new file mode 100644
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+From 2aeb41a9a3a43b11b1e46628d0bf98197ff9f141 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
+Date: Thu, 29 Dec 2022 18:00:20 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] pppdump: Avoid out-of-range access to packet buffer
+
+This fixes a potential vulnerability where data is written to spkt.buf
+and rpkt.buf without a check on the array index. To fix this, we
+check the array index (pkt->cnt) before storing the byte or
+incrementing the count. This also means we no longer have a potential
+signed integer overflow on the increment of pkt->cnt.
+
+Fortunately, pppdump is not used in the normal process of setting up a
+PPP connection, is not installed setuid-root, and is not invoked
+automatically in any scenario that I am aware of.
+
+Ustream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/ppp-project/ppp/commit/a75fb7b198eed50d769c80c36629f38346882cbf]
+CVE: CVE-2022-4603
+Signed-off-by:Minjae Kim <flowergom@gmail.com>
+---
+ pppdump/pppdump.c | 7 ++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/pppdump/pppdump.c b/pppdump/pppdump.c
+index 87c2e8f..dec4def 100644
+--- a/pppdump/pppdump.c
++++ b/pppdump/pppdump.c
+@@ -296,6 +296,10 @@ dumpppp(f)
+ printf("%s aborted packet:\n ", dir);
+ q = " ";
+ }
++ if (pkt->cnt >= sizeof(pkt->buf)) {
++ printf("%s over-long packet truncated:\n ", dir);
++ q = " ";
++ }
+ nb = pkt->cnt;
+ p = pkt->buf;
+ pkt->cnt = 0;
+@@ -399,7 +403,8 @@ dumpppp(f)
+ c ^= 0x20;
+ pkt->esc = 0;
+ }
+- pkt->buf[pkt->cnt++] = c;
++ if (pkt->cnt < sizeof(pkt->buf))
++ pkt->buf[pkt->cnt++] = c;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+--
+2.25.1
+
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://download.samba.org/pub/${BPN}/${BP}.tar.gz \
file://0001-ppp-Remove-unneeded-include.patch \
file://ppp-2.4.7-DES-openssl.patch \
file://0001-pppd-Fix-bounds-check-in-EAP-code.patch \
+ file://CVE-2022-4603.patch \
"
SRC_URI_append_libc-musl = "\