new file mode 100644
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+From 8b0f20002536867bd73ff4552408a72597190cbe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Ken Sharp <ken.sharp@artifex.com>
+Date: Thu, 24 Aug 2023 15:24:35 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] IJS device - try and secure the IJS server startup
+
+Bug #707051 ""ijs" device can execute arbitrary commands"
+
+The problem is that the 'IJS' device needs to start the IJS server, and
+that is indeed an arbitrary command line. There is (apparently) no way
+to validate it. Indeed, this is covered quite clearly in the comments
+at the start of the source:
+
+ * WARNING: The ijs server can be selected on the gs command line
+ * which is a security risk, since any program can be run.
+
+Previously this used the awful LockSafetyParams hackery, which we
+abandoned some time ago because it simply couldn't be made secure (it
+was implemented in PostScript and was therefore vulnerable to PostScript
+programs).
+
+This commit prevents PostScript programs switching to the IJS device
+after SAFER has been activated, and prevents changes to the IjsServer
+parameter after SAFER has been activated.
+
+SAFER is activated, unless explicitly disabled, before any user
+PostScript is executed which means that the device and the server
+invocation can only be configured on the command line. This does at
+least provide minimal security against malicious PostScript programs.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.ghostscript.com/?p=ghostpdl.git;a=commit;h=8b0f20002536867bd73ff4552408a72597190cbe]
+
+CVE: CVE-2023-43115
+
+Signed-off-by: Archana Polampalli <archana.polampalli@windriver.com>
+---
+ devices/gdevijs.c | 4 +++-
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/devices/gdevijs.c b/devices/gdevijs.c
+index 8cbd84b97..16f5a1752 100644
+--- a/devices/gdevijs.c
++++ b/devices/gdevijs.c
+@@ -888,6 +888,8 @@ gsijs_initialize_device(gx_device *dev)
+ static const char rgb[] = "DeviceRGB";
+ gx_device_ijs *ijsdev = (gx_device_ijs *)dev;
+
++ if (ijsdev->memory->gs_lib_ctx->core->path_control_active)
++ return_error(gs_error_invalidaccess);
+ if (!ijsdev->ColorSpace) {
+ ijsdev->ColorSpace = gs_malloc(ijsdev->memory, sizeof(rgb), 1,
+ "gsijs_initialize");
+@@ -1326,7 +1328,7 @@ gsijs_put_params(gx_device *dev, gs_param_list *plist)
+ if (code >= 0)
+ code = gsijs_read_string(plist, "IjsServer",
+ ijsdev->IjsServer, sizeof(ijsdev->IjsServer),
+- dev->LockSafetyParams, is_open);
++ ijsdev->memory->gs_lib_ctx->core->path_control_active, is_open);
+
+ if (code >= 0)
+ code = gsijs_read_string_malloc(plist, "DeviceManufacturer",
+--
+2.40.0
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ SRC_URI_BASE = "https://github.com/ArtifexSoftware/ghostpdl-downloads/releases/d
file://CVE-2023-36664-0001.patch \
file://CVE-2023-36664-0002.patch \
file://CVE-2023-38559.patch \
+ file://CVE-2023-43115.patch \
"
SRC_URI = "${SRC_URI_BASE} \
In Artifex Ghostscript through 10.01.2, gdevijs.c in GhostPDL can lead to remote code execution via crafted PostScript documents because they can switch to the IJS device, or change the IjsServer parameter, after SAFER has been activated. NOTE: it is a documented risk that the IJS server can be specified on a gs command line (the IJS device inherently must execute a command to start the IJS server). References: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-43115 Upstream patches: https://git.ghostscript.com/?p=ghostpdl.git;a=commit;h=8b0f20002536867bd73ff4552408a72597190cbe Signed-off-by: Archana Polampalli <archana.polampalli@windriver.com> --- .../ghostscript/CVE-2023-43115.patch | 62 +++++++++++++++++++ .../ghostscript/ghostscript_9.55.0.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 63 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/ghostscript/ghostscript/CVE-2023-43115.patch