From patchwork Mon Nov 20 16:38:15 2023 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Steve Sakoman X-Patchwork-Id: 34865 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id ABE8CC5AE5B for ; Mon, 20 Nov 2023 16:39:02 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail-oi1-f177.google.com (mail-oi1-f177.google.com [209.85.167.177]) by mx.groups.io with SMTP id smtpd.web10.583.1700498338026484379 for ; Mon, 20 Nov 2023 08:38:58 -0800 Authentication-Results: mx.groups.io; dkim=pass header.i=@sakoman-com.20230601.gappssmtp.com header.s=20230601 header.b=ORj1WF+u; spf=softfail (domain: sakoman.com, ip: 209.85.167.177, mailfrom: steve@sakoman.com) Received: by mail-oi1-f177.google.com with SMTP id 5614622812f47-3b5aee410f2so2228517b6e.1 for ; Mon, 20 Nov 2023 08:38:57 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=sakoman-com.20230601.gappssmtp.com; s=20230601; t=1700498336; x=1701103136; darn=lists.openembedded.org; h=content-transfer-encoding:mime-version:references:in-reply-to :message-id:date:subject:to:from:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id :reply-to; bh=FRXOS0RZZymLd/vCMN8CbNInMUjOsrroSG+24/zVTVY=; b=ORj1WF+u0+NaPW/Wfs/vQnvz8C2ls1MXol9tWoT9pgey7a86eq7uNi2QnMeMrI8NNf 8WDlSFfHOaQRWXaI3lo7K/ivvb2VR1giAY7Pf1OuinGocW1/rUwTe/4H/xzPhgfLZtdA tZeVBnWUKfXBMoG1/tR5VwhphK5sE1juhaevMQ14CGFIuR68SRhlvEvaEugmNRmxYCwg uZMnztadr0MfofbrakIde5/wu9sagck8xO8jzD4DqXtsy0NwO82BdGOsqiVQxIz7zyHi 89W7HMbD6gqMUx1DrPXYaayH5xVhjzTefUCstLnGKn2OvpLx6q4b4KMRxSx+kFSDH+kk L1UQ== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20230601; t=1700498336; x=1701103136; h=content-transfer-encoding:mime-version:references:in-reply-to :message-id:date:subject:to:from:x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc :subject:date:message-id:reply-to; bh=FRXOS0RZZymLd/vCMN8CbNInMUjOsrroSG+24/zVTVY=; b=eZc2STHIjTpusaB9m8Ms3pc9L+dR40+EhRdARgjtWifCy8gf5zJuJke++UAHSLsiIF CSS5qaMPr8miGKyYgOIyhkTmSMe+sFtTdoNR860kEoKXfC8D2reffgaXXBz9H4XYABsO QM5ZThZhkXHZ7fyucC4fxrwMtE9Bv42jZZM4f/jKWahOlkGS2mrEHUsNq5cTccEUJ3SL bwxeM/XSkH4o5IwgKsZGjOFQy+NSHOkPxKZ5OM2qmitgt6TcJWjtRvAwqQfia7w7WWuP tDxDq/pLzA72CqbgQrcEtiLxGsuddzJo2vXbNVszCfXkHggOXzpExDUMp7amDY1BPM2J rGiw== X-Gm-Message-State: AOJu0YwthniVWuRQkahvm2rj4J73Fg94E8tItfzw3eNoWzoNDL5u+8XH mk0+6JPnpSlMmc6v9ClO3Gqdcsv67NFsWKf0zGd/BQ== X-Google-Smtp-Source: AGHT+IGYIPqYIpM0PCw9VoTPwQP0sFXNdbEY4z1/w9+fhIZGfFCgGHIpfVGBZQDA5S0dHVrr5Tn7vg== X-Received: by 2002:a05:6808:19a2:b0:3b2:e233:1e7 with SMTP id bj34-20020a05680819a200b003b2e23301e7mr8060123oib.49.1700498336197; Mon, 20 Nov 2023 08:38:56 -0800 (PST) Received: from hexa.lan (dhcp-72-234-108-41.hawaiiantel.net. [72.234.108.41]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id o23-20020a634e57000000b005c215baacc1sm4899279pgl.70.2023.11.20.08.38.55 for (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Mon, 20 Nov 2023 08:38:55 -0800 (PST) From: Steve Sakoman To: openembedded-core@lists.openembedded.org Subject: [OE-core][nanbield 01/33] libsndfile1: fix CVE-2022-33065 Date: Mon, 20 Nov 2023 06:38:15 -1000 Message-Id: <84ea91d63147c19ebf5909f7e9f377ddb1a52a7b.1700496737.git.steve@sakoman.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.34.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 List-Id: X-Webhook-Received: from li982-79.members.linode.com [45.33.32.79] by aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org with HTTPS for ; Mon, 20 Nov 2023 16:39:02 -0000 X-Groupsio-URL: https://lists.openembedded.org/g/openembedded-core/message/190890 From: Alex Stewart Signed-off-by: Alex Stewart Signed-off-by: Alexandre Belloni (cherry picked from commit f34991c7eeb91702a44ac8b4a190fcb45dac57cb) Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman --- .../libsndfile1/cve-2022-33065.patch | 739 ++++++++++++++++++ .../libsndfile/libsndfile1_1.2.2.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 740 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-multimedia/libsndfile/libsndfile1/cve-2022-33065.patch diff --git a/meta/recipes-multimedia/libsndfile/libsndfile1/cve-2022-33065.patch b/meta/recipes-multimedia/libsndfile/libsndfile1/cve-2022-33065.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..fa4b2fc08b --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-multimedia/libsndfile/libsndfile1/cve-2022-33065.patch @@ -0,0 +1,739 @@ +From c7ce5b0ebeeb58934825077d1324960aa0747718 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Alex Stewart +Date: Tue, 10 Oct 2023 16:10:34 -0400 +Subject: [PATCH] mat4/mat5: fix int overflow in dataend calculation + +The clang sanitizer warns of a possible signed integer overflow when +calculating the `dataend` value in `mat4_read_header()`. + +``` +src/mat4.c:323:41: runtime error: signed integer overflow: 205 * -100663296 cannot be represented in type 'int' +SUMMARY: UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer: undefined-behavior src/mat4.c:323:41 in +src/mat4.c:323:48: runtime error: signed integer overflow: 838860800 * 4 cannot be represented in type 'int' +SUMMARY: UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer: undefined-behavior src/mat4.c:323:48 in +``` + +Cast the offending `rows` and `cols` ints to `sf_count_t` (the type of +`dataend` before performing the calculation, to avoid the issue. + +CVE: CVE-2022-33065 +Fixes: https://github.com/libsndfile/libsndfile/issues/789 +Fixes: https://github.com/libsndfile/libsndfile/issues/833 + +Upstream-Status: Backport [9a829113c88a51e57c1e46473e90609e4b7df151] + +Signed-off-by: Alex Stewart +--- + src/mat4.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/src/mat4.c b/src/mat4.c +index 0b1b414b..575683ba 100644 +--- a/src/mat4.c ++++ b/src/mat4.c +@@ -320,7 +320,7 @@ mat4_read_header (SF_PRIVATE *psf) + psf->filelength - psf->dataoffset, psf->sf.channels * psf->sf.frames * psf->bytewidth) ; + } + else if ((psf->filelength - psf->dataoffset) > psf->sf.channels * psf->sf.frames * psf->bytewidth) +- psf->dataend = psf->dataoffset + rows * cols * psf->bytewidth ; ++ psf->dataend = psf->dataoffset + (sf_count_t) rows * (sf_count_t) cols * psf->bytewidth ; + + psf->datalength = psf->filelength - psf->dataoffset - psf->dataend ; + +From 842303f984b2081481e74cb84a9a24ecbe3dec1a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Alex Stewart +Date: Wed, 11 Oct 2023 16:36:02 -0400 +Subject: [PATCH] au: avoid int overflow while calculating data_end + +At several points in au_read_header(), we calculate the functional end +of the data segment by adding the (int)au_fmt.dataoffset and the +(int)au_fmt.datasize. This can overflow the implicit int_32 return value +and cause undefined behavior. + +Instead, precalculate the value and assign it to a 64-bit +(sf_count_t)data_end variable. + +CVE: CVE-2022-33065 +Fixes: https://github.com/libsndfile/libsndfile/issues/833 + +Signed-off-by: Alex Stewart +--- + src/au.c | 10 ++++++---- + 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/au.c b/src/au.c +index 62bd691d..f68f2587 100644 +--- a/src/au.c ++++ b/src/au.c +@@ -291,6 +291,7 @@ static int + au_read_header (SF_PRIVATE *psf) + { AU_FMT au_fmt ; + int marker, dword ; ++ sf_count_t data_end ; + + memset (&au_fmt, 0, sizeof (au_fmt)) ; + psf_binheader_readf (psf, "pm", 0, &marker) ; +@@ -317,14 +318,15 @@ au_read_header (SF_PRIVATE *psf) + return SFE_AU_EMBED_BAD_LEN ; + } ; + ++ data_end = (sf_count_t) au_fmt.dataoffset + (sf_count_t) au_fmt.datasize ; + if (psf->fileoffset > 0) +- { psf->filelength = au_fmt.dataoffset + au_fmt.datasize ; ++ { psf->filelength = data_end ; + psf_log_printf (psf, " Data Size : %d\n", au_fmt.datasize) ; + } +- else if (au_fmt.datasize == -1 || au_fmt.dataoffset + au_fmt.datasize == psf->filelength) ++ else if (au_fmt.datasize == -1 || data_end == psf->filelength) + psf_log_printf (psf, " Data Size : %d\n", au_fmt.datasize) ; +- else if (au_fmt.dataoffset + au_fmt.datasize < psf->filelength) +- { psf->filelength = au_fmt.dataoffset + au_fmt.datasize ; ++ else if (data_end < psf->filelength) ++ { psf->filelength = data_end ; + psf_log_printf (psf, " Data Size : %d\n", au_fmt.datasize) ; + } + else +From 0754d3380a54e3fbdde0f684b88955c80c79f58f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Alex Stewart +Date: Wed, 11 Oct 2023 16:46:29 -0400 +Subject: [PATCH] avr: fix int overflow in avr_read_header() + +Pre-cast hdr.frames to sf_count_t, to provide the calculation with +enough numeric space to avoid an int-overflow. + +CVE: CVE-2022-33065 +Fixes: https://github.com/libsndfile/libsndfile/issues/833 + +Signed-off-by: Alex Stewart +--- + src/avr.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/src/avr.c b/src/avr.c +index 6c78ff69..1bc1ffc9 100644 +--- a/src/avr.c ++++ b/src/avr.c +@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ avr_read_header (SF_PRIVATE *psf) + psf->endian = SF_ENDIAN_BIG ; + + psf->dataoffset = AVR_HDR_SIZE ; +- psf->datalength = hdr.frames * (hdr.rez / 8) ; ++ psf->datalength = (sf_count_t) hdr.frames * (hdr.rez / 8) ; + + if (psf->fileoffset > 0) + psf->filelength = AVR_HDR_SIZE + psf->datalength ; +From 6ac31a68a614e2bba4a05b54e5558d6270c98376 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Alex Stewart +Date: Wed, 11 Oct 2023 16:54:21 -0400 +Subject: [PATCH] sds: fix int overflow warning in sample calculations + +The sds_*byte_read() functions compose their uint_32 sample buffers by +shifting 7bit samples into a 32bit wide buffer, and adding them +together. Because the 7bit samples are stored in 32bit ints, code +fuzzers become concerned that the addition operation can overflow and +cause undefined behavior. + +Instead, bitwise-OR the bytes together - which should accomplish the +same arithmetic operation, without risking an int-overflow. + +CVE: CVE-2022-33065 +Fixes: https://github.com/libsndfile/libsndfile/issues/833 + +Signed-off-by: Alex Stewart + +Do the same for the 3byte and 4byte read functions. +--- + src/sds.c | 6 +++--- + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/sds.c b/src/sds.c +index 6bc76171..2a0f164c 100644 +--- a/src/sds.c ++++ b/src/sds.c +@@ -454,7 +454,7 @@ sds_2byte_read (SF_PRIVATE *psf, SDS_PRIVATE *psds) + + ucptr = psds->read_data + 5 ; + for (k = 0 ; k < 120 ; k += 2) +- { sample = arith_shift_left (ucptr [k], 25) + arith_shift_left (ucptr [k + 1], 18) ; ++ { sample = arith_shift_left (ucptr [k], 25) | arith_shift_left (ucptr [k + 1], 18) ; + psds->read_samples [k / 2] = (int) (sample - 0x80000000) ; + } ; + +@@ -498,7 +498,7 @@ sds_3byte_read (SF_PRIVATE *psf, SDS_PRIVATE *psds) + + ucptr = psds->read_data + 5 ; + for (k = 0 ; k < 120 ; k += 3) +- { sample = (((uint32_t) ucptr [k]) << 25) + (ucptr [k + 1] << 18) + (ucptr [k + 2] << 11) ; ++ { sample = (((uint32_t) ucptr [k]) << 25) | (ucptr [k + 1] << 18) | (ucptr [k + 2] << 11) ; + psds->read_samples [k / 3] = (int) (sample - 0x80000000) ; + } ; + +@@ -542,7 +542,7 @@ sds_4byte_read (SF_PRIVATE *psf, SDS_PRIVATE *psds) + + ucptr = psds->read_data + 5 ; + for (k = 0 ; k < 120 ; k += 4) +- { sample = (((uint32_t) ucptr [k]) << 25) + (ucptr [k + 1] << 18) + (ucptr [k + 2] << 11) + (ucptr [k + 3] << 4) ; ++ { sample = (((uint32_t) ucptr [k]) << 25) | (ucptr [k + 1] << 18) | (ucptr [k + 2] << 11) | (ucptr [k + 3] << 4) ; + psds->read_samples [k / 4] = (int) (sample - 0x80000000) ; + } ; + +From 96428e1dd4998f1cd47df24f8fe9b0da35d7b947 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Alex Stewart +Date: Wed, 11 Oct 2023 17:26:51 -0400 +Subject: [PATCH] aiff: fix int overflow when counting header elements + +aiff_read_basc_chunk() tries to count the AIFF header size by keeping +track of the bytes returned by psf_binheader_readf(). Though improbable, +it is technically possible for these added bytes to exceed the int-sized +`count` accumulator. + +Use a 64-bit sf_count_t type for `count`, to ensure that it always has +enough numeric space. + +CVE: CVE-2022-33065 +Fixes: https://github.com/libsndfile/libsndfile/issues/833 + +Signed-off-by: Alex Stewart +--- + src/aiff.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/src/aiff.c b/src/aiff.c +index a2bda8f4..6b244302 100644 +--- a/src/aiff.c ++++ b/src/aiff.c +@@ -1702,7 +1702,7 @@ static int + aiff_read_basc_chunk (SF_PRIVATE * psf, int datasize) + { const char * type_str ; + basc_CHUNK bc ; +- int count ; ++ sf_count_t count ; + + count = psf_binheader_readf (psf, "E442", &bc.version, &bc.numBeats, &bc.rootNote) ; + count += psf_binheader_readf (psf, "E222", &bc.scaleType, &bc.sigNumerator, &bc.sigDenominator) ; +From b352c350d35bf978e4d3a32e5d9df1f2284445f4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Alex Stewart +Date: Wed, 11 Oct 2023 17:43:02 -0400 +Subject: [PATCH] ircam: fix int overflow in ircam_read_header() + +When reading the IRCAM header, it is possible for the calculated +blockwidth to exceed the bounds of a signed int32. + +Use a 64bit sf_count_t to store the blockwidth. + +CVE: CVE-2022-33065 +Fixes: https://github.com/libsndfile/libsndfile/issues/833 + +Signed-off-by: Alex Stewart +--- + src/common.h | 2 +- + src/ircam.c | 10 +++++----- + 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/common.h b/src/common.h +index d92eabde..5369cb67 100644 +--- a/src/common.h ++++ b/src/common.h +@@ -439,7 +439,7 @@ typedef struct sf_private_tag + sf_count_t datalength ; /* Length in bytes of the audio data. */ + sf_count_t dataend ; /* Offset to file tailer. */ + +- int blockwidth ; /* Size in bytes of one set of interleaved samples. */ ++ sf_count_t blockwidth ; /* Size in bytes of one set of interleaved samples. */ + int bytewidth ; /* Size in bytes of one sample (one channel). */ + + void *dither ; +diff --git a/src/ircam.c b/src/ircam.c +index 8e7cdba8..3d73ba44 100644 +--- a/src/ircam.c ++++ b/src/ircam.c +@@ -171,35 +171,35 @@ ircam_read_header (SF_PRIVATE *psf) + switch (encoding) + { case IRCAM_PCM_16 : + psf->bytewidth = 2 ; +- psf->blockwidth = psf->sf.channels * psf->bytewidth ; ++ psf->blockwidth = (sf_count_t) psf->sf.channels * psf->bytewidth ; + + psf->sf.format = SF_FORMAT_IRCAM | SF_FORMAT_PCM_16 ; + break ; + + case IRCAM_PCM_32 : + psf->bytewidth = 4 ; +- psf->blockwidth = psf->sf.channels * psf->bytewidth ; ++ psf->blockwidth = (sf_count_t) psf->sf.channels * psf->bytewidth ; + + psf->sf.format = SF_FORMAT_IRCAM | SF_FORMAT_PCM_32 ; + break ; + + case IRCAM_FLOAT : + psf->bytewidth = 4 ; +- psf->blockwidth = psf->sf.channels * psf->bytewidth ; ++ psf->blockwidth = (sf_count_t) psf->sf.channels * psf->bytewidth ; + + psf->sf.format = SF_FORMAT_IRCAM | SF_FORMAT_FLOAT ; + break ; + + case IRCAM_ALAW : + psf->bytewidth = 1 ; +- psf->blockwidth = psf->sf.channels * psf->bytewidth ; ++ psf->blockwidth = (sf_count_t) psf->sf.channels * psf->bytewidth ; + + psf->sf.format = SF_FORMAT_IRCAM | SF_FORMAT_ALAW ; + break ; + + case IRCAM_ULAW : + psf->bytewidth = 1 ; +- psf->blockwidth = psf->sf.channels * psf->bytewidth ; ++ psf->blockwidth = (sf_count_t) psf->sf.channels * psf->bytewidth ; + + psf->sf.format = SF_FORMAT_IRCAM | SF_FORMAT_ULAW ; + break ; +From 3bcd291e57867f88f558fa6f80990e84311df78c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Alex Stewart +Date: Wed, 11 Oct 2023 16:12:22 -0400 +Subject: [PATCH] mat4/mat5: fix int overflow when calculating blockwidth + +Pre-cast the components of the blockwidth calculation to sf_count_t to +avoid overflowing integers during calculation. + +CVE: CVE-2022-33065 +Fixes: https://github.com/libsndfile/libsndfile/issues/833 + +Signed-off-by: Alex Stewart +--- + src/mat4.c | 2 +- + src/mat5.c | 2 +- + 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/mat4.c b/src/mat4.c +index 575683ba..9f046f0c 100644 +--- a/src/mat4.c ++++ b/src/mat4.c +@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ mat4_open (SF_PRIVATE *psf) + + psf->container_close = mat4_close ; + +- psf->blockwidth = psf->bytewidth * psf->sf.channels ; ++ psf->blockwidth = (sf_count_t) psf->bytewidth * psf->sf.channels ; + + switch (subformat) + { case SF_FORMAT_PCM_16 : +diff --git a/src/mat5.c b/src/mat5.c +index da5a6eca..20f0ea64 100644 +--- a/src/mat5.c ++++ b/src/mat5.c +@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ mat5_open (SF_PRIVATE *psf) + + psf->container_close = mat5_close ; + +- psf->blockwidth = psf->bytewidth * psf->sf.channels ; ++ psf->blockwidth = (sf_count_t) psf->bytewidth * psf->sf.channels ; + + switch (subformat) + { case SF_FORMAT_PCM_U8 : +From c177e292d47ef73b1d3c1bb391320299a0ed2ff9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Alex Stewart +Date: Mon, 16 Oct 2023 12:37:47 -0400 +Subject: [PATCH] common: fix int overflow in psf_binheader_readf() + +The psf_binheader_readf() function attempts to count and return the +number of bytes traversed in the header. During this accumulation, it is +possible to overflow the int-sized byte_count variable. + +Avoid this overflow by checking that the accumulated bytes do not exceed +INT_MAX and throwing an error if they do. This implies that files with +multi-gigabyte headers threaten to produce this error, but I imagine +those files don't really exist - and this error is better than the +undefined behavior which would have resulted previously. + +CVE: CVE-2022-33065 +Fixes: https://github.com/libsndfile/libsndfile/issues/833 + +Signed-off-by: Alex Stewart +--- + src/common.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------------ + 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/common.c b/src/common.c +index 1c3d951d..7f6cceca 100644 +--- a/src/common.c ++++ b/src/common.c +@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ + + #include + ++#include + #include + #include + #if HAVE_UNISTD_H +@@ -990,6 +991,7 @@ psf_binheader_readf (SF_PRIVATE *psf, char const *format, ...) + double *doubleptr ; + char c ; + int byte_count = 0, count = 0 ; ++ int read_bytes = 0 ; + + if (! format) + return psf_ftell (psf) ; +@@ -998,6 +1000,7 @@ psf_binheader_readf (SF_PRIVATE *psf, char const *format, ...) + + while ((c = *format++)) + { ++ read_bytes = 0 ; + if (psf->header.indx + 16 >= psf->header.len && psf_bump_header_allocation (psf, 16)) + break ; + +@@ -1014,7 +1017,7 @@ psf_binheader_readf (SF_PRIVATE *psf, char const *format, ...) + intptr = va_arg (argptr, unsigned int*) ; + *intptr = 0 ; + ucptr = (unsigned char*) intptr ; +- byte_count += header_read (psf, ucptr, sizeof (int)) ; ++ read_bytes = header_read (psf, ucptr, sizeof (int)) ; + *intptr = GET_MARKER (ucptr) ; + break ; + +@@ -1022,7 +1025,7 @@ psf_binheader_readf (SF_PRIVATE *psf, char const *format, ...) + intptr = va_arg (argptr, unsigned int*) ; + *intptr = 0 ; + ucptr = (unsigned char*) intptr ; +- byte_count += header_read (psf, sixteen_bytes, sizeof (sixteen_bytes)) ; ++ read_bytes = header_read (psf, sixteen_bytes, sizeof (sixteen_bytes)) ; + { int k ; + intdata = 0 ; + for (k = 0 ; k < 16 ; k++) +@@ -1034,14 +1037,14 @@ psf_binheader_readf (SF_PRIVATE *psf, char const *format, ...) + case '1' : + charptr = va_arg (argptr, char*) ; + *charptr = 0 ; +- byte_count += header_read (psf, charptr, sizeof (char)) ; ++ read_bytes = header_read (psf, charptr, sizeof (char)) ; + break ; + + case '2' : /* 2 byte value with the current endian-ness */ + shortptr = va_arg (argptr, unsigned short*) ; + *shortptr = 0 ; + ucptr = (unsigned char*) shortptr ; +- byte_count += header_read (psf, ucptr, sizeof (short)) ; ++ read_bytes = header_read (psf, ucptr, sizeof (short)) ; + if (psf->rwf_endian == SF_ENDIAN_BIG) + *shortptr = GET_BE_SHORT (ucptr) ; + else +@@ -1051,7 +1054,7 @@ psf_binheader_readf (SF_PRIVATE *psf, char const *format, ...) + case '3' : /* 3 byte value with the current endian-ness */ + intptr = va_arg (argptr, unsigned int*) ; + *intptr = 0 ; +- byte_count += header_read (psf, sixteen_bytes, 3) ; ++ read_bytes = header_read (psf, sixteen_bytes, 3) ; + if (psf->rwf_endian == SF_ENDIAN_BIG) + *intptr = GET_BE_3BYTE (sixteen_bytes) ; + else +@@ -1062,7 +1065,7 @@ psf_binheader_readf (SF_PRIVATE *psf, char const *format, ...) + intptr = va_arg (argptr, unsigned int*) ; + *intptr = 0 ; + ucptr = (unsigned char*) intptr ; +- byte_count += header_read (psf, ucptr, sizeof (int)) ; ++ read_bytes = header_read (psf, ucptr, sizeof (int)) ; + if (psf->rwf_endian == SF_ENDIAN_BIG) + *intptr = psf_get_be32 (ucptr, 0) ; + else +@@ -1072,7 +1075,7 @@ psf_binheader_readf (SF_PRIVATE *psf, char const *format, ...) + case '8' : /* 8 byte value with the current endian-ness */ + countptr = va_arg (argptr, sf_count_t *) ; + *countptr = 0 ; +- byte_count += header_read (psf, sixteen_bytes, 8) ; ++ read_bytes = header_read (psf, sixteen_bytes, 8) ; + if (psf->rwf_endian == SF_ENDIAN_BIG) + countdata = psf_get_be64 (sixteen_bytes, 0) ; + else +@@ -1083,7 +1086,7 @@ psf_binheader_readf (SF_PRIVATE *psf, char const *format, ...) + case 'f' : /* Float conversion */ + floatptr = va_arg (argptr, float *) ; + *floatptr = 0.0 ; +- byte_count += header_read (psf, floatptr, sizeof (float)) ; ++ read_bytes = header_read (psf, floatptr, sizeof (float)) ; + if (psf->rwf_endian == SF_ENDIAN_BIG) + *floatptr = float32_be_read ((unsigned char*) floatptr) ; + else +@@ -1093,7 +1096,7 @@ psf_binheader_readf (SF_PRIVATE *psf, char const *format, ...) + case 'd' : /* double conversion */ + doubleptr = va_arg (argptr, double *) ; + *doubleptr = 0.0 ; +- byte_count += header_read (psf, doubleptr, sizeof (double)) ; ++ read_bytes = header_read (psf, doubleptr, sizeof (double)) ; + if (psf->rwf_endian == SF_ENDIAN_BIG) + *doubleptr = double64_be_read ((unsigned char*) doubleptr) ; + else +@@ -1117,7 +1120,7 @@ psf_binheader_readf (SF_PRIVATE *psf, char const *format, ...) + charptr = va_arg (argptr, char*) ; + count = va_arg (argptr, size_t) ; + memset (charptr, 0, count) ; +- byte_count += header_read (psf, charptr, count) ; ++ read_bytes = header_read (psf, charptr, count) ; + break ; + + case 'G' : +@@ -1128,7 +1131,7 @@ psf_binheader_readf (SF_PRIVATE *psf, char const *format, ...) + if (psf->header.indx + count >= psf->header.len && psf_bump_header_allocation (psf, count)) + break ; + +- byte_count += header_gets (psf, charptr, count) ; ++ read_bytes = header_gets (psf, charptr, count) ; + break ; + + case 'z' : +@@ -1152,7 +1155,7 @@ psf_binheader_readf (SF_PRIVATE *psf, char const *format, ...) + case 'j' : /* Seek to position from current position. */ + count = va_arg (argptr, size_t) ; + header_seek (psf, count, SEEK_CUR) ; +- byte_count += count ; ++ read_bytes = count ; + break ; + + case '!' : /* Clear buffer, forcing re-read. */ +@@ -1164,8 +1167,17 @@ psf_binheader_readf (SF_PRIVATE *psf, char const *format, ...) + psf->error = SFE_INTERNAL ; + break ; + } ; ++ ++ if (read_bytes > 0 && byte_count > (INT_MAX - read_bytes)) ++ { psf_log_printf (psf, "Header size exceeds INT_MAX. Aborting.", c) ; ++ psf->error = SFE_INTERNAL ; ++ break ; ++ } else ++ { byte_count += read_bytes ; + } ; + ++ } ; /*end while*/ ++ + va_end (argptr) ; + + return byte_count ; +From a23d563386e7c8d93dcdbe7d5b1d63cad6009116 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Alex Stewart +Date: Thu, 19 Oct 2023 14:07:19 -0400 +Subject: [PATCH] nms_adpcm: fix int overflow in signal estimate + +It is possible (though functionally incorrect) for the signal estimate +calculation in nms_adpcm_update() to overflow the int value of s_e, +resulting in undefined behavior. + +Since adpcm state signal values are never practically larger than +16 bits, use smaller numeric sizes throughout the file to avoid the +overflow. + +CVE: CVE-2022-33065 +Fixes: https://github.com/libsndfile/libsndfile/issues/833 + +Authored-by: Arthur Taylor +Signed-off-by: Alex Stewart +Rebased-by: Alex Stewart +--- + src/nms_adpcm.c | 85 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------------- + 1 file changed, 42 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/nms_adpcm.c b/src/nms_adpcm.c +index 96d6ad26..460ea077 100644 +--- a/src/nms_adpcm.c ++++ b/src/nms_adpcm.c +@@ -48,36 +48,36 @@ + /* Variable names from ITU G.726 spec */ + struct nms_adpcm_state + { /* Log of the step size multiplier. Operated on by codewords. */ +- int yl ; ++ short yl ; + + /* Quantizer step size multiplier. Generated from yl. */ +- int y ; ++ short y ; + +- /* Coefficents of the pole predictor */ +- int a [2] ; ++ /* Coefficients of the pole predictor */ ++ short a [2] ; + +- /* Coefficents of the zero predictor */ +- int b [6] ; ++ /* Coefficients of the zero predictor */ ++ short b [6] ; + + /* Previous quantized deltas (multiplied by 2^14) */ +- int d_q [7] ; ++ short d_q [7] ; + + /* d_q [x] + s_ez [x], used by the pole-predictor for signs only. */ +- int p [3] ; ++ short p [3] ; + + /* Previous reconstructed signal values. */ +- int s_r [2] ; ++ short s_r [2] ; + + /* Zero predictor components of the signal estimate. */ +- int s_ez ; ++ short s_ez ; + + /* Signal estimate, (including s_ez). */ +- int s_e ; ++ short s_e ; + + /* The most recent codeword (enc:generated, dec:inputted) */ +- int Ik ; ++ char Ik ; + +- int parity ; ++ char parity ; + + /* + ** Offset into code tables for the bitrate. +@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ typedef struct + } NMS_ADPCM_PRIVATE ; + + /* Pre-computed exponential interval used in the antilog approximation. */ +-static unsigned int table_expn [] = ++static unsigned short table_expn [] = + { 0x4000, 0x4167, 0x42d5, 0x444c, 0x45cb, 0x4752, 0x48e2, 0x4a7a, + 0x4c1b, 0x4dc7, 0x4f7a, 0x5138, 0x52ff, 0x54d1, 0x56ac, 0x5892, + 0x5a82, 0x5c7e, 0x5e84, 0x6096, 0x62b4, 0x64dd, 0x6712, 0x6954, +@@ -117,21 +117,21 @@ static unsigned int table_expn [] = + } ; + + /* Table mapping codewords to scale factor deltas. */ +-static int table_scale_factor_step [] = ++static short table_scale_factor_step [] = + { 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x4b0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, /* 2-bit */ + -0x3c, 0x0, 0x90, 0x0, 0x2ee, 0x0, 0x898, 0x0, /* 3-bit */ + -0x30, 0x12, 0x6b, 0xc8, 0x188, 0x2e0, 0x551, 0x1150, /* 4-bit */ + } ; + + /* Table mapping codewords to quantized delta interval steps. */ +-static unsigned int table_step [] = ++static unsigned short table_step [] = + { 0x73F, 0, 0, 0, 0x1829, 0, 0, 0, /* 2-bit */ + 0x3EB, 0, 0xC18, 0, 0x1581, 0, 0x226E, 0, /* 3-bit */ + 0x20C, 0x635, 0xA83, 0xF12, 0x1418, 0x19E3, 0x211A, 0x2BBA, /* 4-bit */ + } ; + + /* Binary search lookup table for quantizing using table_step. */ +-static int table_step_search [] = ++static short table_step_search [] = + { 0, 0x1F6D, 0, -0x1F6D, 0, 0, 0, 0, /* 2-bit */ + 0x1008, 0x1192, 0, -0x219A, 0x1656, -0x1656, 0, 0, /* 3-bit */ + 0x872, 0x1277, -0x8E6, -0x232B, 0xD06, -0x17D7, -0x11D3, 0, /* 4-bit */ +@@ -179,23 +179,23 @@ static sf_count_t nms_adpcm_seek (SF_PRIVATE *psf, int mode, sf_count_t offset) + ** Maps [1,20480] to [1,1024] in an exponential relationship. This is + ** approximately ret = b^exp where b = e^(ln(1024)/ln(20480)) ~= 1.0003385 + */ +-static inline int +-nms_adpcm_antilog (int exp) +-{ int ret ; ++static inline short ++nms_adpcm_antilog (short exp) ++{ int_fast32_t r ; + +- ret = 0x1000 ; +- ret += (((exp & 0x3f) * 0x166b) >> 12) ; +- ret *= table_expn [(exp & 0x7c0) >> 6] ; +- ret >>= (26 - (exp >> 11)) ; ++ r = 0x1000 ; ++ r += (((int_fast32_t) (exp & 0x3f) * 0x166b) >> 12) ; ++ r *= table_expn [(exp & 0x7c0) >> 6] ; ++ r >>= (26 - (exp >> 11)) ; + +- return ret ; ++ return (short) r ; + } /* nms_adpcm_antilog */ + + static void + nms_adpcm_update (struct nms_adpcm_state *s) + { /* Variable names from ITU G.726 spec */ +- int a1ul ; +- int fa1 ; ++ short a1ul, fa1 ; ++ int_fast32_t se ; + int i ; + + /* Decay and Modify the scale factor in the log domain based on the codeword. */ +@@ -222,7 +222,7 @@ nms_adpcm_update (struct nms_adpcm_state *s) + else if (fa1 > 256) + fa1 = 256 ; + +- s->a [0] = (0xff * s->a [0]) >> 8 ; ++ s->a [0] = (s->a [0] * 0xff) >> 8 ; + if (s->p [0] != 0 && s->p [1] != 0 && ((s->p [0] ^ s->p [1]) < 0)) + s->a [0] -= 192 ; + else +@@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ nms_adpcm_update (struct nms_adpcm_state *s) + fa1 = -fa1 ; + } + +- s->a [1] = fa1 + ((0xfe * s->a [1]) >> 8) ; ++ s->a [1] = fa1 + ((s->a [1] * 0xfe) >> 8) ; + if (s->p [0] != 0 && s->p [2] != 0 && ((s->p [0] ^ s->p [2]) < 0)) + s->a [1] -= 128 ; + else +@@ -250,19 +250,18 @@ nms_adpcm_update (struct nms_adpcm_state *s) + s->a [0] = a1ul ; + } ; + +- /* Compute the zero predictor estimate. Rotate past deltas too. */ +- s->s_ez = 0 ; ++ /* Compute the zero predictor estimate and rotate past deltas. */ ++ se = 0 ; + for (i = 5 ; i >= 0 ; i--) +- { s->s_ez += s->d_q [i] * s->b [i] ; ++ { se += (int_fast32_t) s->d_q [i] * s->b [i] ; + s->d_q [i + 1] = s->d_q [i] ; + } ; ++ s->s_ez = se >> 14 ; + +- /* Compute the signal estimate. */ +- s->s_e = s->a [0] * s->s_r [0] + s->a [1] * s->s_r [1] + s->s_ez ; +- +- /* Return to scale */ +- s->s_ez >>= 14 ; +- s->s_e >>= 14 ; ++ /* Complete the signal estimate. */ ++ se += (int_fast32_t) s->a [0] * s->s_r [0] ; ++ se += (int_fast32_t) s->a [1] * s->s_r [1] ; ++ s->s_e = se >> 14 ; + + /* Rotate members to prepare for next iteration. */ + s->s_r [1] = s->s_r [0] ; +@@ -274,7 +273,7 @@ nms_adpcm_update (struct nms_adpcm_state *s) + static int16_t + nms_adpcm_reconstruct_sample (struct nms_adpcm_state *s, uint8_t I) + { /* Variable names from ITU G.726 spec */ +- int dqx ; ++ int_fast32_t dqx ; + + /* + ** The ordering of the 12-bit right-shift is a precision loss. It agrees +@@ -308,17 +307,17 @@ nms_adpcm_codec_init (struct nms_adpcm_state *s, enum nms_enc_type type) + /* + ** nms_adpcm_encode_sample() + ** +-** Encode a linear 16-bit pcm sample into a 2,3, or 4 bit NMS-ADPCM codeword ++** Encode a linear 16-bit pcm sample into a 2, 3, or 4 bit NMS-ADPCM codeword + ** using and updating the predictor state. + */ + static uint8_t + nms_adpcm_encode_sample (struct nms_adpcm_state *s, int16_t sl) + { /* Variable names from ITU G.726 spec */ +- int d ; ++ int_fast32_t d ; + uint8_t I ; + + /* Down scale the sample from 16 => ~14 bits. */ +- sl = (sl * 0x1fdf) / 0x7fff ; ++ sl = ((int_fast32_t) sl * 0x1fdf) / 0x7fff ; + + /* Compute estimate, and delta from actual value */ + nms_adpcm_update (s) ; +@@ -407,7 +406,7 @@ nms_adpcm_encode_sample (struct nms_adpcm_state *s, int16_t sl) + */ + static int16_t + nms_adpcm_decode_sample (struct nms_adpcm_state *s, uint8_t I) +-{ int sl ; ++{ int_fast32_t sl ; + + nms_adpcm_update (s) ; + sl = nms_adpcm_reconstruct_sample (s, I) ; diff --git a/meta/recipes-multimedia/libsndfile/libsndfile1_1.2.2.bb b/meta/recipes-multimedia/libsndfile/libsndfile1_1.2.2.bb index 9c1f601aab..a9ee7c3575 100644 --- a/meta/recipes-multimedia/libsndfile/libsndfile1_1.2.2.bb +++ b/meta/recipes-multimedia/libsndfile/libsndfile1_1.2.2.bb @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ LICENSE = "LGPL-2.1-only" SRC_URI = "${GITHUB_BASE_URI}/download/${PV}/libsndfile-${PV}.tar.xz \ file://noopus.patch \ + file://cve-2022-33065.patch \ " GITHUB_BASE_URI = "https://github.com/libsndfile/libsndfile/releases/"