new file mode 100644
@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
+From 612ebf6c913dd0e4197c44909cb3157f5c51a2f0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net>
+Date: Mon, 31 Aug 2020 19:37:13 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] pager: set $LESSSECURE whenver we invoke a pager
+
+Some extra safety when invoked via "sudo". With this we address a
+genuine design flaw of sudo, and we shouldn't need to deal with this.
+But it's still a good idea to disable this surface given how exotic it
+is.
+
+Prompted by #5666
+
+CVE: CVE-2023-26604
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/systemd/systemd/pull/17270/commits/612ebf6c913dd0e4197c44909cb3157f5c51a2f0]
+Comments: Hunk not refreshed
+Signed-off-by: rajmohan r <rajmohan.r@kpit.com>
+---
+ man/less-variables.xml | 9 +++++++++
+ man/systemctl.xml | 1 +
+ man/systemd.xml | 1 +
+ src/shared/pager.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++--
+ 4 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/man/less-variables.xml b/man/less-variables.xml
+index 08e513c99f8e..c52511ca8e18 100644
+--- a/man/less-variables.xml
++++ b/man/less-variables.xml
+@@ -64,6 +64,15 @@
+ the invoking terminal is determined to be UTF-8 compatible).</para></listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
++ <varlistentry id='lesssecure'>
++ <term><varname>$SYSTEMD_LESSSECURE</varname></term>
++
++ <listitem><para>Takes a boolean argument. Overrides the <varname>$LESSSECURE</varname> environment
++ variable when invoking the pager, which controls the "secure" mode of less (which disables commands
++ such as <literal>|</literal> which allow to easily shell out to external command lines). By default
++ less secure mode is enabled, with this setting it may be disabled.</para></listitem>
++ </varlistentry>
++
+ <varlistentry id='colors'>
+ <term><varname>$SYSTEMD_COLORS</varname></term>
+
+diff --git a/man/systemctl.xml b/man/systemctl.xml
+index 1c5502883700..a3f0c3041a57 100644
+--- a/man/systemctl.xml
++++ b/man/systemctl.xml
+@@ -2240,6 +2240,7 @@ Jan 12 10:46:45 example.com bluetoothd[8900]: gatt-time-server: Input/output err
+ <xi:include href="less-variables.xml" xpointer="pager"/>
+ <xi:include href="less-variables.xml" xpointer="less"/>
+ <xi:include href="less-variables.xml" xpointer="lesscharset"/>
++ <xi:include href="less-variables.xml" xpointer="lesssecure"/>
+ <xi:include href="less-variables.xml" xpointer="colors"/>
+ <xi:include href="less-variables.xml" xpointer="urlify"/>
+ </refsect1>
+diff --git a/man/systemd.xml b/man/systemd.xml
+index a9040545c2ab..c92cfef77689 100644
+--- a/man/systemd.xml
++++ b/man/systemd.xml
+@@ -692,6 +692,7 @@
+ <xi:include href="less-variables.xml" xpointer="pager"/>
+ <xi:include href="less-variables.xml" xpointer="less"/>
+ <xi:include href="less-variables.xml" xpointer="lesscharset"/>
++ <xi:include href="less-variables.xml" xpointer="lesssecure"/>
+ <xi:include href="less-variables.xml" xpointer="colors"/>
+ <xi:include href="less-variables.xml" xpointer="urlify"/>
+
+diff --git a/src/shared/pager.c b/src/shared/pager.c
+index e03be6d23b2d..9c21881241f5 100644
+--- a/src/shared/pager.c
++++ b/src/shared/pager.c
+@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
+ #include <unistd.h>
+
+ #include "copy.h"
++#include "env-util.h"
+ #include "fd-util.h"
+ #include "fileio.h"
+ #include "io-util.h"
+@@ -152,8 +153,7 @@ int pager_open(PagerFlags flags) {
+ _exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+ }
+
+- /* Initialize a good charset for less. This is
+- * particularly important if we output UTF-8
++ /* Initialize a good charset for less. This is particularly important if we output UTF-8
+ * characters. */
+ less_charset = getenv("SYSTEMD_LESSCHARSET");
+ if (!less_charset && is_locale_utf8())
+@@ -164,6 +164,25 @@ int pager_open(PagerFlags flags) {
+ _exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+ }
+
++ /* People might invoke us from sudo, don't needlessly allow less to be a way to shell out
++ * privileged stuff. */
++ r = getenv_bool("SYSTEMD_LESSSECURE");
++ if (r == 0) { /* Remove env var if off */
++ if (unsetenv("LESSSECURE") < 0) {
++ log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to uset environment variable LESSSECURE: %m");
++ _exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
++ }
++ } else {
++ /* Set env var otherwise */
++ if (r < 0)
++ log_warning_errno(r, "Unable to parse $SYSTEMD_LESSSECURE, ignoring: %m");
++
++ if (setenv("LESSSECURE", "1", 1) < 0) {
++ log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to set environment variable LESSSECURE: %m");
++ _exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
++ }
++ }
++
+ if (pager_args) {
+ r = loop_write(exe_name_pipe[1], pager_args[0], strlen(pager_args[0]) + 1, false);
+ if (r < 0) {
new file mode 100644
@@ -0,0 +1,264 @@
+From 1b5b507cd2d1d7a2b053151abb548475ad9c5c3b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Zbigniew=20J=C4=99drzejewski-Szmek?= <zbyszek@in.waw.pl>
+Date: Mon, 12 Oct 2020 18:57:32 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] test-login: always test sd_pid_get_owner_uid(), modernize
+
+A long time some function only worked when in a session, and the test
+didn't execute them when sd_pid_get_session() failed. Let's always call
+them to increase coverage.
+
+While at it, let's test for ==0 not >=0 where we don't expect the function
+to return anything except 0 or error.
+
+CVE: CVE-2023-26604
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/systemd/systemd/pull/17270/commits/1b5b507cd2d1d7a2b053151abb548475ad9c5c3b.patch]
+Comments: Hunk not refreshed
+Signed-off-by: rajmohan r <rajmohan.r@kpit.com>
+---
+ src/libsystemd/sd-login/test-login.c | 131 ++++++++++++++-------------
+ 1 file changed, 70 insertions(+), 61 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/libsystemd/sd-login/test-login.c b/src/libsystemd/sd-login/test-login.c
+index c0c77e04714b..0494fc77ba18 100644
+--- a/src/libsystemd/sd-login/test-login.c
++++ b/src/libsystemd/sd-login/test-login.c
+@@ -5,21 +5,22 @@
+ #include "sd-login.h"
+
+ #include "alloc-util.h"
++#include "errno-list.h"
+ #include "fd-util.h"
+ #include "format-util.h"
+ #include "log.h"
+ #include "string-util.h"
+ #include "strv.h"
+ #include "time-util.h"
+-#include "util.h"
++#include "user-util.h"
+
+ static char* format_uids(char **buf, uid_t* uids, int count) {
+- int pos = 0, k, inc;
++ int pos = 0, inc;
+ size_t size = (DECIMAL_STR_MAX(uid_t) + 1) * count + 1;
+
+ assert_se(*buf = malloc(size));
+
+- for (k = 0; k < count; k++) {
++ for (int k = 0; k < count; k++) {
+ sprintf(*buf + pos, "%s"UID_FMT"%n", k > 0 ? " " : "", uids[k], &inc);
+ pos += inc;
+ }
+@@ -30,6 +31,10 @@ static char* format_uids(char **buf, uid_t* uids, int count) {
+ return *buf;
+ }
+
++static const char *e(int r) {
++ return r == 0 ? "OK" : errno_to_name(r);
++}
++
+ static void test_login(void) {
+ _cleanup_close_pair_ int pair[2] = { -1, -1 };
+ _cleanup_free_ char *pp = NULL, *qq = NULL,
+@@ -39,65 +44,71 @@ static void test_login(void) {
+ *seat = NULL, *session = NULL,
+ *unit = NULL, *user_unit = NULL, *slice = NULL;
+ int r;
+- uid_t u, u2;
+- char *t, **seats, **sessions;
++ uid_t u, u2 = UID_INVALID;
++ char *t, **seats = NULL, **sessions = NULL;
+
+ r = sd_pid_get_unit(0, &unit);
+- assert_se(r >= 0 || r == -ENODATA);
+- log_info("sd_pid_get_unit(0, …) → \"%s\"", strna(unit));
++ log_info("sd_pid_get_unit(0, …) → %s / \"%s\"", e(r), strnull(unit));
++ assert_se(IN_SET(r, 0, -ENODATA));
+
+ r = sd_pid_get_user_unit(0, &user_unit);
+- assert_se(r >= 0 || r == -ENODATA);
+- log_info("sd_pid_get_user_unit(0, …) → \"%s\"", strna(user_unit));
++ log_info("sd_pid_get_user_unit(0, …) → %s / \"%s\"", e(r), strnull(user_unit));
++ assert_se(IN_SET(r, 0, -ENODATA));
+
+ r = sd_pid_get_slice(0, &slice);
+- assert_se(r >= 0 || r == -ENODATA);
+- log_info("sd_pid_get_slice(0, …) → \"%s\"", strna(slice));
++ log_info("sd_pid_get_slice(0, …) → %s / \"%s\"", e(r), strnull(slice));
++ assert_se(IN_SET(r, 0, -ENODATA));
++
++ r = sd_pid_get_owner_uid(0, &u2);
++ log_info("sd_pid_get_owner_uid(0, …) → %s / "UID_FMT, e(r), u2);
++ assert_se(IN_SET(r, 0, -ENODATA));
+
+ r = sd_pid_get_session(0, &session);
+- if (r < 0) {
+- log_warning_errno(r, "sd_pid_get_session(0, …): %m");
+- if (r == -ENODATA)
+- log_info("Seems we are not running in a session, skipping some tests.");
+- } else {
+- log_info("sd_pid_get_session(0, …) → \"%s\"", session);
+-
+- assert_se(sd_pid_get_owner_uid(0, &u2) == 0);
+- log_info("sd_pid_get_owner_uid(0, …) → "UID_FMT, u2);
+-
+- assert_se(sd_pid_get_cgroup(0, &cgroup) == 0);
+- log_info("sd_pid_get_cgroup(0, …) → \"%s\"", cgroup);
+-
+- r = sd_uid_get_display(u2, &display_session);
+- assert_se(r >= 0 || r == -ENODATA);
+- log_info("sd_uid_get_display("UID_FMT", …) → \"%s\"",
+- u2, strnull(display_session));
+-
+- assert_se(socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, pair) == 0);
+- sd_peer_get_session(pair[0], &pp);
+- sd_peer_get_session(pair[1], &qq);
+- assert_se(streq_ptr(pp, qq));
+-
+- r = sd_uid_get_sessions(u2, false, &sessions);
++ log_info("sd_pid_get_session(0, …) → %s / \"%s\"", e(r), strnull(session));
++
++ r = sd_pid_get_cgroup(0, &cgroup);
++ log_info("sd_pid_get_cgroup(0, …) → %s / \"%s\"", e(r), strnull(cgroup));
++ assert_se(r == 0);
++
++ r = sd_uid_get_display(u2, &display_session);
++ log_info("sd_uid_get_display("UID_FMT", …) → %s / \"%s\"", u2, e(r), strnull(display_session));
++ if (u2 == UID_INVALID)
++ assert_se(r == -EINVAL);
++ else
++ assert_se(IN_SET(r, 0, -ENODATA));
++
++ assert_se(socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, pair) == 0);
++ sd_peer_get_session(pair[0], &pp);
++ sd_peer_get_session(pair[1], &qq);
++ assert_se(streq_ptr(pp, qq));
++
++ r = sd_uid_get_sessions(u2, false, &sessions);
++ assert_se(t = strv_join(sessions, " "));
++ log_info("sd_uid_get_sessions("UID_FMT", …) → %s \"%s\"", u2, e(r), t);
++ if (u2 == UID_INVALID)
++ assert_se(r == -EINVAL);
++ else {
+ assert_se(r >= 0);
+ assert_se(r == (int) strv_length(sessions));
+- assert_se(t = strv_join(sessions, " "));
+- strv_free(sessions);
+- log_info("sd_uid_get_sessions("UID_FMT", …) → [%i] \"%s\"", u2, r, t);
+- free(t);
++ }
++ sessions = strv_free(sessions);
++ free(t);
+
+- assert_se(r == sd_uid_get_sessions(u2, false, NULL));
++ assert_se(r == sd_uid_get_sessions(u2, false, NULL));
+
+- r = sd_uid_get_seats(u2, false, &seats);
++ r = sd_uid_get_seats(u2, false, &seats);
++ assert_se(t = strv_join(seats, " "));
++ log_info("sd_uid_get_seats("UID_FMT", …) → %s \"%s\"", u2, e(r), t);
++ if (u2 == UID_INVALID)
++ assert_se(r == -EINVAL);
++ else {
+ assert_se(r >= 0);
+ assert_se(r == (int) strv_length(seats));
+- assert_se(t = strv_join(seats, " "));
+- strv_free(seats);
+- log_info("sd_uid_get_seats("UID_FMT", …) → [%i] \"%s\"", u2, r, t);
+- free(t);
+-
+- assert_se(r == sd_uid_get_seats(u2, false, NULL));
+ }
++ seats = strv_free(seats);
++ free(t);
++
++ assert_se(r == sd_uid_get_seats(u2, false, NULL));
+
+ if (session) {
+ r = sd_session_is_active(session);
+@@ -109,7 +120,7 @@ static void test_login(void) {
+ log_info("sd_session_is_remote(\"%s\") → %s", session, yes_no(r));
+
+ r = sd_session_get_state(session, &state);
+- assert_se(r >= 0);
++ assert_se(r == 0);
+ log_info("sd_session_get_state(\"%s\") → \"%s\"", session, state);
+
+ assert_se(sd_session_get_uid(session, &u) >= 0);
+@@ -123,16 +134,16 @@ static void test_login(void) {
+ log_info("sd_session_get_class(\"%s\") → \"%s\"", session, class);
+
+ r = sd_session_get_display(session, &display);
+- assert_se(r >= 0 || r == -ENODATA);
++ assert_se(IN_SET(r, 0, -ENODATA));
+ log_info("sd_session_get_display(\"%s\") → \"%s\"", session, strna(display));
+
+ r = sd_session_get_remote_user(session, &remote_user);
+- assert_se(r >= 0 || r == -ENODATA);
++ assert_se(IN_SET(r, 0, -ENODATA));
+ log_info("sd_session_get_remote_user(\"%s\") → \"%s\"",
+ session, strna(remote_user));
+
+ r = sd_session_get_remote_host(session, &remote_host);
+- assert_se(r >= 0 || r == -ENODATA);
++ assert_se(IN_SET(r, 0, -ENODATA));
+ log_info("sd_session_get_remote_host(\"%s\") → \"%s\"",
+ session, strna(remote_host));
+
+@@ -161,7 +172,7 @@ static void test_login(void) {
+ assert_se(r == -ENODATA);
+ }
+
+- assert_se(sd_uid_get_state(u, &state2) >= 0);
++ assert_se(sd_uid_get_state(u, &state2) == 0);
+ log_info("sd_uid_get_state("UID_FMT", …) → %s", u, state2);
+ }
+
+@@ -173,11 +184,11 @@ static void test_login(void) {
+ assert_se(sd_uid_is_on_seat(u, 0, seat) > 0);
+
+ r = sd_seat_get_active(seat, &session2, &u2);
+- assert_se(r >= 0);
++ assert_se(r == 0);
+ log_info("sd_seat_get_active(\"%s\", …) → \"%s\", "UID_FMT, seat, session2, u2);
+
+ r = sd_uid_is_on_seat(u, 1, seat);
+- assert_se(r >= 0);
++ assert_se(IN_SET(r, 0, 1));
+ assert_se(!!r == streq(session, session2));
+
+ r = sd_seat_get_sessions(seat, &sessions, &uids, &n);
+@@ -185,8 +196,8 @@ static void test_login(void) {
+ assert_se(r == (int) strv_length(sessions));
+ assert_se(t = strv_join(sessions, " "));
+ strv_free(sessions);
+- log_info("sd_seat_get_sessions(\"%s\", …) → %i, \"%s\", [%i] {%s}",
+- seat, r, t, n, format_uids(&buf, uids, n));
++ log_info("sd_seat_get_sessions(\"%s\", …) → %s, \"%s\", [%u] {%s}",
++ seat, e(r), t, n, format_uids(&buf, uids, n));
+ free(t);
+
+ assert_se(sd_seat_get_sessions(seat, NULL, NULL, NULL) == r);
+@@ -204,7 +215,7 @@ static void test_login(void) {
+
+ r = sd_seat_get_active(NULL, &t, NULL);
+ assert_se(IN_SET(r, 0, -ENODATA));
+- log_info("sd_seat_get_active(NULL, …) (active session on current seat) → %s", strnull(t));
++ log_info("sd_seat_get_active(NULL, …) (active session on current seat) → %s / \"%s\"", e(r), strnull(t));
+ free(t);
+
+ r = sd_get_sessions(&sessions);
+@@ -244,13 +255,11 @@ static void test_login(void) {
+
+ static void test_monitor(void) {
+ sd_login_monitor *m = NULL;
+- unsigned n;
+ int r;
+
+- r = sd_login_monitor_new("session", &m);
+- assert_se(r >= 0);
++ assert_se(sd_login_monitor_new("session", &m) == 0);
+
+- for (n = 0; n < 5; n++) {
++ for (unsigned n = 0; n < 5; n++) {
+ struct pollfd pollfd = {};
+ usec_t timeout, nw;
new file mode 100644
@@ -0,0 +1,182 @@
+From 0a42426d797406b4b01a0d9c13bb759c2629d108 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Zbigniew=20J=C4=99drzejewski-Szmek?= <zbyszek@in.waw.pl>
+Date: Wed, 7 Oct 2020 11:15:05 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] pager: make pager secure when under euid is changed or
+ explicitly requested
+
+The variable is renamed to SYSTEMD_PAGERSECURE (because it's not just about
+less now), and we automatically enable secure mode in certain cases, but not
+otherwise.
+
+This approach is more nuanced, but should provide a better experience for
+users:
+
+- Previusly we would set LESSSECURE=1 and trust the pager to make use of
+ it. But this has an effect only on less. We need to not start pagers which
+ are insecure when in secure mode. In particular more is like that and is a
+ very popular pager.
+
+- We don't enable secure mode always, which means that those other pagers can
+ reasonably used.
+
+- We do the right thing by default, but the user has ultimate control by
+ setting SYSTEMD_PAGERSECURE.
+
+Fixes #5666.
+
+v2:
+- also check $PKEXEC_UID
+
+v3:
+- use 'sd_pid_get_owner_uid() != geteuid()' as the condition
+
+CVE: CVE-2023-26604
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/systemd/systemd/pull/17270/commits/0a42426d797406b4b01a0d9c13bb759c2629d108]
+Comments: Hunk refreshed
+Signed-off-by: rajmohan r <rajmohan.r@kpit.com>
+---
+ man/less-variables.xml | 30 +++++++++++++++----
+ src/shared/pager.c | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
+ 2 files changed, 66 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/man/less-variables.xml b/man/less-variables.xml
+index c52511c..049e9f7 100644
+--- a/man/less-variables.xml
++++ b/man/less-variables.xml
+@@ -65,12 +65,30 @@
+ </varlistentry>
+
+ <varlistentry id='lesssecure'>
+- <term><varname>$SYSTEMD_LESSSECURE</varname></term>
+-
+- <listitem><para>Takes a boolean argument. Overrides the <varname>$LESSSECURE</varname> environment
+- variable when invoking the pager, which controls the "secure" mode of less (which disables commands
+- such as <literal>|</literal> which allow to easily shell out to external command lines). By default
+- less secure mode is enabled, with this setting it may be disabled.</para></listitem>
++ <term><varname>$SYSTEMD_PAGERSECURE</varname></term>
++
++ <listitem><para>Takes a boolean argument. When true, the "secure" mode of the pager is enabled; if
++ false, disabled. If <varname>$SYSTEMD_PAGERSECURE</varname> is not set at all, secure mode is enabled
++ if the effective UID is not the same as the owner of the login session, see <citerefentry
++ project='man-pages'><refentrytitle>geteuid</refentrytitle><manvolnum>2</manvolnum></citerefentry> and
++ <citerefentry><refentrytitle>sd_pid_get_owner_uid</refentrytitle><manvolnum>3</manvolnum></citerefentry>.
++ In secure mode, <option>LESSSECURE=1</option> will be set when invoking the pager, and the pager shall
++ disable commands that open or create new files or start new subprocesses. When
++ <varname>$SYSTEMD_PAGERSECURE</varname> is not set at all, pagers which are not known to implement
++ secure mode will not be used. (Currently only
++ <citerefentry><refentrytitle>less</refentrytitle><manvolnum>1</manvolnum></citerefentry> implements
++ secure mode.)</para>
++
++ <para>Note: when commands are invoked with elevated privileges, for example under <citerefentry
++ project='man-pages'><refentrytitle>sudo</refentrytitle><manvolnum>8</manvolnum></citerefentry> or
++ <citerefentry
++ project='die-net'><refentrytitle>pkexec</refentrytitle><manvolnum>1</manvolnum></citerefentry>, care
++ must be taken to ensure that unintended interactive features are not enabled. "Secure" mode for the
++ pager may be enabled automatically as describe above. Setting <varname>SYSTEMD_PAGERSECURE=0</varname>
++ or not removing it from the inherited environment allows the user to invoke arbitrary commands. Note
++ that if the <varname>$SYSTEMD_PAGER</varname> or <varname>$PAGER</varname> variables are to be
++ honoured, <varname>$SYSTEMD_PAGERSECURE</varname> must be set too. It might be reasonable to completly
++ disable the pager using <option>--no-pager</option> instead.</para></listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
+ <varlistentry id='colors'>
+diff --git a/src/shared/pager.c b/src/shared/pager.c
+index a3b6576..a72d9ea 100644
+--- a/src/shared/pager.c
++++ b/src/shared/pager.c
+@@ -8,6 +8,8 @@
+ #include <sys/prctl.h>
+ #include <unistd.h>
+
++#include "sd-login.h"
++
+ #include "copy.h"
+ #include "env-util.h"
+ #include "fd-util.h"
+@@ -164,25 +166,42 @@ int pager_open(PagerFlags flags) {
+ }
+
+ /* People might invoke us from sudo, don't needlessly allow less to be a way to shell out
+- * privileged stuff. */
+- r = getenv_bool("SYSTEMD_LESSSECURE");
+- if (r == 0) { /* Remove env var if off */
+- if (unsetenv("LESSSECURE") < 0) {
+- log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to uset environment variable LESSSECURE: %m");
+- _exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+- }
+- } else {
+- /* Set env var otherwise */
++ * privileged stuff. If the user set $SYSTEMD_PAGERSECURE, trust their configuration of the
++ * pager. If they didn't, use secure mode when under euid is changed. If $SYSTEMD_PAGERSECURE
++ * wasn't explicitly set, and we autodetect the need for secure mode, only use the pager we
++ * know to be good. */
++ int use_secure_mode = getenv_bool("SYSTEMD_PAGERSECURE");
++ bool trust_pager = use_secure_mode >= 0;
++ if (use_secure_mode == -ENXIO) {
++ uid_t uid;
++
++ r = sd_pid_get_owner_uid(0, &uid);
+ if (r < 0)
+- log_warning_errno(r, "Unable to parse $SYSTEMD_LESSSECURE, ignoring: %m");
++ log_debug_errno(r, "sd_pid_get_owner_uid() failed, enabling pager secure mode: %m");
+
+- if (setenv("LESSSECURE", "1", 1) < 0) {
+- log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to set environment variable LESSSECURE: %m");
+- _exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+- }
++ use_secure_mode = r < 0 || uid != geteuid();
++
++ } else if (use_secure_mode < 0) {
++ log_warning_errno(use_secure_mode, "Unable to parse $SYSTEMD_PAGERSECURE, assuming true: %m");
++ use_secure_mode = true;
+ }
+
+- if (pager_args) {
++ /* We generally always set variables used by less, even if we end up using a different pager.
++ * They shouldn't hurt in any case, and ideally other pagers would look at them too. */
++ if (use_secure_mode)
++ r = setenv("LESSSECURE", "1", 1);
++ else
++ r = unsetenv("LESSSECURE");
++ if (r < 0) {
++ log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to adjust environment variable LESSSECURE: %m");
++ _exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
++ }
++
++ if (trust_pager && pager_args) { /* The pager config might be set globally, and we cannot
++ * know if the user adjusted it to be appropriate for the
++ * secure mode. Thus, start the pager specified through
++ * envvars only when $SYSTEMD_PAGERSECURE was explicitly set
++ * as well. */
+ r = loop_write(exe_name_pipe[1], pager_args[0], strlen(pager_args[0]) + 1, false);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ log_error_errno(r, "Failed to write pager name to socket: %m");
+@@ -194,13 +213,14 @@ int pager_open(PagerFlags flags) {
+ "Failed to execute '%s', using fallback pagers: %m", pager_args[0]);
+ }
+
+- /* Debian's alternatives command for pagers is
+- * called 'pager'. Note that we do not call
+- * sensible-pagers here, since that is just a
+- * shell script that implements a logic that
+- * is similar to this one anyway, but is
+- * Debian-specific. */
++ /* Debian's alternatives command for pagers is called 'pager'. Note that we do not call
++ * sensible-pagers here, since that is just a shell script that implements a logic that is
++ * similar to this one anyway, but is Debian-specific. */
+ FOREACH_STRING(exe, "pager", "less", "more") {
++ /* Only less implements secure mode right now. */
++ if (use_secure_mode && !streq(exe, "less"))
++ continue;
++
+ r = loop_write(exe_name_pipe[1], exe, strlen(exe) + 1, false);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ log_error_errno(r, "Failed to write pager name to socket: %m");
+@@ -211,6 +231,7 @@ int pager_open(PagerFlags flags) {
+ "Failed to execute '%s', using next fallback pager: %m", exe);
+ }
+
++ /* Our builtin is also very secure. */
+ r = loop_write(exe_name_pipe[1], "(built-in)", strlen("(built-in)") + 1, false);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ log_error_errno(r, "Failed to write pager name to socket: %m");
new file mode 100644
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+From b8f736b30e20a2b44e7c34bb4e43b0d97ae77e3c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net>
+Date: Thu, 15 Oct 2020 10:54:48 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] pager: lets check SYSTEMD_PAGERSECURE with secure_getenv()
+
+I can't think of any real vulnerability about this, but it still feels
+better to check a variable with "secure" in its name with
+secure_getenv() rather than plain getenv().
+
+Paranoia FTW!
+
+CVE: CVE-2023-26604
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/systemd/systemd/pull/17359/commits/b8f736b30e20a2b44e7c34bb4e43b0d97ae77e3c]
+Comments: Hunk refreshed
+Signed-off-by: rajmohan r <rajmohan.r@kpit.com>
+---
+ src/shared/pager.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/shared/pager.c b/src/shared/pager.c
+index a72d9ea..250519c 100644
+--- a/src/shared/pager.c
++++ b/src/shared/pager.c
+@@ -170,7 +170,7 @@ int pager_open(PagerFlags flags) {
+ * pager. If they didn't, use secure mode when under euid is changed. If $SYSTEMD_PAGERSECURE
+ * wasn't explicitly set, and we autodetect the need for secure mode, only use the pager we
+ * know to be good. */
+- int use_secure_mode = getenv_bool("SYSTEMD_PAGERSECURE");
++ int use_secure_mode = getenv_bool_secure("SYSTEMD_PAGERSECURE");
+ bool trust_pager = use_secure_mode >= 0;
+ if (use_secure_mode == -ENXIO) {
+ uid_t uid;
@@ -35,6 +35,10 @@ SRC_URI += "file://touchscreen.rules \
file://CVE-2021-3997-2.patch \
file://CVE-2021-3997-3.patch \
file://CVE-2022-3821.patch \
+ file://CVE-2023-26604-1.patch \
+ file://CVE-2023-26604-2.patch \
+ file://CVE-2023-26604-3.patch \
+ file://CVE-2023-26604-4.patch \
"
# patches needed by musl