Patchwork libpam: add a new 'nullok_secure' option support to pam_unix

login
register
mail settings
Submitter Ming Liu
Date July 17, 2013, 3:15 a.m.
Message ID <1374030912-19587-1-git-send-email-ming.liu@windriver.com>
Download mbox | patch
Permalink /patch/53793/
State New
Headers show

Comments

Ming Liu - July 17, 2013, 3:15 a.m.
Debian patch to add a new 'nullok_secure' option to pam_unix, which
accepts users with null passwords only when the applicant is connected
from a tty listed in /etc/securetty.

The original pam_unix.so was configured with nullok_secure in
meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/pam.d/common-auth, but no such code
exists actually.

The patch set comes from:
http://patch-tracker.debian.org/patch/series/view/pam/1.1.3-7.1/054_pam_security_abstract_securetty_handling
http://patch-tracker.debian.org/patch/series/view/pam/1.1.3-7.1/055_pam_unix_nullok_secure

Signed-off-by: Ming Liu <ming.liu@windriver.com>
---
 .../pam-security-abstract-securetty-handling.patch |  196 +++++++++++++++++
 .../pam/libpam/pam-unix-nullok-secure.patch        |  220 ++++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam_1.1.6.bb          |    4 +-
 3 files changed, 419 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/pam-security-abstract-securetty-handling.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/pam-unix-nullok-secure.patch
Saul Wold - July 17, 2013, 4:03 p.m.
On 07/16/2013 08:15 PM, Ming Liu wrote:
> Debian patch to add a new 'nullok_secure' option to pam_unix, which
> accepts users with null passwords only when the applicant is connected
> from a tty listed in /etc/securetty.
>
> The original pam_unix.so was configured with nullok_secure in
> meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/pam.d/common-auth, but no such code
> exists actually.
>
> The patch set comes from:
> http://patch-tracker.debian.org/patch/series/view/pam/1.1.3-7.1/054_pam_security_abstract_securetty_handling
> http://patch-tracker.debian.org/patch/series/view/pam/1.1.3-7.1/055_pam_unix_nullok_secure
>
> Signed-off-by: Ming Liu <ming.liu@windriver.com>
> ---
>   .../pam-security-abstract-securetty-handling.patch |  196 +++++++++++++++++
>   .../pam/libpam/pam-unix-nullok-secure.patch        |  220 ++++++++++++++++++++

Both these patches need proper Upstream-Status: and Signed-off-by: tags 
please

Thanks
	Sau!

>   meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam_1.1.6.bb          |    4 +-
>   3 files changed, 419 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
>   create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/pam-security-abstract-securetty-handling.patch
>   create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/pam-unix-nullok-secure.patch
>
> diff --git a/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/pam-security-abstract-securetty-handling.patch b/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/pam-security-abstract-securetty-handling.patch
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000..a537b33
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/pam-security-abstract-securetty-handling.patch
> @@ -0,0 +1,196 @@
> +Description: extract the securetty logic for use with the "nullok_secure" option
> + introduced in the "055_pam_unix_nullok_secure" patch.
> +
> +diff -urpN a/modules/pam_securetty/Makefile.am b/modules/pam_securetty/Makefile.am
> +--- a/modules/pam_securetty/Makefile.am	2013-07-05 11:08:23.224483237 +0800
> ++++ b/modules/pam_securetty/Makefile.am	2013-07-05 11:15:21.304486456 +0800
> +@@ -24,6 +24,10 @@ endif
> + securelib_LTLIBRARIES = pam_securetty.la
> + pam_securetty_la_LIBADD = -L$(top_builddir)/libpam -lpam
> +
> ++pam_securetty_la_SOURCES =	\
> ++	pam_securetty.c		\
> ++	tty_secure.c
> ++
> + if ENABLE_REGENERATE_MAN
> + noinst_DATA = README
> + README: pam_securetty.8.xml
> +diff -urpN a/modules/pam_securetty/pam_securetty.c b/modules/pam_securetty/pam_securetty.c
> +--- a/modules/pam_securetty/pam_securetty.c	2013-07-05 11:07:50.064483568 +0800
> ++++ b/modules/pam_securetty/pam_securetty.c	2013-07-05 11:12:23.994483344 +0800
> +@@ -1,7 +1,5 @@
> + /* pam_securetty module */
> +
> +-#define SECURETTY_FILE "/etc/securetty"
> +-#define TTY_PREFIX     "/dev/"
> + #define CMDLINE_FILE   "/proc/cmdline"
> + #define CONSOLEACTIVE_FILE	"/sys/class/tty/console/active"
> +
> +@@ -40,6 +38,9 @@
> + #include <security/pam_modutil.h>
> + #include <security/pam_ext.h>
> +
> ++extern int _pammodutil_tty_secure(const pam_handle_t *pamh,
> ++                                  const char *uttyname);
> ++
> + #define PAM_DEBUG_ARG       0x0001
> + #define PAM_NOCONSOLE_ARG   0x0002
> +
> +@@ -73,11 +74,7 @@ securetty_perform_check (pam_handle_t *p
> +     const char *username;
> +     const char *uttyname;
> +     const void *void_uttyname;
> +-    char ttyfileline[256];
> +-    char ptname[256];
> +-    struct stat ttyfileinfo;
> +     struct passwd *user_pwd;
> +-    FILE *ttyfile;
> +
> +     /* log a trail for debugging */
> +     if (ctrl & PAM_DEBUG_ARG) {
> +@@ -105,50 +102,7 @@ securetty_perform_check (pam_handle_t *p
> + 	return PAM_SERVICE_ERR;
> +     }
> +
> +-    /* The PAM_TTY item may be prefixed with "/dev/" - skip that */
> +-    if (strncmp(TTY_PREFIX, uttyname, sizeof(TTY_PREFIX)-1) == 0) {
> +-	uttyname += sizeof(TTY_PREFIX)-1;
> +-    }
> +-
> +-    if (stat(SECURETTY_FILE, &ttyfileinfo)) {
> +-	pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_NOTICE, "Couldn't open %s: %m", SECURETTY_FILE);
> +-	return PAM_SUCCESS; /* for compatibility with old securetty handling,
> +-			       this needs to succeed.  But we still log the
> +-			       error. */
> +-    }
> +-
> +-    if ((ttyfileinfo.st_mode & S_IWOTH) || !S_ISREG(ttyfileinfo.st_mode)) {
> +-	/* If the file is world writable or is not a
> +-	   normal file, return error */
> +-	pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR,
> +-		   "%s is either world writable or not a normal file",
> +-		   SECURETTY_FILE);
> +-	return PAM_AUTH_ERR;
> +-    }
> +-
> +-    ttyfile = fopen(SECURETTY_FILE,"r");
> +-    if (ttyfile == NULL) { /* Check that we opened it successfully */
> +-	pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, "Error opening %s: %m", SECURETTY_FILE);
> +-	return PAM_SERVICE_ERR;
> +-    }
> +-
> +-    if (isdigit(uttyname[0])) {
> +-	snprintf(ptname, sizeof(ptname), "pts/%s", uttyname);
> +-    } else {
> +-	ptname[0] = '\0';
> +-    }
> +-
> +-    retval = 1;
> +-
> +-    while ((fgets(ttyfileline, sizeof(ttyfileline)-1, ttyfile) != NULL)
> +-	   && retval) {
> +-	if (ttyfileline[strlen(ttyfileline) - 1] == '\n')
> +-	    ttyfileline[strlen(ttyfileline) - 1] = '\0';
> +-
> +-	retval = ( strcmp(ttyfileline, uttyname)
> +-		   && (!ptname[0] || strcmp(ptname, uttyname)) );
> +-    }
> +-    fclose(ttyfile);
> ++    retval = _pammodutil_tty_secure(pamh, uttyname);
> +
> +     if (retval && !(ctrl & PAM_NOCONSOLE_ARG)) {
> +         FILE *cmdlinefile;
> +diff -urpN a/modules/pam_securetty/tty_secure.c b/modules/pam_securetty/tty_secure.c
> +--- a/modules/pam_securetty/tty_secure.c	1970-01-01 08:30:00.000000000 +0830
> ++++ b/modules/pam_securetty/tty_secure.c	2013-07-05 11:14:21.534482900 +0800
> +@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
> ++/*
> ++ * A function to determine if a particular line is in /etc/securetty
> ++ */
> ++
> ++
> ++#define SECURETTY_FILE "/etc/securetty"
> ++#define TTY_PREFIX     "/dev/"
> ++
> ++/* This function taken out of pam_securetty by Sam Hartman
> ++ * <hartmans@debian.org>*/
> ++/*
> ++ * by Elliot Lee <sopwith@redhat.com>, Red Hat Software.
> ++ * July 25, 1996.
> ++ * Slight modifications AGM. 1996/12/3
> ++ */
> ++
> ++#include <unistd.h>
> ++#include <sys/types.h>
> ++#include <sys/stat.h>
> ++#include <security/pam_modules.h>
> ++#include <stdarg.h>
> ++#include <syslog.h>
> ++#include <sys/syslog.h>
> ++#include <stdio.h>
> ++#include <string.h>
> ++#include <stdlib.h>
> ++#include <ctype.h>
> ++#include <security/pam_modutil.h>
> ++#include <security/pam_ext.h>
> ++
> ++extern int _pammodutil_tty_secure(const pam_handle_t *pamh,
> ++                                  const char *uttyname);
> ++
> ++int _pammodutil_tty_secure(const pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *uttyname)
> ++{
> ++    int retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR;
> ++    char ttyfileline[256];
> ++    char ptname[256];
> ++    struct stat ttyfileinfo;
> ++    FILE *ttyfile;
> ++    /* The PAM_TTY item may be prefixed with "/dev/" - skip that */
> ++    if (strncmp(TTY_PREFIX, uttyname, sizeof(TTY_PREFIX)-1) == 0)
> ++	uttyname += sizeof(TTY_PREFIX)-1;
> ++
> ++    if (stat(SECURETTY_FILE, &ttyfileinfo)) {
> ++	pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_NOTICE, "Couldn't open %s: %m",
> ++	           SECURETTY_FILE);
> ++	return PAM_SUCCESS; /* for compatibility with old securetty handling,
> ++			       this needs to succeed.  But we still log the
> ++			       error. */
> ++    }
> ++
> ++    if ((ttyfileinfo.st_mode & S_IWOTH) || !S_ISREG(ttyfileinfo.st_mode)) {
> ++	/* If the file is world writable or is not a
> ++	   normal file, return error */
> ++	pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR,
> ++	           "%s is either world writable or not a normal file",
> ++	           SECURETTY_FILE);
> ++	return PAM_AUTH_ERR;
> ++    }
> ++
> ++    ttyfile = fopen(SECURETTY_FILE,"r");
> ++    if(ttyfile == NULL) { /* Check that we opened it successfully */
> ++	pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, "Error opening %s: %m", SECURETTY_FILE);
> ++	return PAM_SERVICE_ERR;
> ++    }
> ++
> ++    if (isdigit(uttyname[0])) {
> ++	snprintf(ptname, sizeof(ptname), "pts/%s", uttyname);
> ++    } else {
> ++	ptname[0] = '\0';
> ++    }
> ++
> ++    retval = 1;
> ++
> ++    while ((fgets(ttyfileline,sizeof(ttyfileline)-1, ttyfile) != NULL)
> ++	   && retval) {
> ++	if(ttyfileline[strlen(ttyfileline) - 1] == '\n')
> ++	    ttyfileline[strlen(ttyfileline) - 1] = '\0';
> ++	retval = ( strcmp(ttyfileline,uttyname)
> ++	           && (!ptname[0] || strcmp(ptname, uttyname)) );
> ++    }
> ++    fclose(ttyfile);
> ++
> ++    if(retval) {
> ++	retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR;
> ++    }
> ++
> ++    return retval;
> ++}
> diff --git a/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/pam-unix-nullok-secure.patch b/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/pam-unix-nullok-secure.patch
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000..09cffe3
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/pam-unix-nullok-secure.patch
> @@ -0,0 +1,220 @@
> +Debian patch to add a new 'nullok_secure' option to pam_unix, which
> +accepts users with null passwords only when the applicant is connected
> +from a tty listed in /etc/securetty.
> +
> +Authors: Sam Hartman <hartmans@debian.org>,
> +         Steve Langasek <vorlon@debian.org>
> +
> +Upstream status: not yet submitted
> +===================================================================
> +diff -urpN a/modules/pam_unix/Makefile.am b/modules/pam_unix/Makefile.am
> +--- a/modules/pam_unix/Makefile.am	2013-07-05 09:51:31.014483164 +0800
> ++++ b/modules/pam_unix/Makefile.am	2013-07-05 10:26:12.884484000 +0800
> +@@ -30,7 +30,8 @@ if HAVE_VERSIONING
> +   pam_unix_la_LDFLAGS += -Wl,--version-script=$(srcdir)/../modules.map
> + endif
> + pam_unix_la_LIBADD = $(top_builddir)/libpam/libpam.la \
> +-	@LIBCRYPT@ @LIBSELINUX@ $(NIS_LIBS)
> ++	@LIBCRYPT@ @LIBSELINUX@ $(NIS_LIBS) \
> ++	../pam_securetty/tty_secure.lo
> +
> + securelib_LTLIBRARIES = pam_unix.la
> +
> +diff -urpN a/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8 b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8
> +--- a/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8	2013-07-05 09:52:16.825108201 +0800
> ++++ b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8	2013-07-05 10:28:34.724483774 +0800
> +@@ -220,7 +220,14 @@ A little more extreme than debug\&.
> + .RS 4
> + The default action of this module is to not permit the user access to a service if their official password is blank\&. The
> + \fBnullok\fR
> +-argument overrides this default\&.
> ++argument overrides this default and allows any user with a blank password to access the service\&.
> ++.RE
> ++.PP
> ++\fBnullok_secure\fR
> ++.RS 4
> ++The default action of this module is to not permit the user access to a service if their official password is blank\&. The
> ++\fBnullok_secure\fR
> ++argument overrides this default and allows any user with a blank password to access the service as long as the value of PAM_TTY is set to one of the values found in /etc/securetty\&.
> + .RE
> + .PP
> + \fBtry_first_pass\fR
> +diff -urpN a/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8.xml b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8.xml
> +--- a/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8.xml	2013-07-05 09:52:38.775108523 +0800
> ++++ b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8.xml	2013-07-05 10:30:23.084483630 +0800
> +@@ -135,7 +135,24 @@
> +           <para>
> +             The default action of this module is to not permit the
> +             user access to a service if their official password is blank.
> +-            The <option>nullok</option> argument overrides this default.
> ++            The <option>nullok</option> argument overrides this default
> ++            and allows any user with a blank password to access the
> ++            service.
> ++          </para>
> ++        </listitem>
> ++      </varlistentry>
> ++      <varlistentry>
> ++        <term>
> ++          <option>nullok_secure</option>
> ++        </term>
> ++        <listitem>
> ++          <para>
> ++            The default action of this module is to not permit the
> ++            user access to a service if their official password is blank.
> ++            The <option>nullok_secure</option> argument overrides this
> ++            default and allows any user with a blank password to access
> ++            the service as long as the value of PAM_TTY is set to one of
> ++            the values found in /etc/securetty.
> +           </para>
> +         </listitem>
> +       </varlistentry>
> +diff -urpN a/modules/pam_unix/README b/modules/pam_unix/README
> +--- a/modules/pam_unix/README	2013-07-05 09:51:52.205107846 +0800
> ++++ b/modules/pam_unix/README	2013-07-05 10:27:10.774484537 +0800
> +@@ -57,7 +57,16 @@ nullok
> +
> +     The default action of this module is to not permit the user access to a
> +     service if their official password is blank. The nullok argument overrides
> +-    this default.
> ++    this default and allows any user with a blank password to access the
> ++    service.
> ++
> ++nullok_secure
> ++
> ++    The default action of this module is to not permit the user access to a
> ++    service if their official password is blank. The nullok_secure argument
> ++    overrides this default and allows any user with a blank password to access
> ++    the service as long as the value of PAM_TTY is set to one of the values
> ++    found in /etc/securetty.
> +
> + try_first_pass
> +
> +diff -urpN a/modules/pam_unix/support.c b/modules/pam_unix/support.c
> +--- a/modules/pam_unix/support.c	2013-07-05 09:50:49.134482523 +0800
> ++++ b/modules/pam_unix/support.c	2013-07-05 09:56:26.924484267 +0800
> +@@ -84,14 +84,22 @@ int _set_ctrl(pam_handle_t *pamh, int fl
> + 	/* now parse the arguments to this module */
> +
> + 	for (; argc-- > 0; ++argv) {
> +-		int j;
> ++		int j, sl;
> +
> + 		D(("pam_unix arg: %s", *argv));
> +
> + 		for (j = 0; j < UNIX_CTRLS_; ++j) {
> +-			if (unix_args[j].token
> +-			    && !strncmp(*argv, unix_args[j].token, strlen(unix_args[j].token))) {
> +-				break;
> ++			if (unix_args[j].token) {
> ++			    sl = strlen(unix_args[j].token);
> ++			    if (unix_args[j].token[sl-1] == '=') {
> ++				/* exclude argument from comparison */
> ++				if (!strncmp(*argv, unix_args[j].token, sl))
> ++				    break;
> ++			    } else {
> ++				/* compare full strings */
> ++				if (!strcmp(*argv, unix_args[j].token))
> ++				    break;
> ++			    }
> + 			}
> + 		}
> +
> +@@ -461,6 +469,7 @@ static int _unix_run_helper_binary(pam_h
> +     child = fork();
> +     if (child == 0) {
> +         int i=0;
> ++        int nullok = off(UNIX__NONULL, ctrl);
> +         struct rlimit rlim;
> + 	static char *envp[] = { NULL };
> + 	char *args[] = { NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL };
> +@@ -488,7 +497,18 @@ static int _unix_run_helper_binary(pam_h
> + 	/* exec binary helper */
> + 	args[0] = strdup(CHKPWD_HELPER);
> + 	args[1] = x_strdup(user);
> +-	if (off(UNIX__NONULL, ctrl)) {	/* this means we've succeeded */
> ++
> ++	if (on(UNIX_NULLOK_SECURE, ctrl)) {
> ++	    const void *uttyname;
> ++	    retval = pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_TTY, &uttyname);
> ++	    if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS || uttyname == NULL
> ++	        || _pammodutil_tty_secure(pamh, (const char *)uttyname) != PAM_SUCCESS)
> ++	    {
> ++	        nullok = 0;
> ++	    }
> ++	}
> ++
> ++	if (nullok) {
> + 	  args[2]=strdup("nullok");
> + 	} else {
> + 	  args[2]=strdup("nonull");
> +@@ -567,6 +587,17 @@ _unix_blankpasswd (pam_handle_t *pamh, u
> + 	if (on(UNIX__NONULL, ctrl))
> + 		return 0;	/* will fail but don't let on yet */
> +
> ++	if (on(UNIX_NULLOK_SECURE, ctrl)) {
> ++		int retval2;
> ++		const void *uttyname;
> ++		retval2 = pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_TTY, &uttyname);
> ++		if (retval2 != PAM_SUCCESS || uttyname == NULL)
> ++			return 0;
> ++
> ++		if (_pammodutil_tty_secure(pamh, (const char *)uttyname) != PAM_SUCCESS)
> ++			return 0;
> ++	}
> ++
> + 	/* UNIX passwords area */
> +
> + 	retval = get_pwd_hash(pamh, name, &pwd, &salt);
> +@@ -653,7 +684,8 @@ int _unix_verify_password(pam_handle_t *
> + 			}
> + 		}
> + 	} else {
> +-		retval = verify_pwd_hash(p, salt, off(UNIX__NONULL, ctrl));
> ++		retval = verify_pwd_hash(p, salt,
> ++		                         _unix_blankpasswd(pamh, ctrl, name));
> + 	}
> +
> + 	if (retval == PAM_SUCCESS) {
> +diff -urpN a/modules/pam_unix/support.h b/modules/pam_unix/support.h
> +--- a/modules/pam_unix/support.h	2013-07-05 09:51:10.385107934 +0800
> ++++ b/modules/pam_unix/support.h	2013-07-05 10:23:54.815107842 +0800
> +@@ -90,8 +90,9 @@ typedef struct {
> + 					   password hash algorithms */
> + #define UNIX_BLOWFISH_PASS       26	/* new password hashes will use blowfish */
> + #define UNIX_MIN_PASS_LEN        27	/* min length for password */
> ++#define UNIX_NULLOK_SECURE       28	/* NULL passwords allowed only on secure ttys */
> + /* -------------- */
> +-#define UNIX_CTRLS_              28	/* number of ctrl arguments defined */
> ++#define UNIX_CTRLS_              29	/* number of ctrl arguments defined */
> +
> + #define UNIX_DES_CRYPT(ctrl)	(off(UNIX_MD5_PASS,ctrl)&&off(UNIX_BIGCRYPT,ctrl)&&off(UNIX_SHA256_PASS,ctrl)&&off(UNIX_SHA512_PASS,ctrl)&&off(UNIX_BLOWFISH_PASS,ctrl))
> +
> +@@ -109,7 +110,7 @@ static const UNIX_Ctrls unix_args[UNIX_C
> + /* UNIX_NOT_SET_PASS */    {"not_set_pass",    _ALL_ON_,                0100},
> + /* UNIX__PRELIM */         {NULL,              _ALL_ON_^(0600),         0200},
> + /* UNIX__UPDATE */         {NULL,              _ALL_ON_^(0600),         0400},
> +-/* UNIX__NONULL */         {NULL,              _ALL_ON_,               01000},
> ++/* UNIX__NONULL */         {NULL,              _ALL_ON_^(0x10000000),  0x200},
> + /* UNIX__QUIET */          {NULL,              _ALL_ON_,               02000},
> + /* UNIX_USE_AUTHTOK */     {"use_authtok",     _ALL_ON_,               04000},
> + /* UNIX_SHADOW */          {"shadow",          _ALL_ON_,              010000},
> +@@ -127,7 +128,8 @@ static const UNIX_Ctrls unix_args[UNIX_C
> + /* UNIX_SHA512_PASS */     {"sha512",       _ALL_ON_^(0260420000), 040000000},
> + /* UNIX_ALGO_ROUNDS */     {"rounds=",         _ALL_ON_,          0100000000},
> + /* UNIX_BLOWFISH_PASS */   {"blowfish",    _ALL_ON_^(0260420000), 0200000000},
> +-/* UNIX_MIN_PASS_LEN */    {"minlen=",		_ALL_ON_,          0400000000},
> ++/* UNIX_MIN_PASS_LEN */    {"minlen=",	        _ALL_ON_,          0400000000},
> ++/* UNIX_NULLOK_SECURE */   {"nullok_secure",   _ALL_ON_^(0x200),  0x10000000},
> + };
> +
> + #define UNIX_DEFAULTS  (unix_args[UNIX__NONULL].flag)
> +@@ -163,6 +165,9 @@ extern int _unix_read_password(pam_handl
> + 			,const char *data_name
> + 			,const void **pass);
> +
> ++extern int _pammodutil_tty_secure(const pam_handle_t *pamh,
> ++				  const char *uttyname);
> ++
> + extern int _unix_run_verify_binary(pam_handle_t *pamh,
> + 			unsigned int ctrl, const char *user, int *daysleft);
> + #endif /* _PAM_UNIX_SUPPORT_H */
> diff --git a/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam_1.1.6.bb b/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam_1.1.6.bb
> index 62ad7b1..3d8999d 100644
> --- a/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam_1.1.6.bb
> +++ b/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam_1.1.6.bb
> @@ -23,6 +23,8 @@ SRC_URI = "http://linux-pam.org/library/Linux-PAM-${PV}.tar.bz2 \
>              file://reflect-the-enforce_for_root-semantics-change-in-pam.patch \
>              file://add-checks-for-crypt-returning-NULL.patch \
>              file://libpam-fix-for-CVE-2010-4708.patch \
> +           file://pam-security-abstract-securetty-handling.patch \
> +           file://pam-unix-nullok-secure.patch \
>             "
>   SRC_URI[md5sum] = "7b73e58b7ce79ffa321d408de06db2c4"
>   SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "bab887d6280f47fc3963df3b95735a27a16f0f663636163ddf3acab5f1149fc2"
> @@ -39,7 +41,7 @@ EXTRA_OECONF = "--with-db-uniquename=_pam \
>
>   CFLAGS_append = " -fPIC "
>
> -PR = "r2"
> +PR = "r3"
>
>   S = "${WORKDIR}/Linux-PAM-${PV}"
>
>
Ming Liu - July 18, 2013, 1:31 a.m.
On 07/18/2013 12:03 AM, Saul Wold wrote:
> On 07/16/2013 08:15 PM, Ming Liu wrote:
>> Debian patch to add a new 'nullok_secure' option to pam_unix, which
>> accepts users with null passwords only when the applicant is connected
>> from a tty listed in /etc/securetty.
>>
>> The original pam_unix.so was configured with nullok_secure in
>> meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/pam.d/common-auth, but no such code
>> exists actually.
>>
>> The patch set comes from:
>> http://patch-tracker.debian.org/patch/series/view/pam/1.1.3-7.1/054_pam_security_abstract_securetty_handling 
>>
>> http://patch-tracker.debian.org/patch/series/view/pam/1.1.3-7.1/055_pam_unix_nullok_secure 
>>
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Ming Liu <ming.liu@windriver.com>
>> ---
>>   .../pam-security-abstract-securetty-handling.patch |  196 
>> +++++++++++++++++
>>   .../pam/libpam/pam-unix-nullok-secure.patch        |  220 
>> ++++++++++++++++++++
>
> Both these patches need proper Upstream-Status: and Signed-off-by: 
> tags please

OK, got it. I will add those in V1.

the best,
thank you

>
> Thanks
>     Sau!
>
>> meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam_1.1.6.bb          |    4 +-
>>   3 files changed, 419 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
>>   create mode 100644 
>> meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/pam-security-abstract-securetty-handling.patch
>>   create mode 100644 
>> meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/pam-unix-nullok-secure.patch
>>
>> diff --git 
>> a/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/pam-security-abstract-securetty-handling.patch 
>> b/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/pam-security-abstract-securetty-handling.patch 
>>
>> new file mode 100644
>> index 0000000..a537b33
>> --- /dev/null
>> +++ 
>> b/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/pam-security-abstract-securetty-handling.patch
>> @@ -0,0 +1,196 @@
>> +Description: extract the securetty logic for use with the 
>> "nullok_secure" option
>> + introduced in the "055_pam_unix_nullok_secure" patch.
>> +
>> +diff -urpN a/modules/pam_securetty/Makefile.am 
>> b/modules/pam_securetty/Makefile.am
>> +--- a/modules/pam_securetty/Makefile.am    2013-07-05 
>> 11:08:23.224483237 +0800
>> ++++ b/modules/pam_securetty/Makefile.am    2013-07-05 
>> 11:15:21.304486456 +0800
>> +@@ -24,6 +24,10 @@ endif
>> + securelib_LTLIBRARIES = pam_securetty.la
>> + pam_securetty_la_LIBADD = -L$(top_builddir)/libpam -lpam
>> +
>> ++pam_securetty_la_SOURCES =    \
>> ++    pam_securetty.c        \
>> ++    tty_secure.c
>> ++
>> + if ENABLE_REGENERATE_MAN
>> + noinst_DATA = README
>> + README: pam_securetty.8.xml
>> +diff -urpN a/modules/pam_securetty/pam_securetty.c 
>> b/modules/pam_securetty/pam_securetty.c
>> +--- a/modules/pam_securetty/pam_securetty.c    2013-07-05 
>> 11:07:50.064483568 +0800
>> ++++ b/modules/pam_securetty/pam_securetty.c    2013-07-05 
>> 11:12:23.994483344 +0800
>> +@@ -1,7 +1,5 @@
>> + /* pam_securetty module */
>> +
>> +-#define SECURETTY_FILE "/etc/securetty"
>> +-#define TTY_PREFIX     "/dev/"
>> + #define CMDLINE_FILE   "/proc/cmdline"
>> + #define CONSOLEACTIVE_FILE    "/sys/class/tty/console/active"
>> +
>> +@@ -40,6 +38,9 @@
>> + #include <security/pam_modutil.h>
>> + #include <security/pam_ext.h>
>> +
>> ++extern int _pammodutil_tty_secure(const pam_handle_t *pamh,
>> ++                                  const char *uttyname);
>> ++
>> + #define PAM_DEBUG_ARG       0x0001
>> + #define PAM_NOCONSOLE_ARG   0x0002
>> +
>> +@@ -73,11 +74,7 @@ securetty_perform_check (pam_handle_t *p
>> +     const char *username;
>> +     const char *uttyname;
>> +     const void *void_uttyname;
>> +-    char ttyfileline[256];
>> +-    char ptname[256];
>> +-    struct stat ttyfileinfo;
>> +     struct passwd *user_pwd;
>> +-    FILE *ttyfile;
>> +
>> +     /* log a trail for debugging */
>> +     if (ctrl & PAM_DEBUG_ARG) {
>> +@@ -105,50 +102,7 @@ securetty_perform_check (pam_handle_t *p
>> +     return PAM_SERVICE_ERR;
>> +     }
>> +
>> +-    /* The PAM_TTY item may be prefixed with "/dev/" - skip that */
>> +-    if (strncmp(TTY_PREFIX, uttyname, sizeof(TTY_PREFIX)-1) == 0) {
>> +-    uttyname += sizeof(TTY_PREFIX)-1;
>> +-    }
>> +-
>> +-    if (stat(SECURETTY_FILE, &ttyfileinfo)) {
>> +-    pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_NOTICE, "Couldn't open %s: %m", 
>> SECURETTY_FILE);
>> +-    return PAM_SUCCESS; /* for compatibility with old securetty 
>> handling,
>> +-                   this needs to succeed.  But we still log the
>> +-                   error. */
>> +-    }
>> +-
>> +-    if ((ttyfileinfo.st_mode & S_IWOTH) || 
>> !S_ISREG(ttyfileinfo.st_mode)) {
>> +-    /* If the file is world writable or is not a
>> +-       normal file, return error */
>> +-    pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR,
>> +-           "%s is either world writable or not a normal file",
>> +-           SECURETTY_FILE);
>> +-    return PAM_AUTH_ERR;
>> +-    }
>> +-
>> +-    ttyfile = fopen(SECURETTY_FILE,"r");
>> +-    if (ttyfile == NULL) { /* Check that we opened it successfully */
>> +-    pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, "Error opening %s: %m", SECURETTY_FILE);
>> +-    return PAM_SERVICE_ERR;
>> +-    }
>> +-
>> +-    if (isdigit(uttyname[0])) {
>> +-    snprintf(ptname, sizeof(ptname), "pts/%s", uttyname);
>> +-    } else {
>> +-    ptname[0] = '\0';
>> +-    }
>> +-
>> +-    retval = 1;
>> +-
>> +-    while ((fgets(ttyfileline, sizeof(ttyfileline)-1, ttyfile) != 
>> NULL)
>> +-       && retval) {
>> +-    if (ttyfileline[strlen(ttyfileline) - 1] == '\n')
>> +-        ttyfileline[strlen(ttyfileline) - 1] = '\0';
>> +-
>> +-    retval = ( strcmp(ttyfileline, uttyname)
>> +-           && (!ptname[0] || strcmp(ptname, uttyname)) );
>> +-    }
>> +-    fclose(ttyfile);
>> ++    retval = _pammodutil_tty_secure(pamh, uttyname);
>> +
>> +     if (retval && !(ctrl & PAM_NOCONSOLE_ARG)) {
>> +         FILE *cmdlinefile;
>> +diff -urpN a/modules/pam_securetty/tty_secure.c 
>> b/modules/pam_securetty/tty_secure.c
>> +--- a/modules/pam_securetty/tty_secure.c    1970-01-01 
>> 08:30:00.000000000 +0830
>> ++++ b/modules/pam_securetty/tty_secure.c    2013-07-05 
>> 11:14:21.534482900 +0800
>> +@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
>> ++/*
>> ++ * A function to determine if a particular line is in /etc/securetty
>> ++ */
>> ++
>> ++
>> ++#define SECURETTY_FILE "/etc/securetty"
>> ++#define TTY_PREFIX     "/dev/"
>> ++
>> ++/* This function taken out of pam_securetty by Sam Hartman
>> ++ * <hartmans@debian.org>*/
>> ++/*
>> ++ * by Elliot Lee <sopwith@redhat.com>, Red Hat Software.
>> ++ * July 25, 1996.
>> ++ * Slight modifications AGM. 1996/12/3
>> ++ */
>> ++
>> ++#include <unistd.h>
>> ++#include <sys/types.h>
>> ++#include <sys/stat.h>
>> ++#include <security/pam_modules.h>
>> ++#include <stdarg.h>
>> ++#include <syslog.h>
>> ++#include <sys/syslog.h>
>> ++#include <stdio.h>
>> ++#include <string.h>
>> ++#include <stdlib.h>
>> ++#include <ctype.h>
>> ++#include <security/pam_modutil.h>
>> ++#include <security/pam_ext.h>
>> ++
>> ++extern int _pammodutil_tty_secure(const pam_handle_t *pamh,
>> ++                                  const char *uttyname);
>> ++
>> ++int _pammodutil_tty_secure(const pam_handle_t *pamh, const char 
>> *uttyname)
>> ++{
>> ++    int retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR;
>> ++    char ttyfileline[256];
>> ++    char ptname[256];
>> ++    struct stat ttyfileinfo;
>> ++    FILE *ttyfile;
>> ++    /* The PAM_TTY item may be prefixed with "/dev/" - skip that */
>> ++    if (strncmp(TTY_PREFIX, uttyname, sizeof(TTY_PREFIX)-1) == 0)
>> ++    uttyname += sizeof(TTY_PREFIX)-1;
>> ++
>> ++    if (stat(SECURETTY_FILE, &ttyfileinfo)) {
>> ++    pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_NOTICE, "Couldn't open %s: %m",
>> ++               SECURETTY_FILE);
>> ++    return PAM_SUCCESS; /* for compatibility with old securetty 
>> handling,
>> ++                   this needs to succeed.  But we still log the
>> ++                   error. */
>> ++    }
>> ++
>> ++    if ((ttyfileinfo.st_mode & S_IWOTH) || 
>> !S_ISREG(ttyfileinfo.st_mode)) {
>> ++    /* If the file is world writable or is not a
>> ++       normal file, return error */
>> ++    pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR,
>> ++               "%s is either world writable or not a normal file",
>> ++               SECURETTY_FILE);
>> ++    return PAM_AUTH_ERR;
>> ++    }
>> ++
>> ++    ttyfile = fopen(SECURETTY_FILE,"r");
>> ++    if(ttyfile == NULL) { /* Check that we opened it successfully */
>> ++    pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, "Error opening %s: %m", SECURETTY_FILE);
>> ++    return PAM_SERVICE_ERR;
>> ++    }
>> ++
>> ++    if (isdigit(uttyname[0])) {
>> ++    snprintf(ptname, sizeof(ptname), "pts/%s", uttyname);
>> ++    } else {
>> ++    ptname[0] = '\0';
>> ++    }
>> ++
>> ++    retval = 1;
>> ++
>> ++    while ((fgets(ttyfileline,sizeof(ttyfileline)-1, ttyfile) != NULL)
>> ++       && retval) {
>> ++    if(ttyfileline[strlen(ttyfileline) - 1] == '\n')
>> ++        ttyfileline[strlen(ttyfileline) - 1] = '\0';
>> ++    retval = ( strcmp(ttyfileline,uttyname)
>> ++               && (!ptname[0] || strcmp(ptname, uttyname)) );
>> ++    }
>> ++    fclose(ttyfile);
>> ++
>> ++    if(retval) {
>> ++    retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR;
>> ++    }
>> ++
>> ++    return retval;
>> ++}
>> diff --git 
>> a/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/pam-unix-nullok-secure.patch 
>> b/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/pam-unix-nullok-secure.patch
>> new file mode 100644
>> index 0000000..09cffe3
>> --- /dev/null
>> +++ b/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/pam-unix-nullok-secure.patch
>> @@ -0,0 +1,220 @@
>> +Debian patch to add a new 'nullok_secure' option to pam_unix, which
>> +accepts users with null passwords only when the applicant is connected
>> +from a tty listed in /etc/securetty.
>> +
>> +Authors: Sam Hartman <hartmans@debian.org>,
>> +         Steve Langasek <vorlon@debian.org>
>> +
>> +Upstream status: not yet submitted
>> +===================================================================
>> +diff -urpN a/modules/pam_unix/Makefile.am 
>> b/modules/pam_unix/Makefile.am
>> +--- a/modules/pam_unix/Makefile.am    2013-07-05 09:51:31.014483164 
>> +0800
>> ++++ b/modules/pam_unix/Makefile.am    2013-07-05 10:26:12.884484000 
>> +0800
>> +@@ -30,7 +30,8 @@ if HAVE_VERSIONING
>> +   pam_unix_la_LDFLAGS += -Wl,--version-script=$(srcdir)/../modules.map
>> + endif
>> + pam_unix_la_LIBADD = $(top_builddir)/libpam/libpam.la \
>> +-    @LIBCRYPT@ @LIBSELINUX@ $(NIS_LIBS)
>> ++    @LIBCRYPT@ @LIBSELINUX@ $(NIS_LIBS) \
>> ++    ../pam_securetty/tty_secure.lo
>> +
>> + securelib_LTLIBRARIES = pam_unix.la
>> +
>> +diff -urpN a/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8 b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8
>> +--- a/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8    2013-07-05 09:52:16.825108201 
>> +0800
>> ++++ b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8    2013-07-05 10:28:34.724483774 
>> +0800
>> +@@ -220,7 +220,14 @@ A little more extreme than debug\&.
>> + .RS 4
>> + The default action of this module is to not permit the user access 
>> to a service if their official password is blank\&. The
>> + \fBnullok\fR
>> +-argument overrides this default\&.
>> ++argument overrides this default and allows any user with a blank 
>> password to access the service\&.
>> ++.RE
>> ++.PP
>> ++\fBnullok_secure\fR
>> ++.RS 4
>> ++The default action of this module is to not permit the user access 
>> to a service if their official password is blank\&. The
>> ++\fBnullok_secure\fR
>> ++argument overrides this default and allows any user with a blank 
>> password to access the service as long as the value of PAM_TTY is set 
>> to one of the values found in /etc/securetty\&.
>> + .RE
>> + .PP
>> + \fBtry_first_pass\fR
>> +diff -urpN a/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8.xml 
>> b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8.xml
>> +--- a/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8.xml    2013-07-05 
>> 09:52:38.775108523 +0800
>> ++++ b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8.xml    2013-07-05 
>> 10:30:23.084483630 +0800
>> +@@ -135,7 +135,24 @@
>> +           <para>
>> +             The default action of this module is to not permit the
>> +             user access to a service if their official password is 
>> blank.
>> +-            The <option>nullok</option> argument overrides this 
>> default.
>> ++            The <option>nullok</option> argument overrides this 
>> default
>> ++            and allows any user with a blank password to access the
>> ++            service.
>> ++          </para>
>> ++        </listitem>
>> ++      </varlistentry>
>> ++      <varlistentry>
>> ++        <term>
>> ++          <option>nullok_secure</option>
>> ++        </term>
>> ++        <listitem>
>> ++          <para>
>> ++            The default action of this module is to not permit the
>> ++            user access to a service if their official password is 
>> blank.
>> ++            The <option>nullok_secure</option> argument overrides this
>> ++            default and allows any user with a blank password to 
>> access
>> ++            the service as long as the value of PAM_TTY is set to 
>> one of
>> ++            the values found in /etc/securetty.
>> +           </para>
>> +         </listitem>
>> +       </varlistentry>
>> +diff -urpN a/modules/pam_unix/README b/modules/pam_unix/README
>> +--- a/modules/pam_unix/README    2013-07-05 09:51:52.205107846 +0800
>> ++++ b/modules/pam_unix/README    2013-07-05 10:27:10.774484537 +0800
>> +@@ -57,7 +57,16 @@ nullok
>> +
>> +     The default action of this module is to not permit the user 
>> access to a
>> +     service if their official password is blank. The nullok 
>> argument overrides
>> +-    this default.
>> ++    this default and allows any user with a blank password to 
>> access the
>> ++    service.
>> ++
>> ++nullok_secure
>> ++
>> ++    The default action of this module is to not permit the user 
>> access to a
>> ++    service if their official password is blank. The nullok_secure 
>> argument
>> ++    overrides this default and allows any user with a blank 
>> password to access
>> ++    the service as long as the value of PAM_TTY is set to one of 
>> the values
>> ++    found in /etc/securetty.
>> +
>> + try_first_pass
>> +
>> +diff -urpN a/modules/pam_unix/support.c b/modules/pam_unix/support.c
>> +--- a/modules/pam_unix/support.c    2013-07-05 09:50:49.134482523 +0800
>> ++++ b/modules/pam_unix/support.c    2013-07-05 09:56:26.924484267 +0800
>> +@@ -84,14 +84,22 @@ int _set_ctrl(pam_handle_t *pamh, int fl
>> +     /* now parse the arguments to this module */
>> +
>> +     for (; argc-- > 0; ++argv) {
>> +-        int j;
>> ++        int j, sl;
>> +
>> +         D(("pam_unix arg: %s", *argv));
>> +
>> +         for (j = 0; j < UNIX_CTRLS_; ++j) {
>> +-            if (unix_args[j].token
>> +-                && !strncmp(*argv, unix_args[j].token, 
>> strlen(unix_args[j].token))) {
>> +-                break;
>> ++            if (unix_args[j].token) {
>> ++                sl = strlen(unix_args[j].token);
>> ++                if (unix_args[j].token[sl-1] == '=') {
>> ++                /* exclude argument from comparison */
>> ++                if (!strncmp(*argv, unix_args[j].token, sl))
>> ++                    break;
>> ++                } else {
>> ++                /* compare full strings */
>> ++                if (!strcmp(*argv, unix_args[j].token))
>> ++                    break;
>> ++                }
>> +             }
>> +         }
>> +
>> +@@ -461,6 +469,7 @@ static int _unix_run_helper_binary(pam_h
>> +     child = fork();
>> +     if (child == 0) {
>> +         int i=0;
>> ++        int nullok = off(UNIX__NONULL, ctrl);
>> +         struct rlimit rlim;
>> +     static char *envp[] = { NULL };
>> +     char *args[] = { NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL };
>> +@@ -488,7 +497,18 @@ static int _unix_run_helper_binary(pam_h
>> +     /* exec binary helper */
>> +     args[0] = strdup(CHKPWD_HELPER);
>> +     args[1] = x_strdup(user);
>> +-    if (off(UNIX__NONULL, ctrl)) {    /* this means we've succeeded */
>> ++
>> ++    if (on(UNIX_NULLOK_SECURE, ctrl)) {
>> ++        const void *uttyname;
>> ++        retval = pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_TTY, &uttyname);
>> ++        if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS || uttyname == NULL
>> ++            || _pammodutil_tty_secure(pamh, (const char *)uttyname) 
>> != PAM_SUCCESS)
>> ++        {
>> ++            nullok = 0;
>> ++        }
>> ++    }
>> ++
>> ++    if (nullok) {
>> +       args[2]=strdup("nullok");
>> +     } else {
>> +       args[2]=strdup("nonull");
>> +@@ -567,6 +587,17 @@ _unix_blankpasswd (pam_handle_t *pamh, u
>> +     if (on(UNIX__NONULL, ctrl))
>> +         return 0;    /* will fail but don't let on yet */
>> +
>> ++    if (on(UNIX_NULLOK_SECURE, ctrl)) {
>> ++        int retval2;
>> ++        const void *uttyname;
>> ++        retval2 = pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_TTY, &uttyname);
>> ++        if (retval2 != PAM_SUCCESS || uttyname == NULL)
>> ++            return 0;
>> ++
>> ++        if (_pammodutil_tty_secure(pamh, (const char *)uttyname) != 
>> PAM_SUCCESS)
>> ++            return 0;
>> ++    }
>> ++
>> +     /* UNIX passwords area */
>> +
>> +     retval = get_pwd_hash(pamh, name, &pwd, &salt);
>> +@@ -653,7 +684,8 @@ int _unix_verify_password(pam_handle_t *
>> +             }
>> +         }
>> +     } else {
>> +-        retval = verify_pwd_hash(p, salt, off(UNIX__NONULL, ctrl));
>> ++        retval = verify_pwd_hash(p, salt,
>> ++                                 _unix_blankpasswd(pamh, ctrl, name));
>> +     }
>> +
>> +     if (retval == PAM_SUCCESS) {
>> +diff -urpN a/modules/pam_unix/support.h b/modules/pam_unix/support.h
>> +--- a/modules/pam_unix/support.h    2013-07-05 09:51:10.385107934 +0800
>> ++++ b/modules/pam_unix/support.h    2013-07-05 10:23:54.815107842 +0800
>> +@@ -90,8 +90,9 @@ typedef struct {
>> +                        password hash algorithms */
>> + #define UNIX_BLOWFISH_PASS       26    /* new password hashes will 
>> use blowfish */
>> + #define UNIX_MIN_PASS_LEN        27    /* min length for password */
>> ++#define UNIX_NULLOK_SECURE       28    /* NULL passwords allowed 
>> only on secure ttys */
>> + /* -------------- */
>> +-#define UNIX_CTRLS_              28    /* number of ctrl arguments 
>> defined */
>> ++#define UNIX_CTRLS_              29    /* number of ctrl arguments 
>> defined */
>> +
>> + #define UNIX_DES_CRYPT(ctrl) 
>> (off(UNIX_MD5_PASS,ctrl)&&off(UNIX_BIGCRYPT,ctrl)&&off(UNIX_SHA256_PASS,ctrl)&&off(UNIX_SHA512_PASS,ctrl)&&off(UNIX_BLOWFISH_PASS,ctrl))
>> +
>> +@@ -109,7 +110,7 @@ static const UNIX_Ctrls unix_args[UNIX_C
>> + /* UNIX_NOT_SET_PASS */    {"not_set_pass", 
>> _ALL_ON_,                0100},
>> + /* UNIX__PRELIM */         {NULL, _ALL_ON_^(0600),         0200},
>> + /* UNIX__UPDATE */         {NULL, _ALL_ON_^(0600),         0400},
>> +-/* UNIX__NONULL */         {NULL, _ALL_ON_,               01000},
>> ++/* UNIX__NONULL */         {NULL, _ALL_ON_^(0x10000000),  0x200},
>> + /* UNIX__QUIET */          {NULL, _ALL_ON_,               02000},
>> + /* UNIX_USE_AUTHTOK */     {"use_authtok", _ALL_ON_,               
>> 04000},
>> + /* UNIX_SHADOW */          {"shadow", _ALL_ON_,              010000},
>> +@@ -127,7 +128,8 @@ static const UNIX_Ctrls unix_args[UNIX_C
>> + /* UNIX_SHA512_PASS */     {"sha512", _ALL_ON_^(0260420000), 
>> 040000000},
>> + /* UNIX_ALGO_ROUNDS */     {"rounds=", _ALL_ON_,          0100000000},
>> + /* UNIX_BLOWFISH_PASS */   {"blowfish", _ALL_ON_^(0260420000), 
>> 0200000000},
>> +-/* UNIX_MIN_PASS_LEN */    {"minlen=", _ALL_ON_,          0400000000},
>> ++/* UNIX_MIN_PASS_LEN */    {"minlen=", _ALL_ON_,          0400000000},
>> ++/* UNIX_NULLOK_SECURE */   {"nullok_secure", _ALL_ON_^(0x200),  
>> 0x10000000},
>> + };
>> +
>> + #define UNIX_DEFAULTS  (unix_args[UNIX__NONULL].flag)
>> +@@ -163,6 +165,9 @@ extern int _unix_read_password(pam_handl
>> +             ,const char *data_name
>> +             ,const void **pass);
>> +
>> ++extern int _pammodutil_tty_secure(const pam_handle_t *pamh,
>> ++                  const char *uttyname);
>> ++
>> + extern int _unix_run_verify_binary(pam_handle_t *pamh,
>> +             unsigned int ctrl, const char *user, int *daysleft);
>> + #endif /* _PAM_UNIX_SUPPORT_H */
>> diff --git a/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam_1.1.6.bb 
>> b/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam_1.1.6.bb
>> index 62ad7b1..3d8999d 100644
>> --- a/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam_1.1.6.bb
>> +++ b/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam_1.1.6.bb
>> @@ -23,6 +23,8 @@ SRC_URI = 
>> "http://linux-pam.org/library/Linux-PAM-${PV}.tar.bz2 \
>> file://reflect-the-enforce_for_root-semantics-change-in-pam.patch \
>>              file://add-checks-for-crypt-returning-NULL.patch \
>>              file://libpam-fix-for-CVE-2010-4708.patch \
>> + file://pam-security-abstract-securetty-handling.patch \
>> +           file://pam-unix-nullok-secure.patch \
>>             "
>>   SRC_URI[md5sum] = "7b73e58b7ce79ffa321d408de06db2c4"
>>   SRC_URI[sha256sum] = 
>> "bab887d6280f47fc3963df3b95735a27a16f0f663636163ddf3acab5f1149fc2"
>> @@ -39,7 +41,7 @@ EXTRA_OECONF = "--with-db-uniquename=_pam \
>>
>>   CFLAGS_append = " -fPIC "
>>
>> -PR = "r2"
>> +PR = "r3"
>>
>>   S = "${WORKDIR}/Linux-PAM-${PV}"
>>
>>
>
>

Patch

diff --git a/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/pam-security-abstract-securetty-handling.patch b/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/pam-security-abstract-securetty-handling.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a537b33
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/pam-security-abstract-securetty-handling.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,196 @@ 
+Description: extract the securetty logic for use with the "nullok_secure" option
+ introduced in the "055_pam_unix_nullok_secure" patch.
+
+diff -urpN a/modules/pam_securetty/Makefile.am b/modules/pam_securetty/Makefile.am
+--- a/modules/pam_securetty/Makefile.am	2013-07-05 11:08:23.224483237 +0800
++++ b/modules/pam_securetty/Makefile.am	2013-07-05 11:15:21.304486456 +0800
+@@ -24,6 +24,10 @@ endif
+ securelib_LTLIBRARIES = pam_securetty.la
+ pam_securetty_la_LIBADD = -L$(top_builddir)/libpam -lpam
+ 
++pam_securetty_la_SOURCES =	\
++	pam_securetty.c		\
++	tty_secure.c
++
+ if ENABLE_REGENERATE_MAN
+ noinst_DATA = README
+ README: pam_securetty.8.xml
+diff -urpN a/modules/pam_securetty/pam_securetty.c b/modules/pam_securetty/pam_securetty.c
+--- a/modules/pam_securetty/pam_securetty.c	2013-07-05 11:07:50.064483568 +0800
++++ b/modules/pam_securetty/pam_securetty.c	2013-07-05 11:12:23.994483344 +0800
+@@ -1,7 +1,5 @@
+ /* pam_securetty module */
+ 
+-#define SECURETTY_FILE "/etc/securetty"
+-#define TTY_PREFIX     "/dev/"
+ #define CMDLINE_FILE   "/proc/cmdline"
+ #define CONSOLEACTIVE_FILE	"/sys/class/tty/console/active"
+ 
+@@ -40,6 +38,9 @@
+ #include <security/pam_modutil.h>
+ #include <security/pam_ext.h>
+ 
++extern int _pammodutil_tty_secure(const pam_handle_t *pamh,
++                                  const char *uttyname);
++
+ #define PAM_DEBUG_ARG       0x0001
+ #define PAM_NOCONSOLE_ARG   0x0002
+ 
+@@ -73,11 +74,7 @@ securetty_perform_check (pam_handle_t *p
+     const char *username;
+     const char *uttyname;
+     const void *void_uttyname;
+-    char ttyfileline[256];
+-    char ptname[256];
+-    struct stat ttyfileinfo;
+     struct passwd *user_pwd;
+-    FILE *ttyfile;
+ 
+     /* log a trail for debugging */
+     if (ctrl & PAM_DEBUG_ARG) {
+@@ -105,50 +102,7 @@ securetty_perform_check (pam_handle_t *p
+ 	return PAM_SERVICE_ERR;
+     }
+ 
+-    /* The PAM_TTY item may be prefixed with "/dev/" - skip that */
+-    if (strncmp(TTY_PREFIX, uttyname, sizeof(TTY_PREFIX)-1) == 0) {
+-	uttyname += sizeof(TTY_PREFIX)-1;
+-    }
+-
+-    if (stat(SECURETTY_FILE, &ttyfileinfo)) {
+-	pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_NOTICE, "Couldn't open %s: %m", SECURETTY_FILE);
+-	return PAM_SUCCESS; /* for compatibility with old securetty handling,
+-			       this needs to succeed.  But we still log the
+-			       error. */
+-    }
+-
+-    if ((ttyfileinfo.st_mode & S_IWOTH) || !S_ISREG(ttyfileinfo.st_mode)) {
+-	/* If the file is world writable or is not a
+-	   normal file, return error */
+-	pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR,
+-		   "%s is either world writable or not a normal file",
+-		   SECURETTY_FILE);
+-	return PAM_AUTH_ERR;
+-    }
+-
+-    ttyfile = fopen(SECURETTY_FILE,"r");
+-    if (ttyfile == NULL) { /* Check that we opened it successfully */
+-	pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, "Error opening %s: %m", SECURETTY_FILE);
+-	return PAM_SERVICE_ERR;
+-    }
+-
+-    if (isdigit(uttyname[0])) {
+-	snprintf(ptname, sizeof(ptname), "pts/%s", uttyname);
+-    } else {
+-	ptname[0] = '\0';
+-    }
+-
+-    retval = 1;
+-
+-    while ((fgets(ttyfileline, sizeof(ttyfileline)-1, ttyfile) != NULL)
+-	   && retval) {
+-	if (ttyfileline[strlen(ttyfileline) - 1] == '\n')
+-	    ttyfileline[strlen(ttyfileline) - 1] = '\0';
+-
+-	retval = ( strcmp(ttyfileline, uttyname)
+-		   && (!ptname[0] || strcmp(ptname, uttyname)) );
+-    }
+-    fclose(ttyfile);
++    retval = _pammodutil_tty_secure(pamh, uttyname);
+ 
+     if (retval && !(ctrl & PAM_NOCONSOLE_ARG)) {
+         FILE *cmdlinefile;
+diff -urpN a/modules/pam_securetty/tty_secure.c b/modules/pam_securetty/tty_secure.c
+--- a/modules/pam_securetty/tty_secure.c	1970-01-01 08:30:00.000000000 +0830
++++ b/modules/pam_securetty/tty_secure.c	2013-07-05 11:14:21.534482900 +0800
+@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
++/*
++ * A function to determine if a particular line is in /etc/securetty
++ */
++
++
++#define SECURETTY_FILE "/etc/securetty"
++#define TTY_PREFIX     "/dev/"
++
++/* This function taken out of pam_securetty by Sam Hartman
++ * <hartmans@debian.org>*/
++/*
++ * by Elliot Lee <sopwith@redhat.com>, Red Hat Software.
++ * July 25, 1996.
++ * Slight modifications AGM. 1996/12/3
++ */
++
++#include <unistd.h>
++#include <sys/types.h>
++#include <sys/stat.h>
++#include <security/pam_modules.h>
++#include <stdarg.h>
++#include <syslog.h>
++#include <sys/syslog.h>
++#include <stdio.h>
++#include <string.h>
++#include <stdlib.h>
++#include <ctype.h>
++#include <security/pam_modutil.h>
++#include <security/pam_ext.h>
++
++extern int _pammodutil_tty_secure(const pam_handle_t *pamh,
++                                  const char *uttyname);
++
++int _pammodutil_tty_secure(const pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *uttyname)
++{
++    int retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR;
++    char ttyfileline[256];
++    char ptname[256];
++    struct stat ttyfileinfo;
++    FILE *ttyfile;
++    /* The PAM_TTY item may be prefixed with "/dev/" - skip that */
++    if (strncmp(TTY_PREFIX, uttyname, sizeof(TTY_PREFIX)-1) == 0)
++	uttyname += sizeof(TTY_PREFIX)-1;
++
++    if (stat(SECURETTY_FILE, &ttyfileinfo)) {
++	pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_NOTICE, "Couldn't open %s: %m",
++	           SECURETTY_FILE);
++	return PAM_SUCCESS; /* for compatibility with old securetty handling,
++			       this needs to succeed.  But we still log the
++			       error. */
++    }
++
++    if ((ttyfileinfo.st_mode & S_IWOTH) || !S_ISREG(ttyfileinfo.st_mode)) {
++	/* If the file is world writable or is not a
++	   normal file, return error */
++	pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR,
++	           "%s is either world writable or not a normal file",
++	           SECURETTY_FILE);
++	return PAM_AUTH_ERR;
++    }
++
++    ttyfile = fopen(SECURETTY_FILE,"r");
++    if(ttyfile == NULL) { /* Check that we opened it successfully */
++	pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, "Error opening %s: %m", SECURETTY_FILE);
++	return PAM_SERVICE_ERR;
++    }
++
++    if (isdigit(uttyname[0])) {
++	snprintf(ptname, sizeof(ptname), "pts/%s", uttyname);
++    } else {
++	ptname[0] = '\0';
++    }
++
++    retval = 1;
++
++    while ((fgets(ttyfileline,sizeof(ttyfileline)-1, ttyfile) != NULL) 
++	   && retval) {
++	if(ttyfileline[strlen(ttyfileline) - 1] == '\n')
++	    ttyfileline[strlen(ttyfileline) - 1] = '\0';
++	retval = ( strcmp(ttyfileline,uttyname)
++	           && (!ptname[0] || strcmp(ptname, uttyname)) );
++    }
++    fclose(ttyfile);
++
++    if(retval) {
++	retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR;
++    }
++
++    return retval;
++}
diff --git a/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/pam-unix-nullok-secure.patch b/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/pam-unix-nullok-secure.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..09cffe3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/pam-unix-nullok-secure.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,220 @@ 
+Debian patch to add a new 'nullok_secure' option to pam_unix, which
+accepts users with null passwords only when the applicant is connected
+from a tty listed in /etc/securetty.
+
+Authors: Sam Hartman <hartmans@debian.org>,
+         Steve Langasek <vorlon@debian.org>
+
+Upstream status: not yet submitted
+===================================================================
+diff -urpN a/modules/pam_unix/Makefile.am b/modules/pam_unix/Makefile.am
+--- a/modules/pam_unix/Makefile.am	2013-07-05 09:51:31.014483164 +0800
++++ b/modules/pam_unix/Makefile.am	2013-07-05 10:26:12.884484000 +0800
+@@ -30,7 +30,8 @@ if HAVE_VERSIONING
+   pam_unix_la_LDFLAGS += -Wl,--version-script=$(srcdir)/../modules.map
+ endif
+ pam_unix_la_LIBADD = $(top_builddir)/libpam/libpam.la \
+-	@LIBCRYPT@ @LIBSELINUX@ $(NIS_LIBS)
++	@LIBCRYPT@ @LIBSELINUX@ $(NIS_LIBS) \
++	../pam_securetty/tty_secure.lo
+ 
+ securelib_LTLIBRARIES = pam_unix.la
+ 
+diff -urpN a/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8 b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8
+--- a/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8	2013-07-05 09:52:16.825108201 +0800
++++ b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8	2013-07-05 10:28:34.724483774 +0800
+@@ -220,7 +220,14 @@ A little more extreme than debug\&.
+ .RS 4
+ The default action of this module is to not permit the user access to a service if their official password is blank\&. The
+ \fBnullok\fR
+-argument overrides this default\&.
++argument overrides this default and allows any user with a blank password to access the service\&.
++.RE
++.PP
++\fBnullok_secure\fR
++.RS 4
++The default action of this module is to not permit the user access to a service if their official password is blank\&. The
++\fBnullok_secure\fR
++argument overrides this default and allows any user with a blank password to access the service as long as the value of PAM_TTY is set to one of the values found in /etc/securetty\&.
+ .RE
+ .PP
+ \fBtry_first_pass\fR
+diff -urpN a/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8.xml b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8.xml
+--- a/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8.xml	2013-07-05 09:52:38.775108523 +0800
++++ b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8.xml	2013-07-05 10:30:23.084483630 +0800
+@@ -135,7 +135,24 @@
+           <para>
+             The default action of this module is to not permit the
+             user access to a service if their official password is blank.
+-            The <option>nullok</option> argument overrides this default.
++            The <option>nullok</option> argument overrides this default
++            and allows any user with a blank password to access the
++            service.
++          </para>
++        </listitem>
++      </varlistentry>
++      <varlistentry>
++        <term>
++          <option>nullok_secure</option>
++        </term>
++        <listitem>
++          <para>
++            The default action of this module is to not permit the
++            user access to a service if their official password is blank.
++            The <option>nullok_secure</option> argument overrides this
++            default and allows any user with a blank password to access
++            the service as long as the value of PAM_TTY is set to one of
++            the values found in /etc/securetty.
+           </para>
+         </listitem>
+       </varlistentry>
+diff -urpN a/modules/pam_unix/README b/modules/pam_unix/README
+--- a/modules/pam_unix/README	2013-07-05 09:51:52.205107846 +0800
++++ b/modules/pam_unix/README	2013-07-05 10:27:10.774484537 +0800
+@@ -57,7 +57,16 @@ nullok
+ 
+     The default action of this module is to not permit the user access to a
+     service if their official password is blank. The nullok argument overrides
+-    this default.
++    this default and allows any user with a blank password to access the
++    service.
++
++nullok_secure
++
++    The default action of this module is to not permit the user access to a
++    service if their official password is blank. The nullok_secure argument
++    overrides this default and allows any user with a blank password to access
++    the service as long as the value of PAM_TTY is set to one of the values
++    found in /etc/securetty.
+ 
+ try_first_pass
+ 
+diff -urpN a/modules/pam_unix/support.c b/modules/pam_unix/support.c
+--- a/modules/pam_unix/support.c	2013-07-05 09:50:49.134482523 +0800
++++ b/modules/pam_unix/support.c	2013-07-05 09:56:26.924484267 +0800
+@@ -84,14 +84,22 @@ int _set_ctrl(pam_handle_t *pamh, int fl
+ 	/* now parse the arguments to this module */
+ 
+ 	for (; argc-- > 0; ++argv) {
+-		int j;
++		int j, sl;
+ 
+ 		D(("pam_unix arg: %s", *argv));
+ 
+ 		for (j = 0; j < UNIX_CTRLS_; ++j) {
+-			if (unix_args[j].token
+-			    && !strncmp(*argv, unix_args[j].token, strlen(unix_args[j].token))) {
+-				break;
++			if (unix_args[j].token) {
++			    sl = strlen(unix_args[j].token);
++			    if (unix_args[j].token[sl-1] == '=') {
++				/* exclude argument from comparison */
++				if (!strncmp(*argv, unix_args[j].token, sl))
++				    break;
++			    } else {
++				/* compare full strings */
++				if (!strcmp(*argv, unix_args[j].token))
++				    break;
++			    }
+ 			}
+ 		}
+ 
+@@ -461,6 +469,7 @@ static int _unix_run_helper_binary(pam_h
+     child = fork();
+     if (child == 0) {
+         int i=0;
++        int nullok = off(UNIX__NONULL, ctrl);
+         struct rlimit rlim;
+ 	static char *envp[] = { NULL };
+ 	char *args[] = { NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL };
+@@ -488,7 +497,18 @@ static int _unix_run_helper_binary(pam_h
+ 	/* exec binary helper */
+ 	args[0] = strdup(CHKPWD_HELPER);
+ 	args[1] = x_strdup(user);
+-	if (off(UNIX__NONULL, ctrl)) {	/* this means we've succeeded */
++
++	if (on(UNIX_NULLOK_SECURE, ctrl)) {
++	    const void *uttyname;
++	    retval = pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_TTY, &uttyname);
++	    if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS || uttyname == NULL
++	        || _pammodutil_tty_secure(pamh, (const char *)uttyname) != PAM_SUCCESS)
++	    {
++	        nullok = 0;
++	    }
++	}
++
++	if (nullok) {
+ 	  args[2]=strdup("nullok");
+ 	} else {
+ 	  args[2]=strdup("nonull");
+@@ -567,6 +587,17 @@ _unix_blankpasswd (pam_handle_t *pamh, u
+ 	if (on(UNIX__NONULL, ctrl))
+ 		return 0;	/* will fail but don't let on yet */
+ 
++	if (on(UNIX_NULLOK_SECURE, ctrl)) {
++		int retval2;
++		const void *uttyname;
++		retval2 = pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_TTY, &uttyname);
++		if (retval2 != PAM_SUCCESS || uttyname == NULL)
++			return 0;
++
++		if (_pammodutil_tty_secure(pamh, (const char *)uttyname) != PAM_SUCCESS)
++			return 0;
++	}
++
+ 	/* UNIX passwords area */
+ 
+ 	retval = get_pwd_hash(pamh, name, &pwd, &salt);
+@@ -653,7 +684,8 @@ int _unix_verify_password(pam_handle_t *
+ 			}
+ 		}
+ 	} else {
+-		retval = verify_pwd_hash(p, salt, off(UNIX__NONULL, ctrl));
++		retval = verify_pwd_hash(p, salt,
++		                         _unix_blankpasswd(pamh, ctrl, name));
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	if (retval == PAM_SUCCESS) {
+diff -urpN a/modules/pam_unix/support.h b/modules/pam_unix/support.h
+--- a/modules/pam_unix/support.h	2013-07-05 09:51:10.385107934 +0800
++++ b/modules/pam_unix/support.h	2013-07-05 10:23:54.815107842 +0800
+@@ -90,8 +90,9 @@ typedef struct {
+ 					   password hash algorithms */
+ #define UNIX_BLOWFISH_PASS       26	/* new password hashes will use blowfish */
+ #define UNIX_MIN_PASS_LEN        27	/* min length for password */
++#define UNIX_NULLOK_SECURE       28	/* NULL passwords allowed only on secure ttys */
+ /* -------------- */
+-#define UNIX_CTRLS_              28	/* number of ctrl arguments defined */
++#define UNIX_CTRLS_              29	/* number of ctrl arguments defined */
+ 
+ #define UNIX_DES_CRYPT(ctrl)	(off(UNIX_MD5_PASS,ctrl)&&off(UNIX_BIGCRYPT,ctrl)&&off(UNIX_SHA256_PASS,ctrl)&&off(UNIX_SHA512_PASS,ctrl)&&off(UNIX_BLOWFISH_PASS,ctrl))
+ 
+@@ -109,7 +110,7 @@ static const UNIX_Ctrls unix_args[UNIX_C
+ /* UNIX_NOT_SET_PASS */    {"not_set_pass",    _ALL_ON_,                0100},
+ /* UNIX__PRELIM */         {NULL,              _ALL_ON_^(0600),         0200},
+ /* UNIX__UPDATE */         {NULL,              _ALL_ON_^(0600),         0400},
+-/* UNIX__NONULL */         {NULL,              _ALL_ON_,               01000},
++/* UNIX__NONULL */         {NULL,              _ALL_ON_^(0x10000000),  0x200},
+ /* UNIX__QUIET */          {NULL,              _ALL_ON_,               02000},
+ /* UNIX_USE_AUTHTOK */     {"use_authtok",     _ALL_ON_,               04000},
+ /* UNIX_SHADOW */          {"shadow",          _ALL_ON_,              010000},
+@@ -127,7 +128,8 @@ static const UNIX_Ctrls unix_args[UNIX_C
+ /* UNIX_SHA512_PASS */     {"sha512",       _ALL_ON_^(0260420000), 040000000},
+ /* UNIX_ALGO_ROUNDS */     {"rounds=",         _ALL_ON_,          0100000000},
+ /* UNIX_BLOWFISH_PASS */   {"blowfish",    _ALL_ON_^(0260420000), 0200000000},
+-/* UNIX_MIN_PASS_LEN */    {"minlen=",		_ALL_ON_,          0400000000},
++/* UNIX_MIN_PASS_LEN */    {"minlen=",	        _ALL_ON_,          0400000000},
++/* UNIX_NULLOK_SECURE */   {"nullok_secure",   _ALL_ON_^(0x200),  0x10000000},
+ };
+ 
+ #define UNIX_DEFAULTS  (unix_args[UNIX__NONULL].flag)
+@@ -163,6 +165,9 @@ extern int _unix_read_password(pam_handl
+ 			,const char *data_name
+ 			,const void **pass);
+ 
++extern int _pammodutil_tty_secure(const pam_handle_t *pamh,
++				  const char *uttyname);
++
+ extern int _unix_run_verify_binary(pam_handle_t *pamh,
+ 			unsigned int ctrl, const char *user, int *daysleft);
+ #endif /* _PAM_UNIX_SUPPORT_H */
diff --git a/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam_1.1.6.bb b/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam_1.1.6.bb
index 62ad7b1..3d8999d 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam_1.1.6.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam_1.1.6.bb
@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@  SRC_URI = "http://linux-pam.org/library/Linux-PAM-${PV}.tar.bz2 \
            file://reflect-the-enforce_for_root-semantics-change-in-pam.patch \
            file://add-checks-for-crypt-returning-NULL.patch \
            file://libpam-fix-for-CVE-2010-4708.patch \
+           file://pam-security-abstract-securetty-handling.patch \
+           file://pam-unix-nullok-secure.patch \
           "
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "7b73e58b7ce79ffa321d408de06db2c4"
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "bab887d6280f47fc3963df3b95735a27a16f0f663636163ddf3acab5f1149fc2"
@@ -39,7 +41,7 @@  EXTRA_OECONF = "--with-db-uniquename=_pam \
 
 CFLAGS_append = " -fPIC "
 
-PR = "r2"
+PR = "r3"
 
 S = "${WORKDIR}/Linux-PAM-${PV}"