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[72.253.5.74]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id c4-20020a170902d48400b001894881842dsm18467004plg.151.2023.01.01.09.42.50 for (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Sun, 01 Jan 2023 09:42:50 -0800 (PST) From: Steve Sakoman To: openembedded-core@lists.openembedded.org Subject: [OE-core][dunfell 03/18] rsync: fix CVE-2022-29154 remote arbitrary files write inside the directories of connecting peers Date: Sun, 1 Jan 2023 07:42:19 -1000 Message-Id: <6367c60c93b76dda9d9b37de21f750966bffbf87.1672594796.git.steve@sakoman.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 List-Id: X-Webhook-Received: from li982-79.members.linode.com [45.33.32.79] by aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org with HTTPS for ; Sun, 01 Jan 2023 17:42:56 -0000 X-Groupsio-URL: https://lists.openembedded.org/g/openembedded-core/message/175221 From: Vivek Kumbhar Signed-off-by: Vivek Kumbhar Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman --- .../rsync/files/CVE-2022-29154.patch | 334 ++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/rsync_3.1.3.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 335 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2022-29154.patch diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2022-29154.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2022-29154.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..61e4e03254 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2022-29154.patch @@ -0,0 +1,334 @@ +From b7231c7d02cfb65d291af74ff66e7d8c507ee871 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Wayne Davison +Date: Sun, 31 Jul 2022 16:55:34 -0700 +Subject: [PATCH] Some extra file-list safety checks. + +CVE-2022-29154 rsync: remote arbitrary files write inside the + +Upstream-Status: Backport from [https://git.samba.org/?p=rsync.git;a=patch;h=b7231c7d02cfb65d291af74ff66e7d8c507ee871] +CVE:CVE-2022-29154 +Signed-off-by: Vivek Kumbhar +--- + exclude.c | 127 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- + flist.c | 17 ++++++- + io.c | 4 ++ + main.c | 7 ++- + receiver.c | 11 +++-- + 5 files changed, 158 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/exclude.c b/exclude.c +index 7989fb3..e146e96 100644 +--- a/exclude.c ++++ b/exclude.c +@@ -26,16 +26,21 @@ extern int am_server; + extern int am_sender; + extern int eol_nulls; + extern int io_error; ++extern int xfer_dirs; ++extern int recurse; + extern int local_server; + extern int prune_empty_dirs; + extern int ignore_perishable; ++extern int relative_paths; + extern int delete_mode; + extern int delete_excluded; + extern int cvs_exclude; + extern int sanitize_paths; + extern int protocol_version; ++extern int list_only; + extern int module_id; + ++extern char *filesfrom_host; + extern char curr_dir[MAXPATHLEN]; + extern unsigned int curr_dir_len; + extern unsigned int module_dirlen; +@@ -43,8 +48,10 @@ extern unsigned int module_dirlen; + filter_rule_list filter_list = { .debug_type = "" }; + filter_rule_list cvs_filter_list = { .debug_type = " [global CVS]" }; + filter_rule_list daemon_filter_list = { .debug_type = " [daemon]" }; ++filter_rule_list implied_filter_list = { .debug_type = " [implied]" }; + + int saw_xattr_filter = 0; ++int trust_sender_filter = 0; + + /* Need room enough for ":MODS " prefix plus some room to grow. */ + #define MAX_RULE_PREFIX (16) +@@ -293,6 +300,123 @@ static void add_rule(filter_rule_list *listp, const char *pat, unsigned int pat_ + } + } + ++/* Each arg the client sends to the remote sender turns into an implied include ++ * that the receiver uses to validate the file list from the sender. */ ++void add_implied_include(const char *arg) ++{ ++ filter_rule *rule; ++ int arg_len, saw_wild = 0, backslash_cnt = 0; ++ int slash_cnt = 1; /* We know we're adding a leading slash. */ ++ const char *cp; ++ char *p; ++ if (relative_paths) { ++ cp = strstr(arg, "/./"); ++ if (cp) ++ arg = cp+3; ++ } else { ++ if ((cp = strrchr(arg, '/')) != NULL) ++ arg = cp + 1; ++ } ++ arg_len = strlen(arg); ++ if (arg_len) { ++ if (strpbrk(arg, "*[?")) { ++ /* We need to add room to escape backslashes if wildcard chars are present. */ ++ cp = arg; ++ while ((cp = strchr(cp, '\\')) != NULL) { ++ arg_len++; ++ cp++; ++ } ++ saw_wild = 1; ++ } ++ arg_len++; /* Leave room for the prefixed slash */ ++ rule = new0(filter_rule); ++ if (!implied_filter_list.head) ++ implied_filter_list.head = implied_filter_list.tail = rule; ++ else { ++ rule->next = implied_filter_list.head; ++ implied_filter_list.head = rule; ++ } ++ rule->rflags = FILTRULE_INCLUDE + (saw_wild ? FILTRULE_WILD : 0); ++ p = rule->pattern = new_array(char, arg_len + 1); ++ *p++ = '/'; ++ cp = arg; ++ while (*cp) { ++ switch (*cp) { ++ case '\\': ++ backslash_cnt++; ++ if (saw_wild) ++ *p++ = '\\'; ++ *p++ = *cp++; ++ break; ++ case '/': ++ if (p[-1] == '/') /* This is safe because of the initial slash. */ ++ break; ++ if (relative_paths) { ++ filter_rule const *ent; ++ int found = 0; ++ *p = '\0'; ++ for (ent = implied_filter_list.head; ent; ent = ent->next) { ++ if (ent != rule && strcmp(ent->pattern, rule->pattern) == 0) ++ found = 1; ++ } ++ if (!found) { ++ filter_rule *R_rule = new0(filter_rule); ++ R_rule->rflags = FILTRULE_INCLUDE + (saw_wild ? FILTRULE_WILD : 0); ++ R_rule->pattern = strdup(rule->pattern); ++ R_rule->u.slash_cnt = slash_cnt; ++ R_rule->next = implied_filter_list.head; ++ implied_filter_list.head = R_rule; ++ } ++ } ++ slash_cnt++; ++ *p++ = *cp++; ++ break; ++ default: ++ *p++ = *cp++; ++ break; ++ } ++ } ++ *p = '\0'; ++ rule->u.slash_cnt = slash_cnt; ++ arg = (const char *)rule->pattern; ++ } ++ ++ if (recurse || xfer_dirs) { ++ /* Now create a rule with an added "/" & "**" or "*" at the end */ ++ rule = new0(filter_rule); ++ if (recurse) ++ rule->rflags = FILTRULE_INCLUDE | FILTRULE_WILD | FILTRULE_WILD2; ++ else ++ rule->rflags = FILTRULE_INCLUDE | FILTRULE_WILD; ++ /* A +4 in the len leaves enough room for / * * \0 or / * \0 \0 */ ++ if (!saw_wild && backslash_cnt) { ++ /* We are appending a wildcard, so now the backslashes need to be escaped. */ ++ p = rule->pattern = new_array(char, arg_len + backslash_cnt + 3 + 1); ++ cp = arg; ++ while (*cp) { ++ if (*cp == '\\') ++ *p++ = '\\'; ++ *p++ = *cp++; ++ } ++ } else { ++ p = rule->pattern = new_array(char, arg_len + 3 + 1); ++ if (arg_len) { ++ memcpy(p, arg, arg_len); ++ p += arg_len; ++ } ++ } ++ if (p[-1] != '/') ++ *p++ = '/'; ++ *p++ = '*'; ++ if (recurse) ++ *p++ = '*'; ++ *p = '\0'; ++ rule->u.slash_cnt = slash_cnt + 1; ++ rule->next = implied_filter_list.head; ++ implied_filter_list.head = rule; ++ } ++} ++ + /* This frees any non-inherited items, leaving just inherited items on the list. */ + static void pop_filter_list(filter_rule_list *listp) + { +@@ -721,7 +845,7 @@ static void report_filter_result(enum logcode code, char const *name, + : name_flags & NAME_IS_DIR ? "directory" + : "file"; + rprintf(code, "[%s] %sing %s %s because of pattern %s%s%s\n", +- w, actions[*w!='s'][!(ent->rflags & FILTRULE_INCLUDE)], ++ w, actions[*w=='g'][!(ent->rflags & FILTRULE_INCLUDE)], + t, name, ent->pattern, + ent->rflags & FILTRULE_DIRECTORY ? "/" : "", type); + } +@@ -894,6 +1018,7 @@ static filter_rule *parse_rule_tok(const char **rulestr_ptr, + } + switch (ch) { + case ':': ++ trust_sender_filter = 1; + rule->rflags |= FILTRULE_PERDIR_MERGE + | FILTRULE_FINISH_SETUP; + /* FALL THROUGH */ +diff --git a/flist.c b/flist.c +index 499440c..630d685 100644 +--- a/flist.c ++++ b/flist.c +@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ extern int need_unsorted_flist; + extern int sender_symlink_iconv; + extern int output_needs_newline; + extern int sender_keeps_checksum; ++extern int trust_sender_filter; + extern int unsort_ndx; + extern uid_t our_uid; + extern struct stats stats; +@@ -80,8 +81,7 @@ extern char curr_dir[MAXPATHLEN]; + + extern struct chmod_mode_struct *chmod_modes; + +-extern filter_rule_list filter_list; +-extern filter_rule_list daemon_filter_list; ++extern filter_rule_list filter_list, implied_filter_list, daemon_filter_list; + + #ifdef ICONV_OPTION + extern int filesfrom_convert; +@@ -904,6 +904,19 @@ static struct file_struct *recv_file_entry(int f, struct file_list *flist, int x + exit_cleanup(RERR_UNSUPPORTED); + } + ++ if (*thisname != '.' || thisname[1] != '\0') { ++ int filt_flags = S_ISDIR(mode) ? NAME_IS_DIR : NAME_IS_FILE; ++ if (!trust_sender_filter /* a per-dir filter rule means we must trust the sender's filtering */ ++ && filter_list.head && check_filter(&filter_list, FINFO, thisname, filt_flags) < 0) { ++ rprintf(FERROR, "ERROR: rejecting excluded file-list name: %s\n", thisname); ++ exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL); ++ } ++ if (implied_filter_list.head && check_filter(&implied_filter_list, FINFO, thisname, filt_flags) <= 0) { ++ rprintf(FERROR, "ERROR: rejecting unrequested file-list name: %s\n", thisname); ++ exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL); ++ } ++ } ++ + if (inc_recurse && S_ISDIR(mode)) { + if (one_file_system) { + /* Room to save the dir's device for -x */ +diff --git a/io.c b/io.c +index c04dbd5..698a7da 100644 +--- a/io.c ++++ b/io.c +@@ -415,6 +415,7 @@ static void forward_filesfrom_data(void) + while (s != eob) { + if (*s++ == '\0') { + ff_xb.len = s - sob - 1; ++ add_implied_include(sob); + if (iconvbufs(ic_send, &ff_xb, &iobuf.out, flags) < 0) + exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL); /* impossible? */ + write_buf(iobuf.out_fd, s-1, 1); /* Send the '\0'. */ +@@ -446,9 +447,12 @@ static void forward_filesfrom_data(void) + char *f = ff_xb.buf + ff_xb.pos; + char *t = ff_xb.buf; + char *eob = f + len; ++ char *cur = t; + /* Eliminate any multi-'\0' runs. */ + while (f != eob) { + if (!(*t++ = *f++)) { ++ add_implied_include(cur); ++ cur = t; + while (f != eob && *f == '\0') + f++; + } +diff --git a/main.c b/main.c +index ee9630f..6ec56e7 100644 +--- a/main.c ++++ b/main.c +@@ -78,6 +78,7 @@ extern BOOL flist_receiving_enabled; + extern BOOL shutting_down; + extern int backup_dir_len; + extern int basis_dir_cnt; ++extern int trust_sender_filter; + extern struct stats stats; + extern char *stdout_format; + extern char *logfile_format; +@@ -93,7 +94,7 @@ extern char curr_dir[MAXPATHLEN]; + extern char backup_dir_buf[MAXPATHLEN]; + extern char *basis_dir[MAX_BASIS_DIRS+1]; + extern struct file_list *first_flist; +-extern filter_rule_list daemon_filter_list; ++extern filter_rule_list daemon_filter_list, implied_filter_list; + + uid_t our_uid; + gid_t our_gid; +@@ -534,6 +535,7 @@ static pid_t do_cmd(char *cmd, char *machine, char *user, char **remote_argv, in + #ifdef ICONV_CONST + setup_iconv(); + #endif ++ trust_sender_filter = 1; + } else if (local_server) { + /* If the user didn't request --[no-]whole-file, force + * it on, but only if we're not batch processing. */ +@@ -1358,6 +1360,8 @@ static int start_client(int argc, char *argv[]) + char *dummy_host; + int dummy_port = rsync_port; + int i; ++ if (filesfrom_fd < 0) ++ add_implied_include(remote_argv[0]); + /* For remote source, any extra source args must have either + * the same hostname or an empty hostname. */ + for (i = 1; i < remote_argc; i++) { +@@ -1381,6 +1385,7 @@ static int start_client(int argc, char *argv[]) + if (!rsync_port && !*arg) /* Turn an empty arg into a dot dir. */ + arg = "."; + remote_argv[i] = arg; ++ add_implied_include(arg); + } + } + +diff --git a/receiver.c b/receiver.c +index d6a48f1..c0aa893 100644 +--- a/receiver.c ++++ b/receiver.c +@@ -577,10 +577,13 @@ int recv_files(int f_in, int f_out, char *local_name) + if (DEBUG_GTE(RECV, 1)) + rprintf(FINFO, "recv_files(%s)\n", fname); + +- if (daemon_filter_list.head && (*fname != '.' || fname[1] != '\0') +- && check_filter(&daemon_filter_list, FLOG, fname, 0) < 0) { +- rprintf(FERROR, "attempt to hack rsync failed.\n"); +- exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL); ++ if (daemon_filter_list.head && (*fname != '.' || fname[1] != '\0')) { ++ int filt_flags = S_ISDIR(file->mode) ? NAME_IS_DIR : NAME_IS_FILE; ++ if (check_filter(&daemon_filter_list, FLOG, fname, filt_flags) < 0) { ++ rprintf(FERROR, "ERROR: rejecting file transfer request for daemon excluded file: %s\n", ++ fname); ++ exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL); ++ } + } + + #ifdef SUPPORT_XATTRS +-- +2.30.2 + diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/rsync_3.1.3.bb b/meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/rsync_3.1.3.bb index c743e3f75b..a5c20dee34 100644 --- a/meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/rsync_3.1.3.bb +++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/rsync_3.1.3.bb @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://download.samba.org/pub/${BPN}/src/${BP}.tar.gz \ file://CVE-2016-9841.patch \ file://CVE-2016-9842.patch \ file://CVE-2016-9843.patch \ + file://CVE-2022-29154.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "1581a588fde9d89f6bc6201e8129afaf"