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[72.234.108.41]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id x37-20020a056a0018a500b006e04efcfbc2sm7767327pfh.74.2024.02.13.13.43.42 for (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Tue, 13 Feb 2024 13:43:43 -0800 (PST) From: Steve Sakoman To: openembedded-core@lists.openembedded.org Subject: [OE-core][dunfell 4/7] go: add a complementary fix for CVE-2023-29406 Date: Tue, 13 Feb 2024 11:43:24 -1000 Message-Id: X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.34.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 List-Id: X-Webhook-Received: from li982-79.members.linode.com [45.33.32.79] by aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org with HTTPS for ; Tue, 13 Feb 2024 21:43:47 -0000 X-Groupsio-URL: https://lists.openembedded.org/g/openembedded-core/message/195433 From: Ming Liu The original CVE-2023-29406.patch is not complete, causing docker failures at runtime, backport a complementary fix from golang upstream. Signed-off-by: Ming Liu Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman --- meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.14.inc | 3 +- ...023-29406.patch => CVE-2023-29406-1.patch} | 0 .../go/go-1.14/CVE-2023-29406-2.patch | 114 ++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 116 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) rename meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.14/{CVE-2023-29406.patch => CVE-2023-29406-1.patch} (100%) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.14/CVE-2023-29406-2.patch diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.14.inc b/meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.14.inc index 42a9ac8435..4fbf9d7590 100644 --- a/meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.14.inc +++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.14.inc @@ -71,7 +71,8 @@ SRC_URI += "\ file://CVE-2023-29402.patch \ file://CVE-2023-29404.patch \ file://CVE-2023-29400.patch \ - file://CVE-2023-29406.patch \ + file://CVE-2023-29406-1.patch \ + file://CVE-2023-29406-2.patch \ file://CVE-2023-29409.patch \ file://CVE-2022-41725-pre1.patch \ file://CVE-2022-41725-pre2.patch \ diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.14/CVE-2023-29406.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.14/CVE-2023-29406-1.patch similarity index 100% rename from meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.14/CVE-2023-29406.patch rename to meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.14/CVE-2023-29406-1.patch diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.14/CVE-2023-29406-2.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.14/CVE-2023-29406-2.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..637f46a537 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.14/CVE-2023-29406-2.patch @@ -0,0 +1,114 @@ +From c08a5fa413a34111c9a37fd9e545de27ab0978b1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Damien Neil +Date: Wed, 19 Jul 2023 10:30:46 -0700 +Subject: [PATCH] [release-branch.go1.19] net/http: permit requests with + invalid Host headers + +Historically, the Transport has silently truncated invalid +Host headers at the first '/' or ' ' character. CL 506996 changed +this behavior to reject invalid Host headers entirely. +Unfortunately, Docker appears to rely on the previous behavior. + +When sending a HTTP/1 request with an invalid Host, send an empty +Host header. This is safer than truncation: If you care about the +Host, then you should get the one you set; if you don't care, +then an empty Host should be fine. + +Continue to fully validate Host headers sent to a proxy, +since proxies generally can't productively forward requests +without a Host. + +For #60374 +Fixes #61431 +Fixes #61825 + +Change-Id: If170c7dd860aa20eb58fe32990fc93af832742b6 +Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/511155 +TryBot-Result: Gopher Robot +Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker +Run-TryBot: Damien Neil +(cherry picked from commit b9153f6ef338baee5fe02a867c8fbc83a8b29dd1) +Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/518855 +Auto-Submit: Dmitri Shuralyov +Run-TryBot: Roland Shoemaker +Reviewed-by: Russ Cox + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/golang/go/commit/c08a5fa413a34111c9a37fd9e545de27ab0978b1] +CVE: CVE-2023-29406 +Signed-off-by: Ming Liu +--- + src/net/http/request.go | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++++- + src/net/http/request_test.go | 17 ++++++++++++----- + 2 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/net/http/request.go b/src/net/http/request.go +index 3100037386..91cb8a66b9 100644 +--- a/src/net/http/request.go ++++ b/src/net/http/request.go +@@ -582,8 +582,29 @@ func (r *Request) write(w io.Writer, usingProxy bool, extraHeaders Header, waitF + if err != nil { + return err + } ++ // Validate that the Host header is a valid header in general, ++ // but don't validate the host itself. This is sufficient to avoid ++ // header or request smuggling via the Host field. ++ // The server can (and will, if it's a net/http server) reject ++ // the request if it doesn't consider the host valid. + if !httpguts.ValidHostHeader(host) { +- return errors.New("http: invalid Host header") ++ // Historically, we would truncate the Host header after '/' or ' '. ++ // Some users have relied on this truncation to convert a network ++ // address such as Unix domain socket path into a valid, ignored ++ // Host header (see https://go.dev/issue/61431). ++ // ++ // We don't preserve the truncation, because sending an altered ++ // header field opens a smuggling vector. Instead, zero out the ++ // Host header entirely if it isn't valid. (An empty Host is valid; ++ // see RFC 9112 Section 3.2.) ++ // ++ // Return an error if we're sending to a proxy, since the proxy ++ // probably can't do anything useful with an empty Host header. ++ if !usingProxy { ++ host = "" ++ } else { ++ return errors.New("http: invalid Host header") ++ } + } + + // According to RFC 6874, an HTTP client, proxy, or other +diff --git a/src/net/http/request_test.go b/src/net/http/request_test.go +index fddc85d6a9..dd1e2dc2a1 100644 +--- a/src/net/http/request_test.go ++++ b/src/net/http/request_test.go +@@ -770,16 +770,23 @@ func TestRequestWriteBufferedWriter(t *testing.T) { + } + } + +-func TestRequestBadHost(t *testing.T) { ++func TestRequestBadHostHeader(t *testing.T) { + got := []string{} + req, err := NewRequest("GET", "http://foo/after", nil) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } +- req.Host = "foo.com with spaces" +- req.URL.Host = "foo.com with spaces" +- if err := req.Write(logWrites{t, &got}); err == nil { +- t.Errorf("Writing request with invalid Host: succeded, want error") ++ req.Host = "foo.com\nnewline" ++ req.URL.Host = "foo.com\nnewline" ++ req.Write(logWrites{t, &got}) ++ want := []string{ ++ "GET /after HTTP/1.1\r\n", ++ "Host: \r\n", ++ "User-Agent: " + DefaultUserAgent + "\r\n", ++ "\r\n", ++ } ++ if !reflect.DeepEqual(got, want) { ++ t.Errorf("Writes = %q\n Want = %q", got, want) + } + } + +-- +2.34.1 +