[nanbield,1/1] arm-bsp/optee: Improve PIN counter handling robustness

diff --git a/meta-arm-bsp/recipes-security/optee/optee-os-3.22.0/0005-ta-pkcs11-Improve-PIN-counter-handling-robustness.patch b/meta-arm-bsp/recipes-security/optee/optee-os-3.22.0/0005-ta-pkcs11-Improve-PIN-counter-handling-robustness.patch
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..d95954fa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta-arm-bsp/recipes-security/optee/optee-os-3.22.0/0005-ta-pkcs11-Improve-PIN-counter-handling-robustness.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,205 @@ 
+From d75c42ff2847b090d5b1f11c49067cd41fcc2734 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Loic Poulain <loic.poulain@linaro.org>
+Date: Tue, 31 Oct 2023 11:07:00 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] ta: pkcs11: Improve PIN counter handling robustness
+
+Make sure PIN check attempt is saved persistently before continuing with
+the actual PIN verification, improving counter and flags coherency in
+case of subsequent failure with persistent saving.
+
+Signed-off-by: Loic Poulain <loic.poulain@linaro.org>
+Reviewed-by: Etienne Carriere <etienne.carriere@foss.st.com>
+Acked-by: Jerome Forissier <jerome.forissier@linaro.org>
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/pull/6445/commits/0a74733d9437d94a5b4b2db6c40c5755cabc5393]
+---
+ ta/pkcs11/src/pkcs11_token.c | 126 +++++++++++++++++------------------
+ 1 file changed, 62 insertions(+), 64 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ta/pkcs11/src/pkcs11_token.c b/ta/pkcs11/src/pkcs11_token.c
+index ab0fc291e..c5271e449 100644
+--- a/ta/pkcs11/src/pkcs11_token.c
++++ b/ta/pkcs11/src/pkcs11_token.c
+@@ -1132,117 +1132,115 @@ static enum pkcs11_rc check_so_pin(struct pkcs11_session *session,
+ 				   uint8_t *pin, size_t pin_size)
+ {
+ 	struct ck_token *token = session->token;
++	struct token_persistent_main *db = token->db_main;
+ 	enum pkcs11_rc rc = PKCS11_CKR_OK;
+ 
+-	assert(token->db_main->flags & PKCS11_CKFT_TOKEN_INITIALIZED);
++	assert(db->flags & PKCS11_CKFT_TOKEN_INITIALIZED);
+ 
+ 	if (IS_ENABLED(CFG_PKCS11_TA_AUTH_TEE_IDENTITY) &&
+-	    token->db_main->flags & PKCS11_CKFT_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH)
++	    db->flags & PKCS11_CKFT_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH)
+ 		return verify_identity_auth(token, PKCS11_CKU_SO);
+ 
+-	if (token->db_main->flags & PKCS11_CKFT_SO_PIN_LOCKED)
++	if (db->flags & PKCS11_CKFT_SO_PIN_LOCKED)
+ 		return PKCS11_CKR_PIN_LOCKED;
+ 
+-	rc = verify_pin(PKCS11_CKU_SO, pin, pin_size,
+-			token->db_main->so_pin_salt,
+-			token->db_main->so_pin_hash);
+-	if (rc) {
+-		unsigned int pin_count = 0;
++	/*
++	 * Preset the counter and flags conservatively in the database so that
++	 * the tentative is saved whatever happens next.
++	 */
++	db->flags |= PKCS11_CKFT_SO_PIN_COUNT_LOW;
++	db->so_pin_count++;
+ 
+-		if (rc != PKCS11_CKR_PIN_INCORRECT)
+-			return rc;
++	if (db->so_pin_count == PKCS11_TOKEN_SO_PIN_COUNT_MAX - 1)
++		db->flags |= PKCS11_CKFT_SO_PIN_FINAL_TRY;
++	else if (db->so_pin_count == PKCS11_TOKEN_SO_PIN_COUNT_MAX)
++		db->flags |= PKCS11_CKFT_SO_PIN_LOCKED;
+ 
+-		token->db_main->flags |= PKCS11_CKFT_SO_PIN_COUNT_LOW;
+-		token->db_main->so_pin_count++;
+-
+-		pin_count = token->db_main->so_pin_count;
+-		if (pin_count == PKCS11_TOKEN_SO_PIN_COUNT_MAX - 1)
+-			token->db_main->flags |= PKCS11_CKFT_SO_PIN_FINAL_TRY;
+-		if (pin_count == PKCS11_TOKEN_SO_PIN_COUNT_MAX)
+-			token->db_main->flags |= PKCS11_CKFT_SO_PIN_LOCKED;
+-
+-		update_persistent_db(token);
++	update_persistent_db(token);
+ 
+-		if (token->db_main->flags & PKCS11_CKFT_SO_PIN_LOCKED)
++	rc = verify_pin(PKCS11_CKU_SO, pin, pin_size,
++			db->so_pin_salt,
++			db->so_pin_hash);
++	if (rc == PKCS11_CKR_PIN_INCORRECT) {
++		if (db->flags & PKCS11_CKFT_SO_PIN_LOCKED)
+ 			return PKCS11_CKR_PIN_LOCKED;
+ 
+ 		return PKCS11_CKR_PIN_INCORRECT;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	if (token->db_main->so_pin_count) {
+-		token->db_main->so_pin_count = 0;
++	if (rc)
++		db->so_pin_count--;
++	else
++		db->so_pin_count = 0;
+ 
+-		update_persistent_db(token);
++	db->flags &= ~PKCS11_CKFT_SO_PIN_LOCKED;
++	if (db->so_pin_count < PKCS11_TOKEN_SO_PIN_COUNT_MAX - 1) {
++		db->flags &= ~PKCS11_CKFT_SO_PIN_FINAL_TRY;
++		if (!db->so_pin_count)
++			db->flags &= ~PKCS11_CKFT_SO_PIN_COUNT_LOW;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	if (token->db_main->flags & (PKCS11_CKFT_SO_PIN_COUNT_LOW |
+-				     PKCS11_CKFT_SO_PIN_FINAL_TRY)) {
+-		token->db_main->flags &= ~(PKCS11_CKFT_SO_PIN_COUNT_LOW |
+-					   PKCS11_CKFT_SO_PIN_FINAL_TRY);
+-
+-		update_persistent_db(token);
+-	}
++	update_persistent_db(token);
+ 
+-	return PKCS11_CKR_OK;
++	return rc;
+ }
+ 
+ static enum pkcs11_rc check_user_pin(struct pkcs11_session *session,
+ 				     uint8_t *pin, size_t pin_size)
+ {
+ 	struct ck_token *token = session->token;
++	struct token_persistent_main *db = token->db_main;
+ 	enum pkcs11_rc rc = PKCS11_CKR_OK;
+ 
+ 	if (IS_ENABLED(CFG_PKCS11_TA_AUTH_TEE_IDENTITY) &&
+-	    token->db_main->flags & PKCS11_CKFT_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH)
++	    db->flags & PKCS11_CKFT_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH)
+ 		return verify_identity_auth(token, PKCS11_CKU_USER);
+ 
+-	if (!token->db_main->user_pin_salt)
++	if (!db->user_pin_salt)
+ 		return PKCS11_CKR_USER_PIN_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+ 
+-	if (token->db_main->flags & PKCS11_CKFT_USER_PIN_LOCKED)
++	if (db->flags & PKCS11_CKFT_USER_PIN_LOCKED)
+ 		return PKCS11_CKR_PIN_LOCKED;
+ 
+-	rc = verify_pin(PKCS11_CKU_USER, pin, pin_size,
+-			token->db_main->user_pin_salt,
+-			token->db_main->user_pin_hash);
+-	if (rc) {
+-		unsigned int pin_count = 0;
+-
+-		if (rc != PKCS11_CKR_PIN_INCORRECT)
+-			return rc;
+-
+-		token->db_main->flags |= PKCS11_CKFT_USER_PIN_COUNT_LOW;
+-		token->db_main->user_pin_count++;
++	/*
++	 * Preset the counter and flags conservatively in the database so that
++	 * the tentative is saved whatever happens next.
++	 */
++	db->flags |= PKCS11_CKFT_USER_PIN_COUNT_LOW;
++	db->user_pin_count++;
+ 
+-		pin_count = token->db_main->user_pin_count;
+-		if (pin_count == PKCS11_TOKEN_USER_PIN_COUNT_MAX - 1)
+-			token->db_main->flags |= PKCS11_CKFT_USER_PIN_FINAL_TRY;
+-		if (pin_count == PKCS11_TOKEN_USER_PIN_COUNT_MAX)
+-			token->db_main->flags |= PKCS11_CKFT_USER_PIN_LOCKED;
++	if (db->user_pin_count == PKCS11_TOKEN_USER_PIN_COUNT_MAX - 1)
++		db->flags |= PKCS11_CKFT_USER_PIN_FINAL_TRY;
++	else if (db->user_pin_count == PKCS11_TOKEN_USER_PIN_COUNT_MAX)
++		db->flags |= PKCS11_CKFT_USER_PIN_LOCKED;
+ 
+-		update_persistent_db(token);
++	update_persistent_db(token);
+ 
+-		if (token->db_main->flags & PKCS11_CKFT_USER_PIN_LOCKED)
++	rc = verify_pin(PKCS11_CKU_USER, pin, pin_size,
++			db->user_pin_salt,
++			db->user_pin_hash);
++	if (rc == PKCS11_CKR_PIN_INCORRECT) {
++		if (db->flags & PKCS11_CKFT_USER_PIN_LOCKED)
+ 			return PKCS11_CKR_PIN_LOCKED;
+ 
+ 		return PKCS11_CKR_PIN_INCORRECT;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	if (token->db_main->user_pin_count) {
+-		token->db_main->user_pin_count = 0;
++	if (rc)
++		db->user_pin_count--;
++	else
++		db->user_pin_count = 0;
+ 
+-		update_persistent_db(token);
++	db->flags &= ~PKCS11_CKFT_USER_PIN_LOCKED;
++	if (db->user_pin_count < PKCS11_TOKEN_USER_PIN_COUNT_MAX - 1) {
++		db->flags &= ~PKCS11_CKFT_USER_PIN_FINAL_TRY;
++		if (!db->user_pin_count)
++			db->flags &= ~PKCS11_CKFT_USER_PIN_COUNT_LOW;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	if (token->db_main->flags & (PKCS11_CKFT_USER_PIN_COUNT_LOW |
+-				     PKCS11_CKFT_USER_PIN_FINAL_TRY)) {
+-		token->db_main->flags &= ~(PKCS11_CKFT_USER_PIN_COUNT_LOW |
+-					   PKCS11_CKFT_USER_PIN_FINAL_TRY);
+-
+-		update_persistent_db(token);
+-	}
++	update_persistent_db(token);
+ 
+-	return PKCS11_CKR_OK;
++	return rc;
+ }
+ 
+ enum pkcs11_rc entry_ck_set_pin(struct pkcs11_client *client,
+-- 
+2.25.1
+
+
diff --git a/meta-arm-bsp/recipes-security/optee/optee-os_3.22.0.bb b/meta-arm-bsp/recipes-security/optee/optee-os_3.22.0.bb
index e1220192..16a193c3 100644
--- a/meta-arm-bsp/recipes-security/optee/optee-os_3.22.0.bb
+++ b/meta-arm-bsp/recipes-security/optee/optee-os_3.22.0.bb
@@ -10,4 +10,5 @@  SRC_URI += " \
     file://0002-core-Define-section-attributes-for-clang.patch \
     file://0003-optee-enable-clang-support.patch \
     file://0004-core-link-add-no-warn-rwx-segments.patch \
+    file://0005-ta-pkcs11-Improve-PIN-counter-handling-robustness.patch \
    "