new file mode 100644
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+From 00e2f5eea29994d19293ec4e8c8775ba73678598 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
+Date: Tue, 4 Jul 2023 17:30:35 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Do not ignore empty associated data with AES-SIV mode
+
+The AES-SIV mode allows for multiple associated data items
+authenticated separately with any of these being 0 length.
+
+The provided implementation ignores such empty associated data
+which is incorrect in regards to the RFC 5297 and is also
+a security issue because such empty associated data then become
+unauthenticated if an application expects to authenticate them.
+
+Fixes CVE-2023-2975
+
+Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21384)
+
+(cherry picked from commit c426c281cfc23ab182f7d7d7a35229e7db1494d9)
+
+CVE: CVE-2023-2975
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/00e2f5eea29994d19293ec4e8c8775ba73678598]
+
+Signed-off-by: Narpat Mali <narpat.mali@windriver.com>
+---
+ .../implementations/ciphers/cipher_aes_siv.c | 18 +++++++++++-------
+ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/providers/implementations/ciphers/cipher_aes_siv.c b/providers/implementations/ciphers/cipher_aes_siv.c
+index 45010b90db..b396c8651a 100644
+--- a/providers/implementations/ciphers/cipher_aes_siv.c
++++ b/providers/implementations/ciphers/cipher_aes_siv.c
+@@ -120,14 +120,18 @@ static int siv_cipher(void *vctx, unsigned char *out, size_t *outl,
+ if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
+ return 0;
+
+- if (inl == 0) {
+- *outl = 0;
+- return 1;
+- }
++ /* Ignore just empty encryption/decryption call and not AAD. */
++ if (out != NULL) {
++ if (inl == 0) {
++ if (outl != NULL)
++ *outl = 0;
++ return 1;
++ }
+
+- if (outsize < inl) {
+- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+- return 0;
++ if (outsize < inl) {
++ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
++ return 0;
++ }
+ }
+
+ if (ctx->hw->cipher(ctx, out, in, inl) <= 0)
+--
+2.40.0
new file mode 100644
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+From 1fa20cf2f506113c761777127a38bce5068740eb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+Date: Thu, 6 Jul 2023 16:36:35 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix DH_check() excessive time with over sized modulus
+
+The DH_check() function checks numerous aspects of the key or parameters
+that have been supplied. Some of those checks use the supplied modulus
+value even if it is excessively large.
+
+There is already a maximum DH modulus size (10,000 bits) over which
+OpenSSL will not generate or derive keys. DH_check() will however still
+perform various tests for validity on such a large modulus. We introduce a
+new maximum (32,768) over which DH_check() will just fail.
+
+An application that calls DH_check() and supplies a key or parameters
+obtained from an untrusted source could be vulnerable to a Denial of
+Service attack.
+
+The function DH_check() is itself called by a number of other OpenSSL
+functions. An application calling any of those other functions may
+similarly be affected. The other functions affected by this are
+DH_check_ex() and EVP_PKEY_param_check().
+
+CVE-2023-3446
+
+Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
+Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
+Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21451)
+
+(cherry picked from commit 9e0094e2aa1b3428a12d5095132f133c078d3c3d)
+
+CVE: CVE-2023-3446
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/1fa20cf2f506113c761777127a38bce5068740eb]
+
+Signed-off-by: Narpat Mali <narpat.mali@windriver.com>
+---
+ crypto/dh/dh_check.c | 6 ++++++
+ include/openssl/dh.h | 6 +++++-
+ 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
+index 0b391910d6..84a926998e 100644
+--- a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
++++ b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
+@@ -152,6 +152,12 @@ int DH_check(const DH *dh, int *ret)
+ if (nid != NID_undef)
+ return 1;
+
++ /* Don't do any checks at all with an excessively large modulus */
++ if (BN_num_bits(dh->params.p) > OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
++ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
++ return 0;
++ }
++
+ if (!DH_check_params(dh, ret))
+ return 0;
+
+diff --git a/include/openssl/dh.h b/include/openssl/dh.h
+index b97871eca7..36420f51d8 100644
+--- a/include/openssl/dh.h
++++ b/include/openssl/dh.h
+@@ -89,7 +89,11 @@ int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_dh_kdf_ukm(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char **ukm);
+ # include <openssl/dherr.h>
+
+ # ifndef OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS
+-# define OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS 10000
++# define OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS 10000
++# endif
++
++# ifndef OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS
++# define OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS 32768
+ # endif
+
+ # define OPENSSL_DH_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS 1024
+--
+2.40.0
@@ -12,6 +12,8 @@ SRC_URI = "http://www.openssl.org/source/openssl-${PV}.tar.gz \
file://0001-buildinfo-strip-sysroot-and-debug-prefix-map-from-co.patch \
file://afalg.patch \
file://0001-Configure-do-not-tweak-mips-cflags.patch \
+ file://CVE-2023-2975.patch \
+ file://CVE-2023-3446.patch \
"
SRC_URI:append:class-nativesdk = " \