-val ] )
+- # chunk-ext-name = token
+- # chunk-ext-val = token | quoted-string
+-
+- # To cope with malicious or broken clients that fail to send valid
+- # chunk lines, the strategy is to read character by character until we either reach
+- # a ; or newline. If at any time we read a non-HEX digit, we bail. If we hit a
+- # ;, indicating an chunk-extension, we'll read up to the next
+- # MAX_REQUEST_LINE characters
+- # looking for the CRLF, and if we don't find it, we bail. If we read more than 16 hex characters,
+- # (the number needed to represent a 64-bit chunk size), we bail (this protects us from
+- # a client that sends an infinite stream of `F`, for example).
++ # Here's the production for a chunk (actually the whole body):
++ # (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7230#section-4.1)
++
++ # chunked-body = *chunk
++ # last-chunk
++ # trailer-part
++ # CRLF
++ #
++ # chunk = chunk-size [ chunk-ext ] CRLF
++ # chunk-data CRLF
++ # chunk-size = 1*HEXDIG
++ # last-chunk = 1*("0") [ chunk-ext ] CRLF
++ # trailer-part = *( header-field CRLF )
++ # chunk-data = 1*OCTET ; a sequence of chunk-size octets
++
++ # To cope with malicious or broken clients that fail to send
++ # valid chunk lines, the strategy is to read character by
++ # character until we either reach a ; or newline. If at any
++ # time we read a non-HEX digit, we bail. If we hit a ;,
++ # indicating an chunk-extension, we'll read up to the next
++ # MAX_REQUEST_LINE characters ("A server ought to limit the
++ # total length of chunk extensions received") looking for the
++ # CRLF, and if we don't find it, we bail. If we read more than
++ # 16 hex characters, (the number needed to represent a 64-bit
++ # chunk size), we bail (this protects us from a client that
++ # sends an infinite stream of `F`, for example).
+
+ buf = BytesIO()
+ while 1:
+@@ -228,16 +272,20 @@ class Input(object):
+ if not char:
+ self._chunked_input_error = True
+ raise _InvalidClientInput("EOF before chunk end reached")
+- if char == b'\r':
+- break
+- if char == b';':
++
++ if char in (
++ b'\r', # Beginning EOL
++ b';', # Beginning extension
++ ):
+ break
+
+- if char not in _HEX:
++ if char not in _HEX: # Invalid data.
+ self._chunked_input_error = True
+ raise _InvalidClientInput("Non-hex data", char)
++
+ buf.write(char)
+- if buf.tell() > 16:
++
++ if buf.tell() > 16: # Too many hex bytes
+ self._chunked_input_error = True
+ raise _InvalidClientInput("Chunk-size too large.")
+
+@@ -257,11 +305,72 @@ class Input(object):
+ if char == b'\r':
+ # We either got here from the main loop or from the
+ # end of an extension
++ self.__read_chunk_size_crlf(rfile, newline_only=True)
++ result = int(buf.getvalue(), 16)
++ if result == 0:
++ # The only time a chunk size of zero is allowed is the final
++ # chunk. It is either followed by another \r\n, or some trailers
++ # which are then followed by \r\n.
++ while self.__read_chunk_trailer(rfile):
++ pass
++ return result
++
++ # Trailers have the following production (they are a header-field followed by CRLF)
++ # See above for the definition of "token".
++ #
++ # header-field = field-name ":" OWS field-value OWS
++ # field-name = token
++ # field-value = *( field-content / obs-fold )
++ # field-content = field-vchar [ 1*( SP / HTAB ) field-vchar ]
++ # field-vchar = VCHAR / obs-text
++ # obs-fold = CRLF 1*( SP / HTAB )
++ # ; obsolete line folding
++ # ; see Section 3.2.4
++
++
++ def __read_chunk_trailer(self, rfile, ):
++ # With rfile positioned just after a \r\n, read a trailer line.
++ # Return a true value if a non-empty trailer was read, and
++ # return false if an empty trailer was read (meaning the trailers are
++ # done).
++ # If a single line exceeds the MAX_REQUEST_LINE, raise an exception.
++ # If the field-name portion contains invalid characters, raise an exception.
++
++ i = 0
++ empty = True
++ seen_field_name = False
++ while i < MAX_REQUEST_LINE:
++ char = rfile.read(1)
++ if char == b'\r':
++ # Either read the next \n or raise an error.
++ self.__read_chunk_size_crlf(rfile, newline_only=True)
++ break
++ # Not a \r, so we are NOT an empty chunk.
++ empty = False
++ if char == b':' and i > 0:
++ # We're ending the field-name part; stop validating characters.
++ # Unless : was the first character...
++ seen_field_name = True
++ if not seen_field_name and char not in _ALLOWED_TOKEN_CHARS:
++ raise _InvalidClientInput('Invalid token character: %r' % (char,))
++ i += 1
++ else:
++ # We read too much
++ self._chunked_input_error = True
++ raise _InvalidClientInput("Too large chunk trailer")
++ return not empty
++
++ def __read_chunk_size_crlf(self, rfile, newline_only=False):
++ # Also for safety, correctly verify that we get \r\n when expected.
++ if not newline_only:
+ char = rfile.read(1)
+- if char != b'\n':
++ if char != b'\r':
+ self._chunked_input_error = True
+- raise _InvalidClientInput("Line didn't end in CRLF")
+- return int(buf.getvalue(), 16)
++ raise _InvalidClientInput("Line didn't end in CRLF: %r" % (char,))
++ char = rfile.read(1)
++ if char != b'\n':
++ self._chunked_input_error = True
++ raise _InvalidClientInput("Line didn't end in LF: %r" % (char,))
+
+ def _chunked_read(self, length=None, use_readline=False):
+ # pylint:disable=too-many-branches
+@@ -294,7 +403,7 @@ class Input(object):
+
+ self.position += datalen
+ if self.chunk_length == self.position:
+- rfile.readline()
++ self.__read_chunk_size_crlf(rfile)
+
+ if length is not None:
+ length -= datalen
+@@ -307,9 +416,9 @@ class Input(object):
+ # determine the next size to read
+ self.chunk_length = self.__read_chunk_length(rfile)
+ self.position = 0
+- if self.chunk_length == 0:
+- # Last chunk. Terminates with a CRLF.
+- rfile.readline()
++ # If chunk_length was 0, we already read any trailers and
++ # validated that we have ended with \r\n\r\n.
++
+ return b''.join(response)
+
+ def read(self, length=None):
+@@ -532,7 +641,8 @@ class WSGIHandler(object):
+ elif len(words) == 2:
+ self.command, self.path = words
+ if self.command != "GET":
+- raise _InvalidClientRequest('Expected GET method: %r' % (raw_requestline,))
++ raise _InvalidClientRequest('Expected GET method; Got command=%r; path=%r; raw=%r' % (
++ self.command, self.path, raw_requestline,))
+ self.request_version = "HTTP/0.9"
+ # QQQ I'm pretty sure we can drop support for HTTP/0.9
+ else:
+@@ -1000,14 +1110,28 @@ class WSGIHandler(object):
+ finally:
+ try:
+ self.wsgi_input._discard()
+- except (socket.error, IOError):
+- # Don't let exceptions during discarding
++ except _InvalidClientInput:
++ # This one is deliberately raised to the outer
++ # scope, because, with the incoming stream in some bad state,
++ # we can't be sure we can synchronize and properly parse the next
++ # request.
++ raise
++ except socket.error
++ # Don't let socket exceptions during discarding
+ # input override any exception that may have been
+ # raised by the application, such as our own _InvalidClientInput.
+ # In the general case, these aren't even worth logging (see the comment
+ # just below)
+ pass
+- except _InvalidClientInput:
++ except _InvalidClientInput as ex:
++ # DO log this one because:
++ # - Some of the data may have been read and acted on by the
++ # application;
++ # - The response may or may not have been sent;
++ # - It's likely that the client is bad, or malicious, and
++ # users might wish to take steps to block the client.
++ self._handle_client_error(ex)
++ self.close_connection = True
+ self._send_error_response_if_possible(400)
+ except socket.error as ex:
+ if ex.args[0] in self.ignored_socket_errors:
+@@ -1054,17 +1178,22 @@ class WSGIHandler(object):
+ def _handle_client_error(self, ex):
+ # Called for invalid client input
+ # Returns the appropriate error response.
+- if not isinstance(ex, ValueError):
++ if not isinstance(ex, (ValueError, _InvalidClientInput)):
+ # XXX: Why not self._log_error to send it through the loop's
+ # handle_error method?
++ # _InvalidClientRequest is a ValueError; _InvalidClientInput is an IOError.
+ traceback.print_exc()
+ if isinstance(ex, _InvalidClientRequest):
+ # No formatting needed, that's already been handled. In fact, because the
+ # formatted message contains user input, it might have a % in it, and attempting
+ # to format that with no arguments would be an error.
+- self.log_error(ex.formatted_message)
++ # However, the error messages do not include the requesting IP
++ # necessarily, so we do add that.
++ self.log_error('(from %s) %s', self.client_address, ex.formatted_message)
+ else:
+- self.log_error('Invalid request: %s', str(ex) or ex.__class__.__name__)
++ self.log_error('Invalid request (from %s): %s',
++ self.client_address,
++ str(ex) or ex.__class__.__name__)
+ return ('400', _BAD_REQUEST_RESPONSE)
+
+ def _headers(self):
+diff --git a/src/gevent/subprocess.py b/src/gevent/subprocess.py
+index 38c9bd3..8a8ccad 100644
+--- a/src/gevent/subprocess.py
++++ b/src/gevent/subprocess.py
+@@ -352,10 +352,11 @@ def check_output(*popenargs, **kwargs):
+
+ To capture standard error in the result, use ``stderr=STDOUT``::
+
+- >>> print(check_output(["/bin/sh", "-c",
++ >>> output = check_output(["/bin/sh", "-c",
+ ... "ls -l non_existent_file ; exit 0"],
+- ... stderr=STDOUT).decode('ascii').strip())
+- ls: non_existent_file: No such file or directory
++ ... stderr=STDOUT).decode('ascii').strip()
++ >>> print(output.rsplit(':', 1)[1].strip())
++ No such file or directory
+
+ There is an additional optional argument, "input", allowing you to
+ pass a string to the subprocess's stdin. If you use this argument
+diff --git a/src/gevent/testing/testcase.py b/src/gevent/testing/testcase.py
+index cd5db80..aa86dcf 100644
+--- a/src/gevent/testing/testcase.py
++++ b/src/gevent/testing/testcase.py
+@@ -225,7 +225,7 @@ class TestCaseMetaClass(type):
+ classDict.pop(key)
+ # XXX: When did we stop doing this?
+ #value = wrap_switch_count_check(value)
+- value = _wrap_timeout(timeout, value)
++ #value = _wrap_timeout(timeout, value)
+ error_fatal = getattr(value, 'error_fatal', error_fatal)
+ if error_fatal:
+ value = errorhandler.wrap_error_fatal(value)
+diff --git a/src/gevent/tests/test__pywsgi.py b/src/gevent/tests/test__pywsgi.py
+index d2125a8..d46030b 100644
+--- a/src/gevent/tests/test__pywsgi.py
++++ b/src/gevent/tests/test__pywsgi.py
+@@ -25,21 +25,11 @@ from gevent import monkey
+ monkey.patch_all()
+
+ from contextlib import contextmanager
+-try:
+- from urllib.parse import parse_qs
+-except ImportError:
+- # Python 2
+- from urlparse import parse_qs
++from urllib.parse import parse_qs
+ import os
+ import sys
+-try:
+- # On Python 2, we want the C-optimized version if
+- # available; it has different corner-case behaviour than
+- # the Python implementation, and it used by socket.makefile
+- # by default.
+- from cStringIO import StringIO
+-except ImportError:
+- from io import BytesIO as StringIO
++from io import BytesIO as StringIO
++
+ import weakref
+ import unittest
+ from wsgiref.validate import validator
+@@ -156,6 +146,10 @@ class Response(object):
+ @classmethod
+ def read(cls, fd, code=200, reason='default', version='1.1',
+ body=None, chunks=None, content_length=None):
++ """
++ Read an HTTP response, optionally perform assertions,
++ and return the Response object.
++ """
+ # pylint:disable=too-many-branches
+ _status_line, headers = read_headers(fd)
+ self = cls(_status_line, headers)
+@@ -716,7 +710,14 @@ class TestNegativeReadline(TestCase):
+
+ class TestChunkedPost(TestCase):
+
++ calls = 0
++
++ def setUp(self):
++ super().setUp()
++ self.calls = 0
++
+ def application(self, env, start_response):
++ self.calls += 1
+ self.assertTrue(env.get('wsgi.input_terminated'))
+ start_response('200 OK', [('Content-Type', 'text/plain')])
+ if env['PATH_INFO'] == '/a':
+@@ -730,6 +731,8 @@ class TestChunkedPost(TestCase):
+ if env['PATH_INFO'] == '/c':
+ return list(iter(lambda: env['wsgi.input'].read(1), b''))
+
++ return [b'We should not get here', env['PATH_INFO'].encode('ascii')]
++
+ def test_014_chunked_post(self):
+ data = (b'POST /a HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: localhost\r\nConnection: close\r\n'
+ b'Transfer-Encoding: chunked\r\n\r\n'
+@@ -797,6 +800,170 @@ class TestChunkedPost(TestCase):
+ fd.write(data)
+ read_http(fd, code=400)
+
++ def test_trailers_keepalive_ignored(self):
++ # Trailers after a chunk are ignored.
++ data = (
++ b'POST /a HTTP/1.1\r\n'
++ b'Host: localhost\r\n'
++ b'Connection: keep-alive\r\n'
++ b'Transfer-Encoding: chunked\r\n'
++ b'\r\n'
++ b'2\r\noh\r\n'
++ b'4\r\n hai\r\n'
++ b'0\r\n' # last-chunk
++ # Normally the final CRLF would go here, but if you put in a
++ # trailer, it doesn't.
++ b'trailer1: value1\r\n'
++ b'trailer2: value2\r\n'
++ b'\r\n' # Really terminate the chunk.
++ b'POST /a HTTP/1.1\r\n'
++ b'Host: localhost\r\n'
++ b'Connection: close\r\n'
++ b'Transfer-Encoding: chunked\r\n'
++ b'\r\n'
++ b'2\r\noh\r\n'
++ b'4\r\n bye\r\n'
++ b'0\r\n' # last-chunk
++ )
++ with self.makefile() as fd:
++ fd.write(data)
++ read_http(fd, body='oh hai')
++ read_http(fd, body='oh bye')
++
++ self.assertEqual(self.calls, 2)
++
++ def test_trailers_too_long(self):
++ # Trailers after a chunk are ignored.
++ data = (
++ b'POST /a HTTP/1.1\r\n'
++ b'Host: localhost\r\n'
++ b'Connection: keep-alive\r\n'
++ b'Transfer-Encoding: chunked\r\n'
++ b'\r\n'
++ b'2\r\noh\r\n'
++ b'4\r\n hai\r\n'
++ b'0\r\n' # last-chunk
++ # Normally the final CRLF would go here, but if you put in a
++ # trailer, it doesn't.
++ b'trailer2: value2' # not lack of \r\n
++ )
++ data += b't' * pywsgi.MAX_REQUEST_LINE
++ # No termination, because we detect the trailer as being too
++ # long and abort the connection.
++ with self.makefile() as fd:
++ fd.write(data)
++ read_http(fd, body='oh hai')
++ with self.assertRaises(ConnectionClosed):
++ read_http(fd, body='oh bye')
++
++ def test_trailers_request_smuggling_missing_last_chunk_keep_alive(self):
++ # When something that looks like a request line comes in the trailer
++ # as the first line, immediately after an invalid last chunk.
++ # We detect this and abort the connection, because the
++ # whitespace in the GET line isn't a legal part of a trailer.
++ # If we didn't abort the connection, then, because we specified
++ # keep-alive, the server would be hanging around waiting for more input.
++ data = (
++ b'POST /a HTTP/1.1\r\n'
++ b'Host: localhost\r\n'
++ b'Connection: keep-alive\r\n'
++ b'Transfer-Encoding: chunked\r\n'
++ b'\r\n'
++ b'2\r\noh\r\n'
++ b'4\r\n hai\r\n'
++ b'0' # last-chunk, but missing the \r\n
++ # Normally the final CRLF would go here, but if you put in a
++ # trailer, it doesn't.
++ # b'\r\n'
++ b'GET /path2?a=:123 HTTP/1.1\r\n'
++ b'Host: a.com\r\n'
++ b'Connection: close\r\n'
++ b'\r\n'
++ )
++ with self.makefile() as fd:
++ fd.write(data)
++ read_http(fd, body='oh hai')
++ with self.assertRaises(ConnectionClosed):
++ read_http(fd)
++
++ self.assertEqual(self.calls, 1)
++
++ def test_trailers_request_smuggling_missing_last_chunk_close(self):
++ # Same as the above, except the trailers are actually valid
++ # and since we ask to close the connection we don't get stuck
++ # waiting for more input.
++ data = (
++ b'POST /a HTTP/1.1\r\n'
++ b'Host: localhost\r\n'
++ b'Connection: close\r\n'
++ b'Transfer-Encoding: chunked\r\n'
++ b'\r\n'
++ b'2\r\noh\r\n'
++ b'4\r\n hai\r\n'
++ b'0\r\n' # last-chunk
++ # Normally the final CRLF would go here, but if you put in a
++ # trailer, it doesn't.
++ # b'\r\n'
++ b'GETpath2a:123 HTTP/1.1\r\n'
++ b'Host: a.com\r\n'
++ b'Connection: close\r\n'
++ b'\r\n'
++ )
++ with self.makefile() as fd:
++ fd.write(data)
++ read_http(fd, body='oh hai')
++ with self.assertRaises(ConnectionClosed):
++ read_http(fd)
++
++ def test_trailers_request_smuggling_header_first(self):
++ # When something that looks like a header comes in the first line.
++ data = (
++ b'POST /a HTTP/1.1\r\n'
++ b'Host: localhost\r\n'
++ b'Connection: keep-alive\r\n'
++ b'Transfer-Encoding: chunked\r\n'
++ b'\r\n'
++ b'2\r\noh\r\n'
++ b'4\r\n hai\r\n'
++ b'0\r\n' # last-chunk, but only one CRLF
++ b'Header: value\r\n'
++ b'GET /path2?a=:123 HTTP/1.1\r\n'
++ b'Host: a.com\r\n'
++ b'Connection: close\r\n'
++ b'\r\n'
++ )
++ with self.makefile() as fd:
++ fd.write(data)
++ read_http(fd, body='oh hai')
++ with self.assertRaises(ConnectionClosed):
++ read_http(fd, code=400)
++
++ self.assertEqual(self.calls, 1)
++
++ def test_trailers_request_smuggling_request_terminates_then_header(self):
++ data = (
++ b'POST /a HTTP/1.1\r\n'
++ b'Host: localhost\r\n'
++ b'Connection: keep-alive\r\n'
++ b'Transfer-Encoding: chunked\r\n'
++ b'\r\n'
++ b'2\r\noh\r\n'
++ b'4\r\n hai\r\n'
++ b'0\r\n' # last-chunk
++ b'\r\n'
++ b'Header: value'
++ b'GET /path2?a=:123 HTTP/1.1\r\n'
++ b'Host: a.com\r\n'
++ b'Connection: close\r\n'
++ b'\r\n'
++ )
++ with self.makefile() as fd:
++ fd.write(data)
++ read_http(fd, body='oh hai')
++ read_http(fd, code=400)
++
++ self.assertEqual(self.calls, 1)
++
+
+ class TestUseWrite(TestCase):
+
+--
+2.40.0
@@ -13,6 +13,8 @@ RDEPENDS:${PN} = "${PYTHON_PN}-greenlet \
SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f48b64578c367b91fa793bf8eaaaf4995cb93c8bc45860e473bf868070ad094e"
+SRC_URI += "file://CVE-2023-41419.patch"
+
inherit pypi setuptools3
# Don't embed libraries, link to the system instead