new file mode 100644
@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
+From e5a313736e13c90d19085e953a26256a198e4950 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Wagner <wagi@monom.org>
+Date: Tue, 25 Jan 2022 10:00:24 +0100
+Subject: dnsproxy: Validate input data before using them
+
+dnsproxy is not validating various input data. Add a bunch of checks.
+
+Fixes: CVE-2022-23097
+Fixes: CVE-2022-23096
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/network/connman/connman.git/commit/?id=e5a313736e13c90d19085e953a26256a198e4950
+
+CVE: CVE-2022-23096 CVE-2022-23097
+Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
+
+---
+ src/dnsproxy.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
+ 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/dnsproxy.c b/src/dnsproxy.c
+index cdfafbc2..c027bcb9 100644
+--- a/src/dnsproxy.c
++++ b/src/dnsproxy.c
+@@ -1951,6 +1951,12 @@ static int forward_dns_reply(unsigned char *reply, int reply_len, int protocol,
+
+ if (offset < 0)
+ return offset;
++ if (reply_len < 0)
++ return -EINVAL;
++ if (reply_len < offset + 1)
++ return -EINVAL;
++ if ((size_t)reply_len < sizeof(struct domain_hdr))
++ return -EINVAL;
+
+ hdr = (void *)(reply + offset);
+ dns_id = reply[offset] | reply[offset + 1] << 8;
+@@ -1986,23 +1992,31 @@ static int forward_dns_reply(unsigned char *reply, int reply_len, int protocol,
+ */
+ if (req->append_domain && ntohs(hdr->qdcount) == 1) {
+ uint16_t domain_len = 0;
+- uint16_t header_len;
++ uint16_t header_len, payload_len;
+ uint16_t dns_type, dns_class;
+ uint8_t host_len, dns_type_pos;
+ char uncompressed[NS_MAXDNAME], *uptr;
+ char *ptr, *eom = (char *)reply + reply_len;
++ char *domain;
+
+ /*
+ * ptr points to the first char of the hostname.
+ * ->hostname.domain.net
+ */
+ header_len = offset + sizeof(struct domain_hdr);
++ if (reply_len < header_len)
++ return -EINVAL;
++ payload_len = reply_len - header_len;
++
+ ptr = (char *)reply + header_len;
+
+ host_len = *ptr;
++ domain = ptr + 1 + host_len;
++ if (domain > eom)
++ return -EINVAL;
++
+ if (host_len > 0)
+- domain_len = strnlen(ptr + 1 + host_len,
+- reply_len - header_len);
++ domain_len = strnlen(domain, eom - domain);
+
+ /*
+ * If the query type is anything other than A or AAAA,
+@@ -2011,6 +2025,8 @@ static int forward_dns_reply(unsigned char *reply, int reply_len, int protocol,
+ */
+ dns_type_pos = host_len + 1 + domain_len + 1;
+
++ if (ptr + (dns_type_pos + 3) > eom)
++ return -EINVAL;
+ dns_type = ptr[dns_type_pos] << 8 |
+ ptr[dns_type_pos + 1];
+ dns_class = ptr[dns_type_pos + 2] << 8 |
+@@ -2040,6 +2056,8 @@ static int forward_dns_reply(unsigned char *reply, int reply_len, int protocol,
+ int new_len, fixed_len;
+ char *answers;
+
++ if (len > payload_len)
++ return -EINVAL;
+ /*
+ * First copy host (without domain name) into
+ * tmp buffer.
+@@ -2054,6 +2072,8 @@ static int forward_dns_reply(unsigned char *reply, int reply_len, int protocol,
+ * Copy type and class fields of the question.
+ */
+ ptr += len + domain_len + 1;
++ if (ptr + NS_QFIXEDSZ > eom)
++ return -EINVAL;
+ memcpy(uptr, ptr, NS_QFIXEDSZ);
+
+ /*
+@@ -2063,6 +2083,8 @@ static int forward_dns_reply(unsigned char *reply, int reply_len, int protocol,
+ uptr += NS_QFIXEDSZ;
+ answers = uptr;
+ fixed_len = answers - uncompressed;
++ if (ptr + offset > eom)
++ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /*
+ * We then uncompress the result to buffer
+@@ -2257,8 +2279,7 @@ static gboolean udp_server_event(GIOChannel *channel, GIOCondition condition,
+
+ len = recv(sk, buf, sizeof(buf), 0);
+
+- if (len >= 12)
+- forward_dns_reply(buf, len, IPPROTO_UDP, data);
++ forward_dns_reply(buf, len, IPPROTO_UDP, data);
+
+ return TRUE;
+ }
+--
+cgit 1.2.3-1.el7
+
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${KERNELORG_MIRROR}/linux/network/${BPN}/${BP}.tar.xz \
file://CVE-2021-26675.patch \
file://CVE-2021-26676-0001.patch \
file://CVE-2021-26676-0002.patch \
+ file://CVE-2022-23096-7.patch \
"
SRC_URI_append_libc-musl = " file://0002-resolve-musl-does-not-implement-res_ninit.patch"
An issue was discovered in the DNS proxy in Connman through 1.40. The TCP server reply implementation lacks a check for the presence of sufficient Header Data, leading to an out-of-bounds read (CVE-2022-23096) An issue was discovered in the DNS proxy in Connman through 1.40. forward_dns_reply mishandles a strnlen call, leading to an out-of-bounds read (CVE-2022-23097) Backport patch from: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/network/connman/connman.git/commit/?id=e5a313736e13c90d19085e953a26256a198e4950 CVE: CVE-2022-23096 CVE-2022-23097 Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman --- .../connman/connman/CVE-2022-23096-7.patch | 121 ++++++++++++++++++ .../connman/connman_1.37.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 122 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/connman/connman/CVE-2022-23096-7.patch