From patchwork Thu Aug 10 17:46:12 2023 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: "Marko, Peter" X-Patchwork-Id: 28675 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id CAF5BC001DE for ; Thu, 10 Aug 2023 17:47:17 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mta-65-226.siemens.flowmailer.net (mta-65-226.siemens.flowmailer.net [185.136.65.226]) by mx.groups.io with SMTP id smtpd.web11.24307.1691689626791755677 for ; Thu, 10 Aug 2023 10:47:08 -0700 Authentication-Results: mx.groups.io; dkim=pass header.i=peter.marko@siemens.com header.s=fm1 header.b=Y4ILMaiT; spf=pass (domain: rts-flowmailer.siemens.com, ip: 185.136.65.226, mailfrom: fm-256628-202308101747011ab64bca16af5215bf-yntasq@rts-flowmailer.siemens.com) Received: by mta-65-226.siemens.flowmailer.net with ESMTPSA id 202308101747011ab64bca16af5215bf for ; Thu, 10 Aug 2023 19:47:02 +0200 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; c=relaxed/relaxed; s=fm1; d=siemens.com; i=peter.marko@siemens.com; h=Date:From:Subject:To:Message-ID:MIME-Version:Content-Type:Content-Transfer-Encoding:Cc:References:In-Reply-To; bh=mA+GptdRX7DYO7yiWNRS9OvCRZfgGdaWG4KcoZHR05A=; b=Y4ILMaiTKmbQnCygI8FXUWBgZxZdIRNC34HzEtKPLE2nVGQy8vzRaioxaPl/G0ojgUvXgA W7rgkwzIW1yRWSRA0t3L7cOseZL8bC+bAwxe4cez7hdRPyMIKYEsqXPdF4+JniOo6NyNPeOh 2ycX0v1HU0a6xlLgeBCHixyI0kRII=; From: Peter Marko To: openembedded-core@lists.openembedded.org Cc: Peter Marko Subject: [OE-core][dunfell][PATCH v2] openssl: Upgrade 1.1.1t -> 1.1.1v Date: Thu, 10 Aug 2023 19:46:12 +0200 Message-Id: <20230810174612.2142568-1-peter.marko@siemens.com> In-Reply-To: <20230801222931.2942099-1-peter.marko@siemens.com> References: <20230801222931.2942099-1-peter.marko@siemens.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Flowmailer-Platform: Siemens Feedback-ID: 519:519-256628:519-21489:flowmailer List-Id: X-Webhook-Received: from li982-79.members.linode.com [45.33.32.79] by aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org with HTTPS for ; Thu, 10 Aug 2023 17:47:17 -0000 X-Groupsio-URL: https://lists.openembedded.org/g/openembedded-core/message/185821 From: Peter Marko https://www.openssl.org/news/openssl-1.1.1-notes.html Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.1u and OpenSSL 1.1.1v [1 Aug 2023] * Fix excessive time spent checking DH q parameter value (CVE-2023-3817) * Fix DH_check() excessive time with over sized modulus (CVE-2023-3446) Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.1t and OpenSSL 1.1.1u [30 May 2023] * Mitigate for very slow `OBJ_obj2txt()` performance with gigantic OBJECT IDENTIFIER sub-identities. (CVE-2023-2650) * Fixed documentation of X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() (CVE-2023-0466) * Fixed handling of invalid certificate policies in leaf certificates (CVE-2023-0465) * Limited the number of nodes created in a policy tree ([CVE-2023-0464]) All CVEs for upgrade to 1.1.1u were already patched, so effectively this will apply patches for CVE-2023-3446 and CVE-2023-3817 plus several non-CVE fixes. Because of mips build changes were backported to openssl 1.1.1 branch, backport of a patch from kirkstone is necessary. Signed-off-by: Peter Marko --- v2: backport mips patch ...1-Configure-do-not-tweak-mips-cflags.patch | 37 +++ .../openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-0464.patch | 226 ------------------ .../openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-0465.patch | 60 ----- .../openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-0466.patch | 82 ------- .../openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-2650.patch | 122 ---------- .../{openssl_1.1.1t.bb => openssl_1.1.1v.bb} | 7 +- 6 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 495 deletions(-) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/0001-Configure-do-not-tweak-mips-cflags.patch delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-0464.patch delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-0465.patch delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-0466.patch delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-2650.patch rename meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/{openssl_1.1.1t.bb => openssl_1.1.1v.bb} (96%) diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/0001-Configure-do-not-tweak-mips-cflags.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/0001-Configure-do-not-tweak-mips-cflags.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b3f6a942d5 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/0001-Configure-do-not-tweak-mips-cflags.patch @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +From 326909baf81a638d51fa8be1d8227518784f5cc4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Alexander Kanavin +Date: Tue, 14 Sep 2021 12:18:25 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] Configure: do not tweak mips cflags + +This conflicts with mips machine definitons from yocto, +e.g. +| Error: -mips3 conflicts with the other architecture options, which imply -mips64r2 + +Upstream-Status: Inappropriate [oe-core specific] +Signed-off-by: Alexander Kanavin +Signed-off-by: Peter Marko +--- + Configure | 10 ---------- + 1 file changed, 10 deletions(-) + +Index: openssl-3.0.4/Configure +=================================================================== +--- openssl-3.0.4.orig/Configure ++++ openssl-3.0.4/Configure +@@ -1243,16 +1243,6 @@ if ($target =~ /^mingw/ && `$config{CC} --target-help 2>&1` =~ m/-mno-cygwin/m) + push @{$config{shared_ldflag}}, "-mno-cygwin"; + } + +-if ($target =~ /linux.*-mips/ && !$disabled{asm} +- && !grep { $_ =~ /-m(ips|arch=)/ } (@{$config{CFLAGS}})) { +- # minimally required architecture flags for assembly modules +- my $value; +- $value = '-mips2' if ($target =~ /mips32/); +- $value = '-mips3' if ($target =~ /mips64/); +- unshift @{$config{cflags}}, $value; +- unshift @{$config{cxxflags}}, $value if $config{CXX}; +-} +- + # If threads aren't disabled, check how possible they are + unless ($disabled{threads}) { + if ($auto_threads) { diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-0464.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-0464.patch deleted file mode 100644 index cce5bad9f0..0000000000 --- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-0464.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,226 +0,0 @@ -From 879f7080d7e141f415c79eaa3a8ac4a3dad0348b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Pauli -Date: Wed, 8 Mar 2023 15:28:20 +1100 -Subject: [PATCH] x509: excessive resource use verifying policy constraints - -A security vulnerability has been identified in all supported versions -of OpenSSL related to the verification of X.509 certificate chains -that include policy constraints. Attackers may be able to exploit this -vulnerability by creating a malicious certificate chain that triggers -exponential use of computational resources, leading to a denial-of-service -(DoS) attack on affected systems. - -Fixes CVE-2023-0464 - -Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz -Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis -(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20569) - -CVE: CVE-2023-0464 -Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=patch;h=879f7080d7e141f415c79eaa3a8ac4a3dad0348b] -Signed-off-by: Nikhil R - ---- - crypto/x509v3/pcy_local.h | 8 +++++++- - crypto/x509v3/pcy_node.c | 12 +++++++++--- - crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------- - 3 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/pcy_local.h b/crypto/x509v3/pcy_local.h -index 5daf78de45..344aa06765 100644 ---- a/crypto/x509v3/pcy_local.h -+++ b/crypto/x509v3/pcy_local.h -@@ -111,6 +111,11 @@ struct X509_POLICY_LEVEL_st { - }; - - struct X509_POLICY_TREE_st { -+ /* The number of nodes in the tree */ -+ size_t node_count; -+ /* The maximum number of nodes in the tree */ -+ size_t node_maximum; -+ - /* This is the tree 'level' data */ - X509_POLICY_LEVEL *levels; - int nlevel; -@@ -159,7 +164,8 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *tree_find_sk(STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *sk, - X509_POLICY_NODE *level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level, - X509_POLICY_DATA *data, - X509_POLICY_NODE *parent, -- X509_POLICY_TREE *tree); -+ X509_POLICY_TREE *tree, -+ int extra_data); - void policy_node_free(X509_POLICY_NODE *node); - int policy_node_match(const X509_POLICY_LEVEL *lvl, - const X509_POLICY_NODE *node, const ASN1_OBJECT *oid); -diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/pcy_node.c b/crypto/x509v3/pcy_node.c -index e2d7b15322..d574fb9d66 100644 ---- a/crypto/x509v3/pcy_node.c -+++ b/crypto/x509v3/pcy_node.c -@@ -59,10 +59,15 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *level_find_node(const X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level, - X509_POLICY_NODE *level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level, - X509_POLICY_DATA *data, - X509_POLICY_NODE *parent, -- X509_POLICY_TREE *tree) -+ X509_POLICY_TREE *tree, -+ int extra_data) - { - X509_POLICY_NODE *node; - -+ /* Verify that the tree isn't too large. This mitigates CVE-2023-0464 */ -+ if (tree->node_maximum > 0 && tree->node_count >= tree->node_maximum) -+ return NULL; -+ - node = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*node)); - if (node == NULL) { - X509V3err(X509V3_F_LEVEL_ADD_NODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -@@ -70,7 +75,7 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level, - } - node->data = data; - node->parent = parent; -- if (level) { -+ if (level != NULL) { - if (OBJ_obj2nid(data->valid_policy) == NID_any_policy) { - if (level->anyPolicy) - goto node_error; -@@ -90,7 +95,7 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level, - } - } - -- if (tree) { -+ if (extra_data) { - if (tree->extra_data == NULL) - tree->extra_data = sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_new_null(); - if (tree->extra_data == NULL){ -@@ -103,6 +108,7 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level, - } - } - -+ tree->node_count++; - if (parent) - parent->nchild++; - -diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c b/crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c -index 6e8322cbc5..6c7fd35405 100644 ---- a/crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c -+++ b/crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c -@@ -13,6 +13,18 @@ - - #include "pcy_local.h" - -+/* -+ * If the maximum number of nodes in the policy tree isn't defined, set it to -+ * a generous default of 1000 nodes. -+ * -+ * Defining this to be zero means unlimited policy tree growth which opens the -+ * door on CVE-2023-0464. -+ */ -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_POLICY_TREE_NODES_MAX -+# define OPENSSL_POLICY_TREE_NODES_MAX 1000 -+#endif -+ - /* - * Enable this to print out the complete policy tree at various point during - * evaluation. -@@ -168,6 +180,9 @@ static int tree_init(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, - return X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL; - } - -+ /* Limit the growth of the tree to mitigate CVE-2023-0464 */ -+ tree->node_maximum = OPENSSL_POLICY_TREE_NODES_MAX; -+ - /* - * http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-6.1.2, figure 3. - * -@@ -184,7 +199,7 @@ static int tree_init(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, - level = tree->levels; - if ((data = policy_data_new(NULL, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_any_policy), 0)) == NULL) - goto bad_tree; -- if (level_add_node(level, data, NULL, tree) == NULL) { -+ if (level_add_node(level, data, NULL, tree, 1) == NULL) { - policy_data_free(data); - goto bad_tree; - } -@@ -243,7 +258,8 @@ static int tree_init(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, - * Return value: 1 on success, 0 otherwise - */ - static int tree_link_matching_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr, -- X509_POLICY_DATA *data) -+ X509_POLICY_DATA *data, -+ X509_POLICY_TREE *tree) - { - X509_POLICY_LEVEL *last = curr - 1; - int i, matched = 0; -@@ -253,13 +269,13 @@ static int tree_link_matching_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr, - X509_POLICY_NODE *node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(last->nodes, i); - - if (policy_node_match(last, node, data->valid_policy)) { -- if (level_add_node(curr, data, node, NULL) == NULL) -+ if (level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree, 0) == NULL) - return 0; - matched = 1; - } - } - if (!matched && last->anyPolicy) { -- if (level_add_node(curr, data, last->anyPolicy, NULL) == NULL) -+ if (level_add_node(curr, data, last->anyPolicy, tree, 0) == NULL) - return 0; - } - return 1; -@@ -272,7 +288,8 @@ static int tree_link_matching_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr, - * Return value: 1 on success, 0 otherwise. - */ - static int tree_link_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr, -- const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache) -+ const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache, -+ X509_POLICY_TREE *tree) - { - int i; - -@@ -280,7 +297,7 @@ static int tree_link_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr, - X509_POLICY_DATA *data = sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_value(cache->data, i); - - /* Look for matching nodes in previous level */ -- if (!tree_link_matching_nodes(curr, data)) -+ if (!tree_link_matching_nodes(curr, data, tree)) - return 0; - } - return 1; -@@ -311,7 +328,7 @@ static int tree_add_unmatched(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr, - /* Curr may not have anyPolicy */ - data->qualifier_set = cache->anyPolicy->qualifier_set; - data->flags |= POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS; -- if (level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree) == NULL) { -+ if (level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree, 1) == NULL) { - policy_data_free(data); - return 0; - } -@@ -373,7 +390,7 @@ static int tree_link_any(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr, - } - /* Finally add link to anyPolicy */ - if (last->anyPolicy && -- level_add_node(curr, cache->anyPolicy, last->anyPolicy, NULL) == NULL) -+ level_add_node(curr, cache->anyPolicy, last->anyPolicy, tree, 0) == NULL) - return 0; - return 1; - } -@@ -555,7 +572,7 @@ static int tree_calculate_user_set(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree, - extra->qualifier_set = anyPolicy->data->qualifier_set; - extra->flags = POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS - | POLICY_DATA_FLAG_EXTRA_NODE; -- node = level_add_node(NULL, extra, anyPolicy->parent, tree); -+ node = level_add_node(NULL, extra, anyPolicy->parent, tree, 1); - } - if (!tree->user_policies) { - tree->user_policies = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_new_null(); -@@ -582,7 +599,7 @@ static int tree_evaluate(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree) - - for (i = 1; i < tree->nlevel; i++, curr++) { - cache = policy_cache_set(curr->cert); -- if (!tree_link_nodes(curr, cache)) -+ if (!tree_link_nodes(curr, cache, tree)) - return X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL; - - if (!(curr->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY) --- -2.34.1 diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-0465.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-0465.patch deleted file mode 100644 index be5068074e..0000000000 --- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-0465.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,60 +0,0 @@ -From b013765abfa80036dc779dd0e50602c57bb3bf95 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Matt Caswell -Date: Tue, 7 Mar 2023 16:52:55 +0000 -Subject: [PATCH] Ensure that EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY is checked even in leaf - certs - -Even though we check the leaf cert to confirm it is valid, we -later ignored the invalid flag and did not notice that the leaf -cert was bad. - -Fixes: CVE-2023-0465 - -Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau -Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz -(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20588) - -CVE: CVE-2023-0465 -Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commitdiff;h=b013765abfa80036dc779dd0e50602c57bb3bf95] -Comment: Refreshed first hunk -Signed-off-by: Omkar Patil - ---- - crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c | 11 +++++++++-- - 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c -index 925fbb5412..1dfe4f9f31 100644 ---- a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c -+++ b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c -@@ -1649,18 +1649,25 @@ - } - /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */ - if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_INVALID) { -- int i; -+ int i, cbcalled = 0; - - /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback. */ -- for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) { -+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) { - X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); - - if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY)) - continue; -+ cbcalled = 1; - if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, - X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION)) - return 0; - } -+ if (!cbcalled) { -+ /* Should not be able to get here */ -+ X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); -+ return 0; -+ } -+ /* The callback ignored the error so we return success */ - return 1; - } - if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_FAILURE) { --- -2.34.1 - diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-0466.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-0466.patch deleted file mode 100644 index f042aa5da1..0000000000 --- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-0466.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,82 +0,0 @@ -From 0d16b7e99aafc0b4a6d729eec65a411a7e025f0a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Tomas Mraz -Date: Tue, 21 Mar 2023 16:15:47 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH] Fix documentation of X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() - -The function was incorrectly documented as enabling policy checking. - -Fixes: CVE-2023-0466 - -Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell -Reviewed-by: Paul Dale -(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20564) - -CVE: CVE-2023-0466 -Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commitdiff;h=0d16b7e99aafc0b4a6d729eec65a411a7e025f0a] -Comment: Refreshed first hunk from CHANGE and NEWS -Signed-off-by: Omkar Patil - ---- - CHANGES | 5 +++++ - NEWS | 1 + - doc/man3/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod | 9 +++++++-- - 3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES -index efccf7838e..b19f1429bb 100644 ---- a/CHANGES -+++ b/CHANGES -@@ -9,6 +9,11 @@ - - Changes between 1.1.1s and 1.1.1t [7 Feb 2023] - -+ *) Corrected documentation of X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() to mention -+ that it does not enable policy checking. Thanks to -+ David Benjamin for discovering this issue. (CVE-2023-0466) -+ [Tomas Mraz] -+ - *) Fixed X.400 address type confusion in X.509 GeneralName. - - There is a type confusion vulnerability relating to X.400 address processing -diff --git a/NEWS b/NEWS -index 36a9bb6890..62615693fa 100644 ---- a/NEWS -+++ b/NEWS -@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ - - Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.1s and OpenSSL 1.1.1t [7 Feb 2023] - -+ o Fixed documentation of X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() (CVE-2023-0466) - o Fixed X.400 address type confusion in X.509 GeneralName (CVE-2023-0286) - o Fixed Use-after-free following BIO_new_NDEF (CVE-2023-0215) - o Fixed Double free after calling PEM_read_bio_ex (CVE-2022-4450) -diff --git a/doc/man3/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod b/doc/man3/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod -index f6f304bf7b..aa292f9336 100644 ---- a/doc/man3/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod -+++ b/doc/man3/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod -@@ -92,8 +92,9 @@ B. - X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time() sets the verification time in B to - B. Normally the current time is used. - --X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() enables policy checking (it is disabled --by default) and adds B to the acceptable policy set. -+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() adds B to the acceptable policy set. -+Contrary to preexisting documentation of this function it does not enable -+policy checking. - - X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_policies() enables policy checking (it is disabled - by default) and sets the acceptable policy set to B. Any existing -@@ -377,6 +378,10 @@ and has no effect. - - The X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_hostflags() function was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0i. - -+The function X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() was historically documented as -+enabling policy checking however the implementation has never done this. -+The documentation was changed to align with the implementation. -+ - =head1 COPYRIGHT - - Copyright 2009-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. --- -2.34.1 - diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-2650.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-2650.patch deleted file mode 100644 index ef344dda7f..0000000000 --- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-2650.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,122 +0,0 @@ -From 9e209944b35cf82368071f160a744b6178f9b098 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Richard Levitte -Date: Fri, 12 May 2023 10:00:13 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH] Restrict the size of OBJECT IDENTIFIERs that OBJ_obj2txt will - translate - -OBJ_obj2txt() would translate any size OBJECT IDENTIFIER to canonical -numeric text form. For gigantic sub-identifiers, this would take a very -long time, the time complexity being O(n^2) where n is the size of that -sub-identifier. - -To mitigate this, a restriction on the size that OBJ_obj2txt() will -translate to canonical numeric text form is added, based on RFC 2578 -(STD 58), which says this: - -> 3.5. OBJECT IDENTIFIER values -> -> An OBJECT IDENTIFIER value is an ordered list of non-negative numbers. -> For the SMIv2, each number in the list is referred to as a sub-identifier, -> there are at most 128 sub-identifiers in a value, and each sub-identifier -> has a maximum value of 2^32-1 (4294967295 decimal). - -Fixes otc/security#96 -Fixes CVE-2023-2650 - -Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell -Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz - -Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/9e209944b35cf82368071f160a744b6178f9b098] -CVE: CVE-2023-2650 -Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati ---- - CHANGES | 28 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++- - NEWS | 2 ++ - crypto/objects/obj_dat.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++ - 3 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) - -diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES -index 1eaaf4e..f2cf38f 100644 ---- a/CHANGES -+++ b/CHANGES -@@ -7,7 +7,33 @@ - https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commits/ and pick the appropriate - release branch. - -- Changes between 1.1.1s and 1.1.1t [7 Feb 2023] -+ Changes between 1.1.1t and 1.1.1u [xx XXX xxxx] -+ -+ *) Mitigate for the time it takes for `OBJ_obj2txt` to translate gigantic -+ OBJECT IDENTIFIER sub-identifiers to canonical numeric text form. -+ -+ OBJ_obj2txt() would translate any size OBJECT IDENTIFIER to canonical -+ numeric text form. For gigantic sub-identifiers, this would take a very -+ long time, the time complexity being O(n^2) where n is the size of that -+ sub-identifier. (CVE-2023-2650) -+ -+ To mitigitate this, `OBJ_obj2txt()` will only translate an OBJECT -+ IDENTIFIER to canonical numeric text form if the size of that OBJECT -+ IDENTIFIER is 586 bytes or less, and fail otherwise. -+ -+ The basis for this restriction is RFC 2578 (STD 58), section 3.5. OBJECT -+ IDENTIFIER values, which stipulates that OBJECT IDENTIFIERS may have at -+ most 128 sub-identifiers, and that the maximum value that each sub- -+ identifier may have is 2^32-1 (4294967295 decimal). -+ -+ For each byte of every sub-identifier, only the 7 lower bits are part of -+ the value, so the maximum amount of bytes that an OBJECT IDENTIFIER with -+ these restrictions may occupy is 32 * 128 / 7, which is approximately 586 -+ bytes. -+ -+ Ref: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2578#section-3.5 -+ -+Changes between 1.1.1s and 1.1.1t [7 Feb 2023] - - *) Corrected documentation of X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() to mention - that it does not enable policy checking. Thanks to -diff --git a/NEWS b/NEWS -index a86220a..41922c4 100644 ---- a/NEWS -+++ b/NEWS -@@ -7,6 +7,8 @@ - - Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.1s and OpenSSL 1.1.1t [7 Feb 2023] - -+ o Mitigate for very slow `OBJ_obj2txt()` performance with gigantic -+ OBJECT IDENTIFIER sub-identities. (CVE-2023-2650) - o Fixed documentation of X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() (CVE-2023-0466) - o Fixed X.400 address type confusion in X.509 GeneralName (CVE-2023-0286) - o Fixed Use-after-free following BIO_new_NDEF (CVE-2023-0215) -diff --git a/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c b/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c -index 7e8de72..d699915 100644 ---- a/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c -+++ b/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c -@@ -428,6 +428,25 @@ int OBJ_obj2txt(char *buf, int buf_len, const ASN1_OBJECT *a, int no_name) - first = 1; - bl = NULL; - -+ /* -+ * RFC 2578 (STD 58) says this about OBJECT IDENTIFIERs: -+ * -+ * > 3.5. OBJECT IDENTIFIER values -+ * > -+ * > An OBJECT IDENTIFIER value is an ordered list of non-negative -+ * > numbers. For the SMIv2, each number in the list is referred to as a -+ * > sub-identifier, there are at most 128 sub-identifiers in a value, -+ * > and each sub-identifier has a maximum value of 2^32-1 (4294967295 -+ * > decimal). -+ * -+ * So a legitimate OID according to this RFC is at most (32 * 128 / 7), -+ * i.e. 586 bytes long. -+ * -+ * Ref: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2578#section-3.5 -+ */ -+ if (len > 586) -+ goto err; -+ - while (len > 0) { - l = 0; - use_bn = 0; --- -2.25.1 - diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.1.1t.bb b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.1.1v.bb similarity index 96% rename from meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.1.1t.bb rename to meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.1.1v.bb index eea8ef64af..d1222dc470 100644 --- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.1.1t.bb +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.1.1v.bb @@ -19,17 +19,14 @@ SRC_URI = "http://www.openssl.org/source/openssl-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://reproducible.patch \ file://reproducibility.patch \ file://0001-Configure-add-2-missing-key-sorts.patch \ - file://CVE-2023-0464.patch \ - file://CVE-2023-0465.patch \ - file://CVE-2023-0466.patch \ - file://CVE-2023-2650.patch \ + file://0001-Configure-do-not-tweak-mips-cflags.patch \ " SRC_URI_append_class-nativesdk = " \ file://environment.d-openssl.sh \ " -SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "8dee9b24bdb1dcbf0c3d1e9b02fb8f6bf22165e807f45adeb7c9677536859d3b" +SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "d6697e2871e77238460402e9362d47d18382b15ef9f246aba6c7bd780d38a6b0" inherit lib_package multilib_header multilib_script ptest MULTILIB_SCRIPTS = "${PN}-bin:${bindir}/c_rehash"